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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On October 8, 2009, the Utah Court of Appeals received this case via pour-over
from the Utah Supreme Court. Jurisdiction is proper in this case under Utah Code section
78A-4-103(2)Q). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err in entering partial summary judgment on Dr.

Davidhizar's claims and defenses of fraud and negligent misrepresentation despite
abundant genuine issues of material fact?
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Dr.
Davidhizar's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion in Limine
Re: Fraud and Negligent Representation and in the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (R. 1190; 1632.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Utah appellate courts "review a district court's

grant of summary judgment for correctness and afford no deference to that court's legal
conclusions." Afridi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 UT 53, | 5, 122 P.3d 596.
ISSUE II:

Did the trial court err in dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and

negligent misrepresentation claims on the eve of trial for failure to plead with
particularity and for failure to timely amend when those claims had been thoroughly
litigated by the parties?

1

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

This issue was preserved below in hearings

before the trial court on August 23, 2007, and on December 18, 2007, and in the trial
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1858: 14; 1861: 28; R. 1632.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

"Because the propriety of a motion to dismiss is a

question of law, [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness, giving no deference to the
decision of the trial court." Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ^ 2, 20 P.3d 895.
ISSUE HI:

Did the trial court commit multiple errors in its application of rules

for measuring damages that resulted in an egregiously inflated damages award?
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Dr.
Davidhizar's Closing Brief and in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. (R. 1436; 1606-28; 1634.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether the district court applied the correct rule
for measuring damages is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for
correctness." Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ^f 25, 96 P.3d 893.

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no governing constitutional or statutory provisions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an attempt to enforce a contract induced by fraud. Dr.
Davidhizar agreed to invest in a business but was misled about the revenues being
generated and the status of key contracts for the company's income-producing assets.
2

The fraudulently induced contract was executed by the parties in February 2002.
Pursuant to that agreement, Dr. Davidhizar, in exchange for the assumption of $180,000
of the company's debt, was to receive a ninety-percent (90%) ownership interest in
OMC, ownership of three income-producing medical tables used for the management of
back pain, and the assignment of existing contracts related to placement of the medical
tables within medical facilities.
In entering into the agreement, Dr. Davidhizar relied on Plaintiffs' representations
regarding the revenues generated by OMC and the status of its contracts. Within days
after executing the agreement, Dr. Da\ idhizar learned that these representations were
false and he promptly rescinded the agreement. In response, Plaintiffs sued Dr.
Davidhizar, among other defendants, for claims both in tort and arising out of the
agreement. Dr. Davidhizar counterclaimcd for fraud and negligent misrepresentation,
and asserted the affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement.
In 2005, after three years of litigation and the completion of extensive discovery,
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment seeking, among olhn things, dismissal of
Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses related to fraud. Plaintiffs' summary judgment
motion addressed in detail the same allegations of fraud that Plaintiffs later claimed had
not been pled with particularity. Dr. Davidhizar responded to the motion with evidence
that Plaintiffs had misrepresented the amount of income being generated by OMC and the
status of the contracts, which, contrary to Plaintiffs' representations, were experiencing
significant problems at the time the agreement was executed. Based on these facts, the
3

trial court properly denied Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. Following that denial
and up to the pretrial hearing in the case two years later, the parties engaged in no
additional fact discovery.
On August 23, 2007, the parties attended a pretrial conference. This hearing took
place more than five years after the Plaintiffs initiated the litigation and Dr. Davidhizar
filed his Answer and Counterclaim, more than two years after the court denied Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment, and just four days before trial was set to begin. At the
beginning of the pretrial conference, Plaintiffs hand-delivered a motion in limine seeking
to exclude all evidence of fraud and negligent misrepresentation based on Dr.
Davidhizar's purported failure to plead such claims with particularity in his Answer and
Counterclaim. Although Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine had just been submitted the
morning of the pretrial conference and no response had been filed, the trial court
immediately heard oral argument on the motion. During the hearing, it became quickly
apparent that Plaintiffs and the trial court were focused not on whether Dr. Davidhizar's
claims and defenses had been pled with particularity, but whether Dr. Davidhizar had
presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. At the conclusion of the
pretrial conference, the trial court ruled that Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses should
be dismissed.
The following day, on August 24, 2007, Dr. Davidhizar filed a motion to continue
the trial and a motion to amend his Answer and Counterclaim to add detail to the
allegations of fraud. In response, the trial court indicated that it believed its ruling
4

dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses was proper but that it would allow a
response in writing to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine and would consider the Motion to
Amend.
A new hearing was held concerning these issues on December 18, 2007, at which
time the trial court once again affirmed its decision to dismiss the fraud-related claims
and defenses and denied the Motion to Amend. This erroneous ruling left Dr. Davidhizar
entirely exposed to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. The only issue left for trial was
the amount of damages.
At the trial on damages, the trial court adopted wholesale Plaintiffs' erroneous
calculation of damages without careful examination of the facts and governing law. As a
result of these errors, Plaintiffs were allowed to turn their $180,000 breach of contract
claim into a windfall judgment of almost $820,000.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dr, Davidhizar Signs a Contract Based on Plaintiffs5 Representations
1

Dr. Davidhizar is a family practice physician living in Soldotna, Alaska.

2.

In August 2001, Dr. Davidhizar provided $ 100,000 to assist Plaintiffs in

(R.21.)

financing two therapeutic tables, known as Internal Disc Decompression tables (the
"Medical Tables"), used in the management of back pain. (R. 22; 378.)
3.

In or around October 2001, a dispute developed between Dr. Davidhizar

and Fisher, one of two members of OMC, concerning ownership of the Medical Tables
5

financed by Dr. Davidhizar. (R. 367; 378.)
4.

Eventually, the parties discussed resolving the dispute by having Dr.

Davidhizar assume the remaining debt on OMC's Medical Tables (the two he had helped
finance and one more) and other OMC debts in exchange for his ownership of OMC and
the Medical Tables. (R. 378.)
5.

On February 18, 2002, the parties met in St. George, Utah to discuss this

proposed resolution. Present at this meeting were Dr. Davidhizar, Fisher, H. Eugene
Coder (the other member of OMC), Robert Nash (Dr. Davidhizar's accountant), and
attorney Darwin Fisher (Plaintiffs' attorney and the father of David Fisher). (R. 367-69;
379.)
6.

At the February 18, 2002 meeting, Dr. Davidhizar entered into an

agreement (the "Agreement") with Plaintiffs, under which Dr. Davidhizar agreed to
assume $180,000 in OMC debt in exchange for a 90% interest in OMC. This interest
included the transfer of ownership of the Medical Tables and all OMC contracts related
to the Medical Tables to Dr. Davidhizar. (R. 1587-90.)
7.

The Agreement was drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel, Darwin Fisher, and does

not contain an integration clause. (R. 382; 37-38.)
8.

Prior to entering into the Agreement, Plaintiffs made statements to Dr.

Davidhizar concerning the status of the OMC contracts (which were OMC's primary
source of income) and the amount of income being generated by these contracts.
Specifically, Plaintiffs and their representatives indicated that each of the three Medical
6

Tables was the subject of contracts with medical professionals (Dr. Cutler, Dr. Jeppsen,
and Dr. Ott); all of these contracts were in good condition and standing; nothing had
changed with the contracts; and all of the contracts were still functioning. (R. 367-70;
653; 1184.)
9.

Additionally, Plaintiffs admit that prior to signing the Agreement, they

represented to Dr. Davidhizar that the OMC contracts were "generating between $5,000
and $7,000" of income each month. (R. 1202: 33-36; 1246-47; 1203: 124.)
10. In making his decision to invest in OMC and the Medical Tables and in
deciding to enter into the Agreement, Dr. Davidhizar relied on Lhese statements. (R. 654;
1188.)
11. The night before the morning meeting where the parties executed the
Agreement, Plaintiffs gave Robert Nash some financial cloamicnls

I hcsc documents

were inadequate, "incomplete," and in "horrible form." They did not appear to include
financial statements, balance sheets, or Profit and Loss. The documents were useless in
helping to determine the true financial condition of OMC and the Medical Table
contracts. Dr. Davidhizar testified that he "didn't see any documents before the
meeting." (R. 1242: 110-12; 1210:28.)
Dr. Davidhizar Learns Plaintiffs9 Representations Were Untrue and Rescinds the
Agreement
12. Immediately following the execution of the Agreement, as Dr. Davidhizar
drove away, Fisher admitted that he was aware of a problem with the contract between
OMC and Dr. Michael Cutler. At that time, Fisher told Coder that "Dr. Cutler's contract
7

. . . was going to be changed to a lease agreement - or that he is negotiating to make it a
lease agreement." (R. 1224: 206.)
13. The day after the parties signed the Agreement, Dr. Davidhizar learned that,
contrary to the representations of Plaintiffs, Dr. Cutler planned to terminate his contract
relating to one of the Medical Tables and that he had informed Fisher of this intention
several weeks before. (R. 653; 1222: 38; 1211: 53-54.)
14.

On February 24, 2002 (just six days after the Agreement was signed), Dr.

Cutler sent notice of his intent to terminate his Medical Table contract. (R. 1221: 34.)
15. Additionally, contrary to Plaintiffs' representations at the time Dr.
Davidhizar signed the Agreement, there were issues with the Medical Table placed with
Dr. Jeppsen, another doctor under contract with OMC. Specifically, because of a dispute
between Plaintiffs and their technician assigned to operate the table, that table had been
unmanned and had generated no revenue and no new billings for approximately four to
six weeks immediately prior to the February 18 meeting. (R. 1238-39: 207; 1234-35:7981.)
16. Also, because of problems with a billing company, Plaintiffs apparently
were not receiving payments for services actually performed using the table placed with
Dr. Jeppsen. (R. 1204: 29; 1238: 207-08; 1239: 209.)
17. Additionally, contrary to the representations, Plaintiffs had only received a
total of $12,742.99 in revenue from all three tables for the approximately five months
prior to the signing of the Agreement. In other words, the Medical Tables had only
8

generated a gross average of $2,548.60 per month, far less than the $5,000 to $7,000 of
income represented by Plaintiffs. (R: 1249; 1186-87; 324; 530; 1862: 8.)1
18. Ultimately, Fisher conceded that prior to the February 18 meeting, he
"knew that we were paying out more than we were generating" from the OMC contracts.
(R. 1205: 134-36.)
19. Had Dr. Davidhizar known that Plaintiffs' representations concerning the
status of the OMC contracts and the amount of income generated by the Medical Tables
were false, he would not have entered into the Agreement. (R. 654; 1188.)
20. Upon learning of Plaintiffs' misrepresentations, Dr. Davidhizar rescinded
the Agreement. Dr. Davidhizar's rescission occurred on February 27, 2002, only nine
days after signing the Agreement. (R. 1216: 91.)
21.

After Dr. Davidhizar rescinded the Agreement, Plaintiffs continued to

operate OMC and collect income from the Medical Tables. For the entire period from
rescission through trial, the Medical Tables only generated a total of approximately
The actual revenue amounts set forth here were first presented in Dr. Davidhizar's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion in Limine re: Fraud and
Negligent Misrepresentation (the "Opposition"). (R. 1186.) In their Reply, Plaintiffs
never disputed these figures. (R. 1252.) The revenue amounts were calculated by
reviewing the amounts listed in OMC, LLC's Profit & Loss Detail (provided by Plaintiffs
during discovery) and adding the amounts listed under "IDD Management Fees" by
doctor's name (Cutler, Ott, and Jeppsen). The totals by doctor were then totaled to come
up with the final figure of $12,742.99. The numbers set forth in the Opposition contain a
slight miscalculation in favor of Plaintiffs because one negative entry of $168 was treated
as a positive entry during the initial calculation, inflating the total by that amount. The
discrepancy is small and in favor of Plaintiffs. Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal,
Dr. Davidhizar has used the figures originally set forth in the Opposition as those were
the figures before the trial court at the time it dismissed his claims.
9

$31,221 in gross revenue, a small fraction of what should have been received had
Plaintiffs' representations been true. (R. 1862: 48.)
22. After rescinding the Agreement, Dr. Davidhizar further learned that Fisher
had a pattern of entering into business deals on the basis of material misrepresentations,
including: (i) fraudulently altering a bank statement he provided to a business partner (R.
1863: 86-87); (ii) brokering first priority loans on already-encumbered property owned
by him but conveyed to family members for the purpose of obtaining new loans (1863:
67-72); and (iii) pledging property he did not own by executing a trust deed in favor of a
lender to obtain a loan for $500,000 (R. 1863: 85).
Plaintiffs Sue Dr. Davidhizar and Others
23. On May 13, 2002, Plaintiffs filed suit against Dr. Davidhizar, Robert Nash,
and Dennis McOmber. (R. 1; 20.)
24. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs appeared to assert the following
causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract (against Dr. Davidhizar); (2) Conversion of
Property (against all Defendants); (3) Slander (against Nash); (4) Declaratory Judgment
appointing Fisher as manager of OMC; (5) Interference with Economic Relations (against
McOmber); and (6) Civil Conspiracy. (R. 20-36.)
25. The Agreement states that "[i]f any party brings any legal action to enforce
the terms of this agreement, the prevailing party shall be paid reasonable attorney [] fees
and costs." (R. 38.)
26. On July 2, 2002, Dr. Davidhizar filed his Answer and Counterclaim
10

asserting, among other things, the following claims: (1) Fraud; (2) Negligent
Misrepresentation; (3) Accounting; and (4) Declaratory Judgment seeking to set aside the
Agreement based on fraud. In addition, the Answer and Counterclaim asserted the
affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement based on the representations of Plaintiffs
upon which Dr. Davidhizar relied when he executed the Agreement. (R. 63.)
27.

Following the filing of these pleadings, the parties engaged in lengthy

discovery involving all four individual parties to the lawsuit and specifically including
depositions of the following individuals: (1) Dr. Davidhizar; (2) Fisher; (3) Dr. Michael
Cutler; (4) Eugene Coder; (5) Dennis McOmber; and (6) Robert Nash. (R. 220; 223;
226; 236; 238; 241.)
28. During the course of the litigation, Dr. Davidhizar took possession of one
of the Medical Tables in partial satisfaction for the $100,000 purchase money financing
he initially provided. The other two tables have at all times remained in the possession of
Plaintiffs. (R. 1863:9-10.)
Plaintiffs Move for Summary Judgment on Dr. Davidhizar's Fraud-Related Claims
and Defenses
29.

On April 19, 2005, after discovery was complete, and almost three years

after filing their amended complaint, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking to dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's counterclaim for fraud and his affirmative defense of
fraud in the inducement. (R. 250.)
30.

In the memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment,

Plaintiffs stated the following:
11

[Dr.] Davidhizar alleges that Fisher fraudulently induced him
to sign the Agreement by stating that OMC's client contracts
had a value of $60-80,000.00. In addition, [Dr.] Davidhizar
claims that Fisher knew prior to February 18, 2002, that Dr.
Cutler had terminated his client contract with OMC and still
included Dr. Cutler's client contract in the $60,000.00 80,000.00 valuation.
(R. 320; 322-24.)
31.

Due to a change of counsel, the opposition memorandum was filed late,

and Plaintiffs moved to strike the memorandum on that basis. The denial of Plaintiffs'
motion to strike the opposition is one of two grounds upon which Plaintiffs now base
their cross appeal. (R. 677; Plaintiffs' Docketing Statement, filed Sept. 23, 2009.)
32.

In opposition to Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, Dr. Davidhizar

presented evidence that prior to entering into the Agreement, Plaintiffs had
misrepresented the income the Medical Tables were producing, and had affirmatively
represented that the OMC contracts were "in good standing," "in good condition," and
were "still functioning," when, in fact, one of the doctors had informed Fisher prior to the
February 18 meeting that he was unhappy with his contract and intended to change or
cancel it. (R. 615-16; 623-24.)
33.

Dr. Davidhizar presented additional evidence that he would not have

entered into the Agreement had he known the truth concerning these facts. (R. 624.)
34.

On January 31, 2006, the trial court ruled from the bench that Plaintiffs

were not entitled to summary judgment on Dr. Davidhizar's counterclaim for fraud and
his affirmative defense for fraud in the inducement. The trial court entered an order to
12

that effect on February 13, 2006. (R. 890; 905.)
Plaintiffs Move to Dismiss the Fraud Claims at the Pretrial Hearing
35.

For the next two years following the trial court's denial of summary

judgment, the parties engaged in no additional fact discovery. (R. 1858: 15-16.)
36.

On August 23, 2007, four days before the weeklong jury trial in the case

was to begin, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing (the "August 23 Hearing") to
determine "what final polishing . . . the [cjourt [could] help with" prior to trial. (R. 1858:
3.)
37.

At this hearing, Plaintiffs informed the trial court that they were

voluntarily dismissing all claims against then-defendants McOmber and Nash and that
they were dismissing all claims against Dr. Davidhizar except for breach of contract. (R.
1858: 3-4.)
38.

Additionally, at the beginning of the August 23 Hearing, Plaintiffs'

counsel hand-delivered to the trial court and served on Dr. Davidhizar's counsel for the
first time "Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Re: Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation" (the
"Motion in Limine"). (R. 1133.)
39.

In the Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs sought to exclude any evidence

concerning Dr. Davidhizar's counterclaims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and
his affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement. (R. 1135.)
40.

Dr. Davidhizar's counsel did not receive and did not know of the Motion

in Limine until just before the pretrial hearing was to begin. (R. 1858: 13.)
13

41.

At the pretrial hearing, in support of the Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs

argued that because Dr. Davidhizar did not plead his fraud allegations with the requisite
specificity required under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the claims should be
dismissed. (R. 1858: 5, 8-9; 1137.)
42.

Plaintiffs also argued that, as an alternative basis under Rule 9(b), the trial

court should enter dismissal sanctions against Dr. Davidhizar under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 37 on grounds that he violated the court's approved scheduling order by not
filing an amended pleading by the established deadline. (R. 1858: 8-9; 1139.)
43.

The trial court's Fourth Amended Scheduling Order provided that all

pleadings should be completed by September 15, 2004, and all dispositive motions filed
by December 3, 2004. [R. 205.]
44.

During the hearing, however, Plaintiffs and the trial court focused on

whether the evidence of fraud was sufficient to survive a summary judgment analysis.
(R. 1858: 16-35.)
45.

Plaintiffs asserted that
[w]ithout an amended pleading and that particularity, at this
point, a week away from a jury trial, we are moving the Court
to strike the affirmative defense and the counterclaim and
essentially renewing a Motion for Summary Judgment on that
basis that there is no defense to the earlier breach of contract
findings that the Court has already entered.. . .
[T]he Court has the discretion and authority through Rule 16
at this point particularly in the fact of a jury trial and tying up
jurors for a week of looking at this again under Rule 56. . . .
[I]f Rule 56 is going to mean anything to us at the end of
discovery on the eve of trial, we have to have more than just
14

an issue of fact. We have to have some evidence.
(R. 1858:9,24.)
46.

In evaluating Plaintiffs' motion, the trial court directed the parties to

proffer the evidence they would present to the jury concerning fraud. (R. 1858: 162021.)
47.

Specifically, the trial court stated:
Okay. Now, the question is, what facts are going to be shown
to the jury next week that will show clear and convincing
evidence to that jury that these contracts were no where near
the value of 5 to 7,000?

But as this case comes up to trial, I just don't think we've got
anything here of clear and convincing evidence to give to a
jury; and yes, I realize that this is mostly a rehash of the
motion for summary judgment but I feel a lot more
comfortable in where we stand today.
(R. 1858: 16,36.)
48.

In response to Plaintiffs' arguments in support of summary judgment and

to the court's request that Dr. Davidhizar proffer evidence of fraud, his counsel
attempted, without prior notice, to proffer the evidence that would demonstrate a
•genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. (R. 1858: 30-35.)
49.

Following oral argument on Plaintiffs' motion, the trial court, ruling from

the bench, granted the Motion in Limine. (R. 1858: 35.)
50.

The trial court issued this ruling without giving counsel an opportunity to

thoroughly review the Motion in Limine or to formulate a written opposition and
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without requiring Plaintiffs to meet the formal requirements set forth in Rule 56(c)
regarding motions for summary judgment. (R. 1858: 35.)
51.

In granting the Motion in Limine, the trial court thereby effectively

disposed of Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses relating to Defendants' alleged fraud
as a matter of law. (R. 1860: 5.)

Dr. Davidhizar Moves to Amend, Continue Trial, and Set Aside the Court's
Dismissal Order
52.

On August 24, 2007, the day following the August 23 Hearing, Dr.

Davidhizar filed a motion to amend, a motion to continue trial, and a motion to set aside
the trial court's August 23 order. (R. 1147; 1174.)
53.

That same day, the trial court held a hearing on Dr. Davidhizar's motions,

during which it granted his motion to continue the trial and gave Dr. Davidhizar an
opportunity to respond in writing to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine. (R. 1860: 5.)
54.

In granting Dr. Davidhizar's motion to continue the trial, the trial court

stated on the record:
I still think my basic decision granting the Motion in Limine
is correct. I don't think you have a cause of action left. So
the result is a Motion for Summary Judgment. . . . I saw no
instance where the state of the record as I see it in this lawsuit
should go in front of a jury on issues of fraud and inducement
or fraud of any kind. The standard of proof simply is beyond
what is in the record in this case. . . . I'll let you respond to
the motion. I don't think I'm going that direction unless you
can show me something that is absolutely clear as a bell that I
was wrong.
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(R.1860:5-6.)
55.

Following this hearing, the parties briefed the Motion in Limine that had

previously been decided by the trial court. The parties also briefed Dr. Davidhizar's
Motion to Amend his Answer and Counterclaim to conform to the evidence and to plead
fraud with particularity. (R. 1183; 1252; 1264; 1271.)
56.

Because the trial court had previously treated the Motion in Limine

essentially as a motion for summary judgment, Dr. Davidhizar framed his opposition to
the Motion in Limine as an opposition to a motion for summary judgment and proffered
evidence with citation to deposition and affidavit testimony demonstrating that there were
genuine issues of material fact precluding judgment as a matter of law. (R. 1183-88;
1190-94.)
The Trial Court Upholds Its Prior Ruling Dismissing the Claims and Defenses
57.

On December 18, 2007, the trial court heard oral argument regarding the

Motion in Limine and Dr. Davidhizar's Motion to Amend (the "December 18 Hearing").
During the December 18 Hearing, the trial court emphasized that its prior ruling was not
based on Rule 9(b)5s requirement to plead fraud with particularity, but was based on the
court's view that the evidence was not sufficient to avoid summary judgment:
Because I really don't have any difficulty in implying into the
pleadings of fraud in the inducement plan [sic]. It's been
spoken of for years in this litigation. It has been eluded [sic]
to either directly or indirectly for years. . . . But even if it was,
there simply isn't the proof to carry by clear and convincing
evidence.
(R. 1861:7.)
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58.

During the December 18 Hearing, the trial court further stated:
Well, in candor, counsel, one of the things that happened is I
think the court's focused more specifically on what is needed
in this case for it to go to trial. And when I focused on the
fact lhat, yes, we have disputed facts, but those disputed facts
will not meet the necessary level of proof to make it to clear
and convincing in order to prevail and I can rule on that as a
matter of law based upon the record that we have. And so it
kind of throws us back to summary judgment that I wasn't
specifically focused enough two years ago, and I think you
can rightly tell your clients it's the fault of the Court. Maybe
I should have done this two years ago looking at that evidence
and then suddenly it was focused for me at the last time when
[Plaintiffs] filed [their] motion in limine.

(R. 1861:8-9.)
59.

At the conclusion of the December 18 Hearing, the trial court ruled from

the bench that the order it had issued during the August 23 Hearing would stand: Dr.
Davidhizar's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and his affirmative defense
of fraud in the inducement would not be reinstated. (R. 1861: 30.)
60.

On April 17, 2008, the trial court entered its Order Striking Defendant's

Counterclaim. The content of this Order was later incorporated into the trial court's final
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1293; 1631-34.)
The Trial Court Awards $819,811.47 in Damages Against Dr. Davidhizar
61.

On December 15, 2008, and on May 11, 2009, with Dr. Davidhizar's

claims and defenses related to fraud and negligent misrepresentation dismissed, the trial
court held a trial solely on Plaintiffs' damages resulting from Dr. Davidhizar's purported
breach of the Agreement. (R. 1862; 1863.)
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62.

Under the Agreement, the OMC debts Dr. Davidhizar was to assume

totaled $180,000.00. These debts consisted of the following loans: (a) Anderson:
$35,000; (b) GMAC: $60,000; (c) Far West Bank Line of Credit: $40,000; (d) North
American Medical Corp.: $45,000 (collectively, the "Assumed Loans55). (R. 1595.)
63.

At trial, Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to the following damages: (a)

$154,411.95 for the Anderson Loan; (b) $160,968.54 for the GMAC Loan; (c)
$115,281.93 for the Far West Loan; (d) $28,590.03 for lease payments to Eaglecrest; (e)
$84,711.07 for the North American Medical Loan; (f) $268,891.94 for attorney fees; and
(g) $14,346.51 for additional OMC operating expenses. (R. Plaintiffs5 Trial Exhibit No.
41:001.)
64.

Since the execution of the Agreement, Plaintiffs had just made interest-

only payments on the Assumed Loans or refinanced the principal amounts through other
loans on which Plaintiffs made interest only payments. (R. 1606-09; 1620-22.)
65.

The trial court's findings reflect that the principal balance on the Assumed

Loans at the time of trial was still $180,000. (R. 1595; 1598.)
66.

At the conclusion of the damages trial, the trial court entered judgment

against Dr. Davidhizar in the total amount of $819,811.47. (R. 1634.)
67.

That judgment consisted of the following elements: (a) $154,411.95

related to the Anderson loan (originally $35,000), which included interest payments made
and fees paid, prejudgment interest on such payments, principal payments not made and
prejudgment interest on such amounts; (b) $160,968.54 related to the GMAC loan
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(originally $60,000), which included interest payments made and fees paid, prejudgment
interest on such payments, principal payments not made and prejudgment interest on such
amounts; (c) $115,281.93 related to the Far West Bank loan (originally $40,000), which
included interest payments made, prejudgment interest on such payments, principal
payments not made and prejudgment interest on such amounts; (d) $28,590.03 for
payments to Eagle Crest pursuant to a lease by OMC, which included prejudgment
interest on such payments; (e) $84,711.07 related to the North American Medical loan
(originally $45,000), which included interest payments made, prejudgment interest on
such payments, principal payments not made and prejudgment interest on such amounts;
(f) $261,501.44 for attorney fees related to legal services provided by Darwin Fisher,
other family members of David Fisher, and William Ronnow, including prejudgment
interest on these fees; and (g) $14,346.51 for additional OMC operating expenses. (R.
1634.)
68.

Despite the fact that judgment was entered against only one defendant on a

single claim for relief, no effort was made by Plaintiffs or the trial court to allocate
attorney fees incurred among the three different defendants or among the six or more
claims that had all been part of the lawsuit for seven years. (R. 1625; 1630-31; 1634;
1304; 1308; 1312; 1422; 1426; Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit No. 41:001, 098-100.)
69.

In addition to awarding all interest payments and fees related to the

Assumed Loans, including prejudgment interest on such amounts, the trial court awarded
Plaintiffs prejudgment interest on all principal amounts, despite the fact that the principal
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amounts of the Assumed Loans were still outstanding. (R. 1606-23; 1634.)
70.

The trial court granted Plaintiffs $25,257.53 in prejudgment interest on

the principal amount of the Anderson loan. (R. 1609-10; 1634.)
71.

The trial court granted Plaintiffs $43,298.63 in prejudgment interest on

the principal amount of the GMAC loan. (R. 1614; 1634.)
72.

The trial court granted Plaintiffs $28,865.75 in prejudgment interest on

the principal amount of the Far West loan. (R. 1618; 1634.)
73.

The trial court granted Plaintiffs $32,473.96 in prejudgment interest on

the principal amount of the North American Medical loan. (R. 1622; 1634.)
74.

The trial court's findings state that "[Dr.] Davidhizar is not entitled to

an offset for the tables." (R. 1634.)
75.

Neither in the judgment itself nor in the damages ruling does the trial court

address the ownership status of, or the present or future entitlement to, the Medical
Tables. (R. 1628-34.)
76.

Under the trial court's ruling and entry of judgment, Plaintiffs presumably

have the benefit (both past and future) of possessing and earning income off two of the
three tables; Dr. Davidhizar took possession of the third table. (R. 1628-34.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it summarily dismissed Dr. Davidhizar's claims and
defenses without allowing him an opportunity to present such claims to a jury. In so
doing, the trial court relied on three alternative bases for dismissal, all of which were
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patently erroneous.
First, as the trial court explained during several relevant hearings, the principal
basis for its dismissal ruling was its conclusion that Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses
would not survive summary judgment. But, as discussed below, ample evidence was
presented to the trial court that, if accepted as true (as the trial court was required to do),
was more than sufficient to support all the required elements of fraud clearly and
convincingly.
Second, as an alternative basis to summary judgment, the trial court relied upon
Rule 9(b)'s requirement that fraud must be pled with particularity. This reliance was
erroneous because, at the time of the trial court's dismissal, Plaintiffs were fully aware of
Dr. Davidhizar's specific allegations of fraud, and such allegations had been thoroughly
vetted two years earlier when Plaintiffs filed their summary judgment motion.
Third, as an additional alternative basis to summary judgment, the trial court
deemed Dr. Davidhizar's failure to seek leave to amend his Answer and Counterclaim
prior to the deadline for such amendments to be a violation of the trial court's scheduling
order and therefore subject to Rule 37 dismissal sanctions. This was a clear abuse of
discretion. Moreover, not only was the court's dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's claims
under Rules 9(b) and 37 improper, but the trial court's refusal to allow Dr. Davidhizar to
amend his Answer and Counterclaim was a clear abuse of discretion and contrary to wellestablished law.
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Compounding its substantial error in dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's claims and
defenses, the trial court also erred in adopting wholesale Plaintiffs' erroneous methods of
calculating damages that unfairly inflated the judgment in a manner plainly inconsistent
with the law. Throughout the proceedings and up until four days before the original trial
was set to begin, the case proceeded against three defendants (Dr. Davidhizar, McOmber
and Nash) and on the basis of at least six claims for relief. Only at the last minute were
the other defendants and claims dismissed, leaving only the breach of contract claim
against Dr. Davidhizar to be resolved. Yet, not only did the trial court enter judgment for
the entire amount of attorney fees purportedly incurred by Plaintiffs, without any attempt
to allocate such fees according to the various claims and defendants as required by law, it
also granted Plaintiffs almost $50,000 in prejudgment interest on attorney fees.
Additionally, the trial court not only included in the judgment all interest payments made
and fees incurred on hard money loans obtained by Plaintiffs to service the OMC debt,
but also granted almost $130,000 in prejudgment interest on the debts Plaintiffs had not
paid and for which they had not lost the time value of money. Thus, the damages award
provides for a double-counting of interest on that portion of the judgment. Moreover, the
trial court completely disregarded undisputed evidence concerning income received by
Plaintiffs from the Medical Tables during the relevant time period and gave no credit or
offset for this income. This error was further compounded by charging Dr. Davidhizar
with all expenses incurred by OMC during the same time period. Finally, the trial court
entered no findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning the disposition of the
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Medical Tables that are currently in Plaintiffs' possession, but that should belong to Dr.
Davidhizar pursuant to the trial court's ruling that the Agreement is enforceable.
In other words, the $819,811.47 judgment entered by the trial court not only gave
Plaintiffs the windfall of receiving, without allocation, all the attorney fees incurred in the
entire litigation, prejudgment interest on attorney fees, prejudgment interest on amounts
that Plaintiffs never paid, and all income Plaintiffs received while charging Dr.
Davidhizar with all expenses incurred in the generation of that income, it also gave
Plaintiffs the windfall of retaining two of the three Medical Tables, potentially valued at
over $100,000, while still receiving the complete benefit of the Agreement pursuant to
which Plaintiffs were supposed to transfer the Medical Tables to Dr. Davidhizar.
In short, and as evidenced herein, the trial court committed significant errors
below. If not corrected, these errors will result in extreme injustice to Dr. Davidhizar.
Therefore, the judgment below should be reversed in every respect.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred When It Dismissed Dr. Davidhizar's Claims and
Defenses Related to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation.
On February 27, 2002, only nine days after the parties executed the Agreement,

Dr. Davidhizar informed Plaintiffs that he was rescinding the Agreement due to
Plaintiffs' misrepresentations about the facts concerning OMC's income and contracts.
Dr. Davidhizar has never disputed that he did not (justifiably, in his view) fulfill the
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terms of the Agreement. Therefore, when the trial court summarily dismissed Dr.
Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses on the eve of trial, the court not only took all
recourse away from Dr. Davidhizar for the financial injury he had suffered as a result of
Plaintiffs' misrepresentations, but it entirely eliminated his defense to Plaintiffs' breach
of contract claim.
As discussed more fully below, the primary basis for the order dismissing Dr.
Davidhizar's claims and defenses was the trial court's view (articulated clearly on the
record) that Dr. Davidhizar could not present sufficient evidence at trial to satisfy the
clear and convincing standard of proof required for him to prevail on his fraud claims.
Yet, when the trial court entered its final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it
adopted two additional bases for its decision to dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's claims and
defenses prior to trial: (1) failure to state with particularity in the Answer and
Counterclaim the specific circumstances supporting the elements of fraud as required
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); and (2) dismissal sanctions under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 37 for failing to amend the Answer and Counterclaim prior to the
deadlines set forth in the court's scheduling order. (R. 1631-34.)

Consistent with this fact, the trial court granted partial summary judgment "without
prejudice" on February 13, 2006, conclusively determining that Dr. Davidhizar had not
fulfilled the terms of the Agreement. (R. 907.) This ruling had no practical effect at the
time because Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses remained to be adjudicated. In
fact, as discussed above, on the same day, the trial court entered an order denying
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses.
(R. 905.)
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As demonstrated below, regardless of which of the three asserted bases are
considered, the dismissal was patently erroneous. Therefore, this Court should reverse
the trial court's ruling dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses, set aside the
judgment entered against Dr. Davidhizar, and remand the case for trial on those issues.
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment.
1. The Underlying Basis for Dismissal of the Fraud Claims and Defenses
Was the Trial Court's Summary Judgment Analysis.
Even a cursory review of the trial court proceedings reveals that, although the

motion that prompted the trial court's ruling was characterized as a motion in limine
based on Rule 9(b), the real basis for the court's ruling was its summary judgment
analysis. In its Order Striking Defendant's Counterclaim (prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel
and ultimately signed by the trial court without modification), the trial court
acknowledged Plaintiffs' original purported basis for their Motion in Limine - namely,
Dr. Davidhizar's alleged failure to plead his fraud claims with particularity. (R. 1293,
1299-1301.) But the proceedings reveal that when the trial court addressed the Plaintiffs'
newly-filed Motion in Limine for the first time on August 23, 2007, the court explained
the basis for its ruling in the following terms: "[A]s this case comes up to trial, I just
don't think we've got anything here of clear and convincing evidence to give to a jury;
and yes, I realize that this is mostly a rehash of the motion for summary judgment but I
feel a lot more comfortable in where we stand today." (Statement of Facts 147.)
Similarly, during the December 18 Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, the
trial court was not persuaded that Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses should be
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rejected on the basis of Rule 9(b). In fact, the court noted that it did not "have any
difficulty in implying into the pleadings" the allegations related to fraud in the
inducement, since it had "been spoken of for years in this litigation . . . [and had] been
eluded [sic] to either directly or indirectly for years." (Statement of Facts ^ 57.) Instead,
the trial court's dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses was based on the
court's view that "there simply [was]n't the proof to carry by clear and convincing
evidence." (Statement of Facts ^f 57.)
In short, it was the trial court's erroneous conclusion that Dr. Davidhizar could not
ultimately meet the clear and convincing standard of proof that prompted the court to
dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses. As demonstrated below, this ruling was
erroneous.
2. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment on Dr.
Davidhizar's Fraud Claims and Defenses.
Summary Judgment is only proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court "review[s] the trial court's order granting . . . summary
judgment for correctness and accord[s] no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions." Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f 14, 56 P.3d 534. "In
making this determination, [this Court] view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. In other words,
"[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "Courts
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cannot weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgment motion." Hardy
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah 1988).
Although a court may consider the eventual standard of proof when evaluating
summary judgment, this consideration must be made while accepting all evidence
submitted by the non-moving party as true and drawing all legitimate inferences in its
favor. See Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App.
1994); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . . The evidence of the nonmovant
is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor"' (emphasis
added)).
Here, it is apparent that the trial court did not accept Dr. Davidhizar's evidence as
true and did not draw all reasonable inferences in Dr. Davidhizar's favor. Instead, the
trial court employed the clear and convincing evidentiary standard as a justification to
weigh the proffered evidence, make its own credibility determinations, and draw its own
inferences in order to determine whether, in its view, a jury should return a verdict in
favor of Dr. Davidhizar. Indeed, during the hearing in which the trial court initially
announced it would dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses, the argument
that the trial court solicited from the parties focused, in significant part, on what evidence
Plaintiffs would present to counter the evidence proffered by Dr. Davidhizar. (R. 1858:
20-29.)
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As demonstrated below, Dr. Davidhizar presented a substantial body of evidence
supporting the elements of fraud. The evidence is indeed clear and convincing; at a
minimum it creates genuine issues of material fact that should have been presented to a
jury.
Under Utah law, the requisite elements of fraud are the following:
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing fact;
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party
to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and
was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Republic Group, Inc. v. Won~Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In
the instant case, Dr. Davidhizar presented ample evidence which, if accepted as true,
would clearly and convincingly support a finding that all the required elements necessary
to prove fraud have been met.
First, the evidence shows that Plaintiffs made false representations about presently
existing facts which they knew to be false and which they made in order to induce Dr.
Davidhizar to enter into the Agreement. When the parties met on February 18, 2002, to
discuss a potential agreement, Plaintiffs represented that each of the three Medical Tables
was under contract with medical professionals (Dr. Cutler, Dr. Jeppsen and Dr. Ott) and
that such contracts were in good condition and good standing. (Statement of Facts \ 8.)
Plaintiffs also represented that the OMC contracts were "generating between $5,000 and
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$7,000" of income each month—a representation that had been previously made by
Plaintiffs' attorney. (Statement of Facts ^ 9.)
At the time Plaintiffs made these representations, they knew that the
representations were false. Dr. Cutler had already informed Fisher that he was unhappy
with the contract and wanted to change or cancel it. (Statement of Factsffif12-13.) Dr.
Davidhizar learned this directly from Dr. Cutler the day after he executed the Agreement.
(Statement of Facts f 13.) Moreover, Fisher told another member of OMC, Gene Coder,
as Dr. Davidhizar was driving away from the February 18 meeting, that Dr. Cutler was
negotiating to change the contract. (Statement of Facts Tf 12.) Further evidence of the
falsity of Plaintiffs' statements about the condition of the contracts may be properly
inferred from the fact that Dr. Cutler actually sent a notice of his intent to terminate the
contract a mere six days after the Agreement was executed. (Statement of Facts ^ 14.)
OMC's contract with Dr. Cutler was not the only contract experiencing problems
at the time Plaintiffs misrepresented the status of the contracts. The Medical Table
placed with Dr. Jeppsen had been having significant problems for a number of weeks due
to disputes with the Plaintiffs' technician and with the billing company. As a result of
these problems, Dr. Jeppsen's table had generated no revenue and no new billings for the
prior four to six weeks before the Agreement was executed. (Statement of Factsfflf1516.) This evidence, if accepted as true, is sufficient by itself to create a genuine issue of
material fact concerning Plaintiffs' false representations.
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Dr. Davidhizar also presented evidence that Plaintiffs' representation at the time of
the Agreement about the purported $5,000 to $7,000 of monthly income being generated
by the OMC contracts was false. In fact, the Medical Tables had only generated a gross
average of $2,548.60 per month and were not producing any profit. (Statement of Facts ^|
17.) Significantly, Fisher conceded during his own deposition testimony that at the time
of the February 18 meeting, he knew OMC was paying out more than it was generating.
(Statement of Facts 118.)
Dr. Davidhizar also proffered evidence of other frauds perpetrated by Fisher that
demonstrated intent and a pattern of misrepresentations in business deals, including: (i)
fraudulently altering a bank statement he provided to a business partner; (ii) brokering
first priority loans on already-encumbered property owned by him but conveyed to family
members for the purpose of obtaining new loans; and (iii) pledging property he did not
own by executing a trust deed in favor of a lender to obtain a loan for $500,000.
(Statement of Facts f 22.) In short, the evidence presented by Dr. Davidhizar was more
than sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the first five elements
of fraud.
The evidence proffered by Dr. Davidhizar, with all reasonable inferences drawn in
his favor, was also sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the
remaining elements of fraud; namely, that he was ignorant of the falsity of Plaintiffs'
representations and reasonably relied on such representations when he decided to execute
the Agreement. Dr. Davidhizar testified that he did not know Plaintiffs' representations
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were false and that he would not have entered into the Agreement if he had known of
their falsity. (Statement of Factsfflf19-20.)
In their Reply Memorandum in support of their initial motion for summary
judgment on Dr. Davidhizar5s fraud claims, Plaintiffs asserted that Dr. Davidhizar did not
reasonably rely on their false statements because "he had received OMC's financial
information which showed that the [Medical T]ables had lost $29,021.20," implying that
Dr. Davidhizar should have analyzed the data in a mass of incomplete and facially
indecipherable financial records that had been given to his accountant the night before, or
performed independent research to discover that Plaintiffs' representations were false.
(R. 808.)
Aside from the fact that this statement essentially constitutes an admission that
Plaintiffs' statements about OMC's income were misrepresentations, Dr. Davidhizar did
not receive OMC's financial information prior to February 18, 2002. (Statement of Facts
Tf 11.) Moreover, Dr. Davidhizar's accountant, who received some financial information
the night before the February 18 meeting, testified that because the records he received
from Plaintiffs were in such "horrible form" and because critical documents were
missing, the financial condition of OMC and its contracts was not readily identifiable
from the records. (Statement of Facts f 11.)
Further, even if he financial records had plainly shown the truth about monthly
revenues (which they did not), nothing in those records would have disclosed the truth
about problems with the contracts, which had been falsely described as in good condition.
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At the time of the Agreement, Dr. Davidhizar had no reason to question Plaintiffs'
representations as to information with which they were intimately familiar, and Dr.
Davidhizar had no reason to believe that Plaintiffs were deceiving him. "In general, a
plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without independent
investigation." Robinson v. Tripco Investment, Inc., 2000 UT App 200, ^ 20, 21 P.3d
219. "It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should be apparent to one of his
knowledge and intelligence from a cursory glance, or he has discovered something which
should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that he is required to make an
investigation of his own." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 639
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also Robinson, 2000 UT App 200 at \ 20.
Accordingly, drawing all inferences in his favor, the evidence proffered by Dr.
Davidhizar was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether he reasonably
relied upon Plaintiffs' misrepresentations when he executed the Agreement. See Conder,
739 P.2d at 638 ("Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of
each case, and is usually a question for the jury to determine.").
In sum, accepting the proffered evidence as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of Dr. Davidhizar, both of which must be done for purposes of
summary judgment, there can be no serious question that genuine issues of material fact
exist concerning the elements of fraud, even under a heightened evidentiary standard.
Indeed, the evidence proffered by Dr. Davidhizar is much more abundant and
compelling than the evidence proffered in other cases where this Court reversed the trial
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court's decision to dismiss fraud claims on summary judgment. See, e.g., Robinson, 2000
UT App 200 atfflf4-8, 15-23 (reversing summary judgment on fraud claim based on preagreement representation regarding structure of unsound building even where agreement
included an integration clause (unlike the agreement at issue in this appeal) and expressly
provided that plaintiff was buying building "as is" and not based on any prior
representation); Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292-93 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (reversing summary judgment where the plaintiffs evidence, when
accepted as true, was sufficient to create material issue of fact on fraud claim); Condas v.
Adams, 388 P.2d 803, 804-05 (Utah 1964) (reversing trial court's sua sponte dismissal of
fraud claim during pretrial conference where viewing the record in the light most
favorable to defendants the evidence was sufficient that defendants should have been
granted the opportunity to present their claim to the jury); Territorial Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (reversing summary
judgment on fraud claim and holding that the trial court's statements regarding burden of
persuasion, if relied upon to dismiss fraud claims, would have been erroneous because "it
is well settled thai a party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not 'prove' its
theory or theories, but rather it need only establish facts that 'create a genuine issue of
material fact'" (citations omitted)); Conder, 739 P.2d at 638-40 (reversing trial court's
dismissal of fraud in the inducement and finding trial court's conclusion that the
plaintiffs claims failed as a matter of law could not be supported by the facts before the
court in case where employee testified that current employer had misrepresented the
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nature of its company inducing employee to quit his former employment); Reliable
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 398 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah
1965) (reversing trial court's dismissal of fraud claim on summary judgment during
pretrial conference where appellate court could not "conclude with such certainty as to
justify ruling as a matter of law that there was no . . . fraud practiced upon the plaintiff in
obtaining the release in question").
In the instant case, Dr. Davidhizar has presented more than sufficient evidence, if
accepted as true, to allow his claims and defenses to be presented to a jury. Likewise,
and for the same reasons, Dr. Davidhizar has presented more than sufficient evidence, if
accepted as true, to allow his claim for negligent misrepresentation to be presented to a
jury. This is particularly true given that negligent misrepresentation requires a showing
of a lesser mental state than fraud ("carelessly and negligently55 versus "negligently and
recklessly55). Under Utah law, "a claim for negligent misrepresentation requires a party
to demonstrate that (1) a party carelessly or negligently makes a false representation
'expecting the other party to rely and act thereon,' (2) the plaintiff actually relies on the
statement, and (3) suffers a loss as a result of that reliance." Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT
App 101,1| 36 n. 12, 158 P.3d 562 (quoting Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, \ 9, 94 P.3d
919).
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B.

The Trial Court Erroneously Relied on Rules 9(b) and 37(b) as Grounds to
Dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's Claims and Defenses and Improperly Denied the
Motion to Amend.
The alternative bases for dismissal included in the trial court's order-Rules 9(b)

and 37(b)--were likewise improper. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing Dr. Davidhizar's request to amend.
First, the trial court erred in dismissing under Rule 9(b) where Plaintiffs waited
until the eve of trial to assert that the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims had
not been pled with sufficient particularity. Dr. Davidhizar filed his Counterclaim for
fraud and negligent representation in 2002. For five years thereafter, Plaintiffs raised no
objections to the sufficiency of the Counterclaim or the affirmative defense. In fact, in
2005, following extensive discovery, Plaintiffs actually moved for summary judgment on
Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claim and affirmative defense. In this motion, Plaintiffs made no
mention of Rule 9(b) pleading deficiencies and, in fact, addressed Dr. Davidhizar's
specific allegations of fraud. It was not until the parties' pre-trial hearing in August
2007, four days before trial, that Plaintiffs first asserted that Dr. Davidhizar's
Counterclaim and affirmative defense were defective under Rule 9(b) and that the trial
court should therefore preclude evidence at trial in support of these claims.
"The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to assure that defendants are apprised of the
allegations against them in sufficient detail to frame an adequate responsive pleading."
Prakash v. Pulsent Corp. Employee Long Term Disability Plan, No. C-06-7592, 2008
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WL 3905445, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008)3; see also U.S. ex rel McCready v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F.Supp.2d 114, 116 (D.D.C. 2003) ("The main
purpose of Rule 9(b) is to ensure that defendants have adequate notice of the charges
against them to prepare a defense.").4 Thus, "[w]here, as here, [Plaintiffs] ha[d]
extensively litigated the Counterclaim [as demonstrated by their motion for summary
judgment], any concern that [they] did not adequately understand the allegations against
them is unwarranted." Prakash, 2008 WL 3905445 at * 2.
Furthermore, courts have commonly rejected belated objections under Rule 9(b).
See, e.g., United Nat'I Records, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 33, 38-39 (N.D. 111.
1984) ("A party who fails to raise a [r]ule 9(b) objection normally waives the
requirement.55); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 181 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1263 (D.
Kan. 2002) (rejecting belated objections under Rule 9(b)). A Rule 9(b) objection raised
after filing for summary judgment is considered belated. See, e.g., Davsko v. Golden
Harvest Prods., Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (D. Kan. 1997) ("[A] rule 9(b) objection is
waived unless made as a separate motion prior to or concurrent with the filing of a
responsive pleading.55); Prakash, 2008 WL 3905445 at * 2 ("By waiting until after they
filed both a Rule 12 motion and a summary judgment motion, [the p]laintiffs waived their

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 30(f), a copy of Prakash v. Pulsent Corp.
Employee Long Term Disability Plan, No. C-06-7592, 2008 WL 3905445 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 20, 2008), is included in the Addendum attached hereto.
4
"Rule[] 9 ( b ) . . . of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [is] substantially identical to
rule[] 9(b). .. of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, federal case law, though
not binding, may guide [the Court's] interpretation of the[] rule[].55 Armed Forces Ins.
Exck v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, If 23 n.5, 70 P.3d 35.
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objections under Rule 9(b)."); Broadleaf, Inc. v. Price, 445 So.2d 308, 310 (Ala. Ct. App.
1984) ("By failing to raise th[e 9(b)] pleading defect until after his own summary
judgment motion, [the defendant] has allowed [the plaintiff] the opportunity to
supplement its fraud pleadings with affidavits and other evidentiary materials which cure
the pleading defect by supplying evidence of several false representations.").
In short, Plaintiffs should not have been allowed on the eve of trial to invoke Rule
9(b) as a technical pretext to seek dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses, and
the trial court should have rejected Plaintiffs' dilatory request to dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's
claims for reasons of defective pleading.
Second, the trial court erroneously determined that, as an alternative to Rule 9(b),
dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and negligent representation claims was an
appropriate sanction under Rules 16 and 37 because Dr. Davidhizar had failed to amend
prior to the court's scheduling order deadline. To begin, simply because the scheduling
order permitted the parties to amend pleadings up to a certain deadline, does not mean
Dr. Davidhizar was required to amend his pleadings. Additionally, although Dr.
Davidhizar sought leave to amend in response to Plaintiffs' Rule 9(b) objections, the trial
court denied that request, as evidenced by this appeal, so Dr. Davidhizar never actually
filed an amended pleading that could have been construed as violating the scheduling
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order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d) (allowing courts to award sanctions where a party "fails
to obey" a scheduling order).5
Finally, even if dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and negligent representation
claims could be justified under Rules 9(b) or 37(b), the court abused its discretion in
denying Dr. Davidhizar's motion to amend. Under Utah law, "the trial court is obligated
to freely allow motions to amend." Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^f
23, 70 P.3d 35. This is true even when the trial court has previously entered a pretrial
scheduling order. See 62A Am. Jur. 2d Pretrial Conference § 66 ("The entry of a pretrial
order does not prevent the trial court from permitting an amendment to the pleadings, and
such an amendment cannot be affected by the order."). And it is especially true when the
reason for amendment is to satisfy the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement. See Harrison,
2003 UT 14 at If 23; Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, 209 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2000)
("Leave to amend should be freely granted, especially when dismissal is based on Rule
9(b)."), overruled on other grounds by Universal Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 312 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2002); Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 248
n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Although a court may dismiss the claim [under Rule 9(b)], it should
not do so without granting leave to amend, unless the defect is simply incurable or the
plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity after being afforded repeated opportunities

5

It is the height of irony that the trial court dismissed Dr. Davidhizar's claims for
violating the court's scheduling order when Plaintiffs filed their motion asking the court
to dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's claims only four days before trial. This was a clear violation
of the December 3, 2004 scheduling order deadline for filing dispositive motions.
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to do so."); Anderson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 221 F.R.D. 250, 253 (D.D.C. 2004)
("Where a pleading does not satisfy the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b), the court
should freely grant leave to amend.").
Here, Dr. Davidhizar's request to amend was proper under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(b): "When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). That rule "provides for amendment of
the pleadings to conform to the evidence." Harrison, 2003 UT 14 at f 24. Here, the
parties had been litigating the issue of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and negligent
representation claims throughout the entire case.
Although Utah courts have not specifically addressed the issue, other jurisdictions
have held that "[w]here the evidence presented at a summary judgment hearing would
justify an amendment to the pleadings, [the court] will consider the pleadings amended to
conform to the evidence raised at the hearing." Stephenson v. Warren, 525 S.E.2d 809,
811 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); see also In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742, 748 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1977) ("[I]t is now settled that the process of amendment may be initiated by presentation
of an issue for the first time in a motion for summary judgment."); In re Bennett Funding
Group, Inc., 220 B.R. 743, 752 (Bkrtcy. N.D. N.Y. 1997) ("Rule 15(b) also applies at the
summary judgment stage of proceedings."). And Utah courts have stated that "[a]n
amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence can be made by either party at
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any time

" Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518,1f 36, 127 P.3d 1224 (emphasis

added).
Furthermore, the rationale behind Rule 15(b)—of ensuring notice and an
opportunity to address all issues— was fully satisfied in this case. It is obvious, based on
Plaintiffs5 own summary judgment motion and the discovery that occurred that Plaintiffs
had more than adequate notice of the specifics of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims. See Cowley, 2005 UT App 518 at ^j 40 (explaining that the
defendants' "own submissions to the trial court reveal that [they were] on notice" of
issues not raised in pleadings). Accordingly, Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by any
technical defects in Dr. Davidhizar's Counterclaim, and Plaintiffs should not be allowed
to prevail on this basis. See Harrison, 2003 UT 14 at 124 (holding that because the
defendant had notice and an opportunity to respond, she was not prejudiced by "technical
failings" of the plaintiffs pleadings).

II.

The Trial Court Applied Incorrect Rules When Measuring Damages at Trial.
In awarding damages to Plaintiffs, the trial court compounded its already

unmitigated error of dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses, by accepting
wholesale Plaintiffs' incorrect and unlawful damages calculation. In indiscriminately
accepting Plaintiffs' damages calculation, the trial court ended up awarding Plaintiffs
damages for unallocated attorney fees, for prejudgment interest on attorney fees, for
prejudgment interest on amounts that Plaintiffs never paid, and without consideration of
assets Plaintiffs improperly retained. Because of the trial court's acceptance of these
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improper calculations, Plaintiffs' were able to inflate their $180,000 breach of contract
claim into a final judgment of almost $820,000 against Dr. Davidhizar.
A. The Trial Court Erred Both By Granting Attorney Fees Where Plaintiffs
Failed to Allocate Such Fees in Accordance with Utah Law and By Awarding
Prejudgment Interest on Attorney Fees.
In awarding $261,501.44 in attorney fees below, the trial court failed to properly
apply the law in several significant respects. First, the trial court should not have
awarded fees to Plaintiffs where they failed to allocate their fee request according to the
various claims and defendants. Utah law is well established that a
[p]arty must categorize time and fees expended for "(1)
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would
have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorney fees."
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830
P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992)). "Claims must also be categorized according to the
various opposing parties." Id.
Utah law is also clear that in reviewing a claim for attorney fees, the trial court
"must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light
of the parties' evidentiary submissions." Id. "The trial court should also document its
evaluation of the requested fees' reasonableness through findings of fact." Id. "These
findings should mirror the requesting party's allocation of fees per claims and parties and
should support any award issued." Id. "The findings of fact, furthermore, should detail
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the factors considered dispositive by the trial court in calculating the award." Id. The
trial court failed to comply with any of these mandates.
For a majority of the litigation in this case, Dr. Davidhizar was only one of three
named defendants. Specifically, from 2002 until just prior to the original trial date in
August 2007, the named defendants were Dennis McOmber, Robert Nash, and Dr.
Davidhizar. (Statement of Facts Tf 23.) On August 23, 2007, Plaintiffs informed the trial
court that they were dismissing all claims against McOmber and Nash, leaving Dr.
Davidhizar as the only remaining defendant. (Statement of Facts <[} 37.) Despite the
existence of these other two defendants for most of the litigation, Plaintiffs' attorney fees
request and the trial court's fee award based on that request failed to allocate Plaintiffs'
fees between the various party defendants. (Statement of Facts ^ 68.) Consequently, Dr.
Davidhizar was erroneously and unfairly charged with all $261,501.44 in attorney fees
incurred by Plaintiffs for the entire litigation. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court,
"[w]hen a plaintiff has a substantial claim against one defendant, he should not have a
free ride to assert claims against other defendants with the expectation that the target
defendant will end up paying all attorney[] fees." Turtle Mgmt. v. Haggis Mgmt., 645
P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982).
This failure to allocate between the various defendants was even more egregious
given that the basis of the fees was the Agreement, under which only Dr. Davidhizar,
Fisher, and Coder were parties. Moreover, the fact that the only basis for fees in this case
was the Agreement exposes an additional error in the fee award as to allocation. For
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much of the case, Plaintiffs litigated other claims, in addition to breach of contract,
against Dr. Davidhizar and the other defendants. As set forth in their Verified Complaint,
Plaintiffs alleged claims against Dr. Davidhizar, McOmber, and Nash for conversion,
slander, abandonment, tortious interference with economic relations, and civil
conspiracy. (Statement of Factsffl[23-24.) But Plaintiffs' fee request, and the court's
award of fees, does not allocate fees between these various claims. (Statement of Facts ^
68.) This was a significant error. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. The Agreement, under
which Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to attorney fees, does not provide for fee recovery
for Plaintiffs' tortious claims against any of the defendants. Consequently, "[i]t would
violate the contract to require [Dr. Davidhizar] to pay attorney fees accrued in pursuing
these claims when the work done did not tangibly relate to the breach of contract claim."
Id. at 56.
Second, in awarding attorney fees, the trial court erroneously awarded
prejudgment interest on Plaintiffs' incurred fees. This award was contrary to longstanding Utah law holding that a party is not entitled to prejudgment interest on its
attorney fees except where the fee amount is fixed by a valid attorney fee agreement. See
James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 672 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). The reason for this rule is that until the trial court determines the requested fee
amount is reasonable, the attorney fee award is not fixed. See id. at 672-73. And an
award of prejudgment interest is only proper if "the loss is fixed as of a definite time and
the interest can be calculated with mathematical certainty." Id. at 671.
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Here, there was no attorney fee agreement fixing the amount of the fee award.
Instead, there was a contractual provision providing for reasonable fees incurred in
enforcing the terms of the Agreement.
B. The Trial Court Erred By Awarding Prejudgment Interest on Amounts
Plaintiffs Never Paid.
The trial court erred when it granted Plaintiffs prejudgment interest on principal
loan amounts that Plaintiffs never actually paid. Pursuant to the Agreement, Dr.
Davidhizar was supposed to assume $180,000 in OMC debt. After Dr. Davidhizar
rescinded the Agreement, Plaintiffs either made interest-only payments on the Assumed
Loans or simply replaced the Assumed Loans with new loans. Accordingly, at the time
judgment was entered, the principal amounts on the Assumed Loans were still
outstanding and had not been paid by Plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the trial court awarded
Plaintiffs damages for all amounts they actually paid in interest and fees related to the
loans, and then granted prejudgment interest on the principal amounts of the loans which
the Plaintiffs had not yet paid. This resulted in an unfair windfall to Plaintiffs in the
amount of $129,895.87.
The general rule under Utah law is that '"where the damage is complete and the
amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and
figures, interest should be allowed from that time.'5' Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003
UT App 201,1J78, 71 P.3d 188 (additional quotations and citations omitted) (quoting
Trail Mt Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Utah
1996)). The purpose of prejudgment interest "is to restore to the plaintiff the time value
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of money lost through a defendant's breach." Id. Thus "[u]nless [the plaintiff] actually
paid money, thus losing the benefit of the use of that money over time, the purpose of
prejudgment interest would not be served and [the plaintiff] would receive an unfair
windfall." Id. ?A^19\ see also Woolardv. JLGIndus., Inc., 210 F.3d 1158, 1176 (10th
Cir. 2000) (relying on Oklahoma law that "[t]he purpose of prejudgment interest is to
make the plaintiff whole by repayment of interest for loss of use of the money to which
the plaintiff was entitled").
To justify prejudgment interest on the principal amounts of the loans, it was
Plaintiffs' burden to prove that they actually paid those amounts prior to judgment. See
Kraatz, 2003 UT App 201 at \ 80 (holding that it was the plaintiffs burden of producing
evidence that he actually paid fees prior to judgment before he was entitled to seek
prejudgment interest on such amounts). Not only did Plaintiffs fail to prove that they
actually paid the principal amounts prior to judgment, but the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by Plaintiffs demonstrate that the principal amounts of the
loans were still outstanding and had not been paid by Plaintiffs. By erroneously granting
Plaintiffs $129,895.87 in prejudgment interest on the principal amounts of loans that
Plaintiffs did not pay, the trial court consequently granted Plaintiffs an unfair windfall
and put Plaintiffs in a better position than they would have occupied if Dr. Davidhizar
had not rescinded the Agreement.
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C. The Trial Court Erred By Failing to Address the Medical Tables and Related
Income.
Despite the fact that Plaintiffs retained the ownership and benefit of two of the
three Medical Tables that were supposed to be conveyed pursuant to the Agreement
enforced by the court, the trial court failed to make any findings or conclusions related to
these substantial assets. The undisputed evidence presented at trial was that the Medical
Tables were purchased for a total of approximately $240,000, $100,000 of which was
funded by Dr. Davidhizar. (1863: 87-88.) Yet the trial court accepted without revision
the findings and conclusions drafted by the Plaintiffs, which included only a single
unsupported conclusion as to the status of the Medical Tables: "Davidhizar is not entitled
to an offset for the tables.55 (Statement of Facts ^ 74.) This resulted in yet another unfair
windfall to Plaintiffs. That is, not only did the trial court enter a judgment that gave
Plaintiffs the entire benefit of the Agreement, but the trial court allowed Plaintiffs to
retain two of the three most substantial assets that were supposed to be transferred to Dr.
Davidhizar pursuant to the Agreement. The trial court's failure to make any findings or
conclusions concerning the status of the Medical Tables was erroneous, as was the trial
court's unsupported and unjustified conclusion that Dr. Davidhizar was not entitled to
any offset for the value of the Medical Tables.
Further, the trial court completely failed to account for the income Plaintiffs
received from the Medical Tables after rescission of the Agreement. Although the
undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs received $31,221 of income from the Medical
Tables after February 18, 2002 (Statement of Facts at ^} 21), the trial court did not apply
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this amount as a credit against the judgment. The trial court did, however, include the
entire amount of Plaintiffs' operating expenses for the same period in the judgment
against Dr. Davidhizar. This is just another example of the impropriety of the
proceedings below.
In short, not only did the trial court erroneously dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's claims
and defenses based on Plaintiffs' misrepresentations, it also accepted wholesale
Plaintiffs' unfairly inflated damages calculation, which resulted in a judgment that was
over four times the amount of Plaintiffs' original claim.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Dr. Davidhizar respectfully requests that this
Court reverse and remand both the trial court's ruling dismissing his fraud and negligent
representation claims and defenses and the trial court's damages award based on that
dismissal.
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ST. GEORGE, UTAH;. AUGUST 23, 2 0 07
JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification
may not be accurate with audio recordings.)
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Thank you everyone.

We're back on the

record for the 23rd of August, 2007 and it's 10:00 and this
is the pretrial hearing of Fisher v. Davidhizer.
you are here.

Mr. Ronnow,

Mr. Olson for the defense.

Counsel, what final polishing can the Court help
with here?
MR. RONNOW:

Your Honor, if I may and Mr. Olson can

jump in there whenever and however.

As is often the case

with these things, motions in limine in the eleventh hour.
have a motion and memorandum.

That's the original.

I

The

Court can work from the original for now I assume.
THE COURT:
MR. RONNOW:

I can, counsel.
And counsel has a copy and we also

have a pretrial order which I will come to.

Let me do a

little housekeeping and then you can give us some direction.
Last Tuesday we told you that we were talking,
trying to streamline this thing and it went from streamlined
to too big for five days to back down into 5-day trial and so
you have pending, a Motion to Strike Mr. McOmber, Defendant
McOmber's answer and counterclaim.

That is now moot because

1

we have agreed to drop all claims against Mr. McOmber.

2

has in turn agreed to drop his claim for commission.

3

will be a witness, he is out of the action as a party and our

4

pretrial order, whatever we land on will reflect that.

5

He
So — he

Last weej^ the plaintiffs were going to try the

6

intentional interference with business relations and

7

conversion based on a taking of one of these treatment tables

8

and defend the fraud that grew out of the Court's summary

9

judgment order.

That is the defendant's counterclaim and

10

affirmative defense of fraud and inducement.

11

have a few loose end claims as well.

12

Defendant's

We are now down to Your Honor, fraud.

That is the

13

defendant's affirmative defense and counterclaim for fraud as

14

the defense to their defendant's breach of contract.

15

also means that we are down to one party defendant, that is

16

Lavern Davidhizer.

17

pretrial order and now that I'm thinking about it, I think I

18

dropped that paragraph out.

19

later.

That

So we have - we'll dismiss in our

So we'll file a pretrial order

20

We are dismissing defendant, McOmber as I told the

21

Court; Robert Nash, any claims against Robert Nash; and that

22

leaves only Lavern Davidhizer.

23

I said, the Motion to Strike with regard to McOmber is now

24

moot.

25

All right?

Now then, and as

I've given the Court this morning a plaintiff's

1

Motion in Limine that is, I think, what we have to discuss

2

here.

3

of the interplay of —

In the context of the fraud defense and a combination

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. RONNOW:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. RONNOW:

Breach and fraud - Rule 9 Okay.
- 9-B and plea with specificity and

8

then what we will argue some options for the Court under the

9

Sanctions Provisions under Rule 16 and under Rule 37.

In

10

essence, Your Honor, what we have argued in that Motion in

11

Limine is that the - a verified complaint, an amended

12

verified complaint was filed in May of 2002.

13

amended complaint was ever filed.

14

defendants filed an amended answer, counterclaim and demand

15

for jury trial.

16

pleading with regard to either their defenses or their

17

counterclaim.

18

inducement as b o t h an affirmative defense and then again as

19

an affirmative claim under the counterclaim.

20

No other

In July of 2 0 02,

Defendants did not file any other amended

In relation to - the defendants pled fraud and

In the answer under the affirmative defense, the

21

parties, the defendants made only this statement, that

22

defendant was guilty of fraud upon defendants as more

23

specifically pled in the counterclaim.

24

the counterclaim, first in fact Paragraph 10 of the

25

counterclaim, the defendants pled "Based on certain financial

N o w when you get to

1

representations to Davidhizer, Davidhizer was induced by

2

Fisher to purchase OMC and enter into the alleged Settlement

3

Agreement.

4

in come of OMC were material to Davidhizer's decision."

5

then under the cause of action itself, the defendants pled

6

that uPlaintiffs owe to defendants such damages as shall be

7

proven at trial for fraudulent inducement entered into

8

alleged Settlement Agreement based on misrepresentation of

9

facts including but not limited to the assets and liabilities

10

The representations by Fisher as to the bills and
And

of OMC."

11

Now then, as the Court will recall in 2005, it

12

dealt with two Motions for Summary Judgment, one for the

13

breach of contract and one for summary judgment against the -

14

as to the affirmative defense and counterclaim of fraud and

15

the Court allowed - denied the summary judgment as against

16

Davidhizer and that's why we are here.

17

It is our position that after all of the discovery

18

and the close of the fact discovery investigation and

19

multiple depositions, there has been no amendment to the

20

allegation of what the material misrepresentation is, when it

21

occurred, where it occurred, who said what, etc.

22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

Nor even anyone who relied upon said

material representation?
MR. RONNOW:

There is not a statement as to

defendant, Davidhizer, the only defendant remaining asserting

1

that claim, no.

Now then, what we have is an affidavit of

2

Mr. Davidhizer as submitted into court of the - in opposition

3

to the summary judgment.

That was in November I believe of—

4

THE COURT:

2 0 05?

5

MR. RONNOW:

Yes or 2 0 04.

6

THE COURT: Four.

7

MR. RONNOW:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. RONNOW:

10

That's when I didn't rule until 2005.
— that pleading, that series of

pleadings began.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

MR. RONNOW: And essentially, Your Honor, what we

13

would argue is first of all, that's well past the fact

14

discovery cutoff.

15

a backdoor attempt to amend the complaint.

16

Davidhizer asserts two statements as to fraud that have

17

evolved or morphed into what has been discussed and kicked

18

around in our discussions with regard to what goes into the

19

pretrial order.

20

order that has shapely focused this issue because we couldn't

21

focus on what we were suppose to be dealing with as to the

22

fraud.

23

Let me find it here. And it is essentially
In it Mr.

It is been the discussions of this pretrial

THE COURT:

Up until this time you've not been able

24

to focus with any specificity on the elements of fraud in the

25

inducement.

1

MR. RONNOW:

That's correct, Your Honor.

Now, it's

2

important to note that Mr. Davidhizer's affidavit raises

3

issues that were not raised in terms of testimony in his

4

deposition and/or are contrary to sworn statements in his

5

deposition.

6

summary judgment that we can't create an issue of fact in an

7

affidavit that contradicts an earlier deposition and by

8

analogy, it's the same policy we're dealing with here under

9

Rule B.

That's kicks up over into the case law on

We are entitled in dealing with fraud to

10

specificity.

That's why it has its own rule.

Pleading is a

11

special matter.

12

there, Your Honor, Utah cases and a Utah Federal case, all

13

stand for the proposition that if it is not pled with

14

particularity it is either subject to a Motion to Dismiss or

15

Summary Judgment, but dismissal for failure to comply with

16

Rule 9-B.

17

interplay of the revised Rule 9, 16 and 26 or excuse me, 9,

18

16, 26 and 37, those primary discover rules and the interplay

19

or their sanctions.

20

pleading with specificity.

21

disclosures and update of disclosures.

22

of an approved scheduling order that includes among other

23

things, cutoffs for amending pleadings and cutoffs for the

24

end of fact discovery, both of which ran by stipulation

25

without any amended pleading.

The eases that we've cited in our memorandum

Now, at this point it's important to note the

Under 9 we have a requirement of
Under 26 we have a requirement of
We have a requirement

Then you have in relationship

1

to through the sanctions in Rule 16 under this Court's trial

2

management authority, particularly as focused in these recent

3

amendments to allow the Court to hold people to the fire, so

4

to speak, the Court through 16 can reach into 3 7 for the

5

sanctions there and strike answers and dismiss affirmative

6

pleadings or can prevent the —

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. RONNOW:

9

Introduction of evidence.
— presentation of evidence, exactly,

in the Motion in Limine context has those options.

And so

10

that's what we have pled and suggest to the Court by virtue

11

of the fact that no amended pleading for Mr. Davidhizer has

12

ever been filed that asserts with any particularity, with any

13

level of particularity as expressly, you know, talked about

14

in these various cases, Utah cases like the Williams vs.

15

State Farm Insurance, 1982 case that outlines the

16

particularity.

17

particularity, at this point, a week away from a jury trial,

18

we are moving the Court to strike the affirmative defense and

19

the counterclaim and essentially renewing a M o t i o n

20

S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t on the basis that there is no defense to the

21

earlier breach of contract findings that the Court has

22

already entered.

Without an amended pleading and that

for

Now —

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RONNOW:

25

THE COURT:

But — there's one more thing —
- counsel, let me make sure I've got

this setup right.

Through all you processes of discovery,

deposition of Mr. Davidhizer, interrogatories to Mr.
Davidhizer, it was only unt il you got to this affidavit that
was filed in opposition to your Motion for Summary Judgment
that these claimed issues c)f fact, elements of fraud in the
inducement were ever either* pled or testified to.

I've got

that right:)
MR. RONNOW:
Honor.

Pled, yes.

Let me modify that just slightly, Your

Testified to, the problem is that we have

vague testimony that's all over the park.

Let me give you

the factual scenario which would be the focus for the alleged
fraud as we're now discussing it in a pretrial order.

Do you

need to take care of that, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
of it.

Actually counsel, you need to take care

Judge Ludlow wants you in courtroom C briefly and so

I'll break right now and rather than have the unseemly scene
of two judges playing tug-a-war with you being the rope,
we'll just be still and let you go talk to Judge Ludlow about
whatever is cooking in there.

I'll take a break.

MR. RONNOW:

What is cooking in there?

THE COURT:

I have no idea but we'll...

(Whereupon a recess was taken)
THE COURT:

Please be seated.

Thank you everyone.

Now having settled much ado about nothing, Mr. Ronnow, we'll
let you go ahead with your arguments regarding your Motion in
10

1
2

Limine.
MR. RONNOW:

I was able to wrangle a stay of the

3

contempt order, Your Honor, so I have time to finish this.

4

Gather my thoughts again.

5

The affidavit sounds in pleading, the issues in

6

discovery - sound as if it were pleading raising two issues,

7

misrepresentation as to what has been referred to by various

8

witnesses as the value of OMC contracts and then a

9

representation or alleged representation as to the status of

10

those contracts, that they are in "good standing."

11

second one, in the discovery there is no evidence, no

12

testimony from Davidhizer in his deposition, in his

13

disclosures or in his interrogatories that runs to any

14

statement as to the status of contracts —

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. RONNOW:

As to the

Or the standing of contracts.
— or standing of contracts or uses the
u

17

phrase, puts the phrase

in good standing" into the

18

plaintiff's mouth at any time or anyplace.

19

say before I got called into the other courtroom, the

20

affirmative fraud arises out of a negotiation session that

21

occurred on February 18, 2 0 02 that took several hours on a

22

Sunday afternoon and some communication that led up to that

23

m e e t i n g and as a result of that m e e t i n g there was a contract

24

that is c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a Settlement A g r e e m e n t for the

25

p u r c h a s e of O M C .

Now, I started to

11

1

Now then, as I said in answer to your question,

2

Your Honor, in the discovery, we were with all various

3

witnesses, we were all over the park as to numbers and who

4

said it and how it was said and what was said and I'll say

-5

one more thing and then leave it to the Court and Mr. Olson

6

to respond to that.

7

In trying to focus that statement for purposes of

8

the pretrial order, and in turn for purposes of weeding out

9

exhibits as we weeded out parties and claims and what not, it

10

came down to a reference to what will become an exhibit, is a

11

document called Reconciliation that contains on it a

12

statement that the value of OMC contracts and then range,

13

5000 times 12 for $60,000,

14

That's all it says.

$7,000 times 12 for $84,000.

All right?

15

In discussion with counsel the question was simply,

16

what is the statement, where in our last discussion was - and

17

frankly it's what prompted this motion at the late hour was

18

that he was going to rely on or at least as of yesterday -

19

and again Mr. Olson can explain where they are now - rely on

20

this Reconciliation as a statement of fraud.

21

question as to —

22

THE COURT:

In followup

As a statement of material fact which

23

was relied upon, which was knowingly and intentionally

24

misrepresented?

25

MR. RONNOW:

Bingo.

That's right, Y o u r Honor, and
12

1

that's why we're here in a Motion in Limine.

2

are.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Olson, let me give you a

4

chance to respond.

5

or there wouldn't be a lawsuit.

6

That's where we

You've obviously got another side of it

MR. OLSON:

Sure, Your Honor and, Your Honor, I

7

just read this motion of the first time about an hour ago.

8

I'm going to apologize if I'm a little scattered here but I

9

think I've got some thoughts on it.

I think what's important

10

to notice is that although it's characterized as a Motion in

11

Limine, it's a really a Motion to Dismiss.

12

would go to what evidence I'd be presented and —

13
14

THE COURT:

Motion in Limine

And if it cuts out the heart of your

lawsuit, it might as well be dismissed.

15

MR. OLSON:

- basically a Motion to Dismiss.

16

only other issue remaining is the damages on breach of

17

contract.

The

18

THE COURT:

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

19

MR. OLSON:

But yeah, it's b a s i c a l l y a Motion to

20

D i s m i s s the fraud claim.

Now M r . R o n n o w was correct

21

there were amended scheduling orders in this case that pretty

22

much everything was cutoff back in, I want to say

23

years ago; in fact, before I even got into this case, the

24

discovery deadline had run.

25

motion deadlines.

x

that

03, many

But along with that as did the

This is essentially a Morion to Dismiss,
13

1

dispositive or otherwise, it was due years ago.

2

curious is, this case has been pending since 2002.

3

gone

4

judgment and the Thursday before Monday trial is the first

5

time we're coming to, heh, you didn't plead fraud with

6

particularity five years ago.

through extensive discovery.

7

And what's
They've

We've gone through summary

The problem with that argument is that the issues

8

really have been tried through the (inaudible) of the

9

parties.

So at this time, if the Court is going in that

10

direction, I would make a motion that the pleadings be

11

amended to conform with the evidence under Rule 15-B,

12
13
14

THE COURT:
counsel?

What evidence would they conform with,

That's why I want to look at that.
MR. OLSON:

Yeah, let's go to that because I think

15

what's important in showing that these issues have been tried

16

at the implied consent of the parties is we go back to the

17

motions for summary judgment.

18

summary judgment on the issues of fraud, negligent

19

misrepresentation, all of those issues, not once mentioning

20

failure to plead with particularity,- rather, in their

21

statements of undisputed facts they go through and state the

22

very representations that we're talking about.

23

statement of undisputed fact, Paragraph 15, talks about the

24

representations, the financial representations that the

25

contract were valued at $60,000 to $80,000 per year.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for

Their

14

1

They go through - I'm going to try to circle some

2

here - I'm missing a page - Paragraph 23 was a statement by

3

David Fisher that the contracts were in good standing.

4

we came back to my reply and we go through a number of these

5

issues, we say, Nope, look here in the deposition record.

6

These were the representations that were made, they're not

7

true.

8

good standing.

9

made that these things were making $5,000 to $7,000 monthly.

When

The representation was made that the contracts were in
That's not true.

The representations were

10

And that's not true.

11

look at these depositions where this was said, this was said.

12

Ultimately the Court came to the conclusion, well, we've got

13

disputed issues of fact.

14

fact are the very representations that we're talking about.

15

They were all flushed out through discovery and up until

16

today, you know, I think everybody has had a pretty good

17

handle on what this fraud claim is all about.

18

Rule 15-B, it's really not even permissive by the Court - it

19

says shall -

20

to the evidence w h e n issues have b e e n tried by the

21

consent of the parties."

22

were in summary judgment, maybe longer and those issues were

23

thoroughly argued and discussed in summary judgment and

24

summary judgment was denied and we've had no discovery since

25

that time.

u

They came back and reply and said, no,

And all of those disputed issues of

In looking at

T h e Court shall allow an amendment to conform
implied

It's been, been two years since we

In fact, all we've done is prepare for trial a
15

1

couple of times when it's been bumped.

2

weeks away from trial last November and this issue was never

3

brought up.

4

We were, I think, two

So I think that it's too little too late at this

5

point in time.

I think the Court does have to allow an

6

amendment to conform to the evidence and as we look through

7

the undisputed facts and the facts in both their motion for

8

summary judgment, my response, their reply, it's clear the

9

parties are arguing about those very representations.

At the

10

meeting on February 18, 2 0 02, a representation was made that

11

contracts are making $5,000 to $7,000 monthly.

12

THE COURT:

Is that reconciliation document Mr.

13

Ronnow just pulled out, was that on the table at the time of

14

that meeting?

15

MR. OLSON:

Yes.

16

THE COURT:

All right.

And those were the

17

representations that your client relied upon in order to

18

purchase OMC?

19

MR. OLSON:

Correct.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, the question is, what facts

21

are going to be shown to the jury next week that will show

22

clear and convincing evidence to that jury that these

23

contracts were no "where near the \falue at 5 to 7,000?

24
25

MR. OLSON:
going to show that.

The accounting documents themselves are
I mean, we've got an accounting of OMC
16

1

from 2 00 0 - I mean I've seen tax returns through 2 0 05.

The

2

very accounting records that make up the backbone of this

3

entity are going to show the contracts were not making that.

4

THE COURT:

How much were they making?

5

MR. OLSON:

I'd probably have to have the document

6

in front of me to give you a definitive answer on that but

7

the other issue of evidence that goes to that, again this

8

kind of goes to the second representation as to the status of

9

the contracts and I think we can look at this two ways,

10

whether, you know, it was represented in the meeting that

11

hey, the contracts with all the doctors are good or if after

12

the facts my client finds out the contracts were in trouble,

13

that certainly goes to what are these things making.

14

maybe evidence of the falsity of that representation.

15

fact pattern, the testimony that's going to come out is that

16

the day after signing this contract, my client visited with a

17

doctor up north who my client will testify said, "Hey, I've

18

terminated that contract," and that's what kind of led to the

19

downfall, just the day after the signature of this agreement.

20

So there's going to be testimony by not only my client but by

21

two other witnesses that that was the representation of the

22

doctor.

23

It
The

The doctor will be on the stand as well.
So I think that there is plenty of evidence in the

24

record of discovery,

in the record we get from che

summary

25

judgment, that we've k n o w n what the issues of this case are
17

1

for a number of years.

2

get ready to prepare this case for trial.

3

that we're talking about, everybody has disputes as to what

4

the representations were, whether they were urue or false and

5

those are the issues that the jury needs L O decide.

6

There's no real surprise today as we
Everybody knows

This late in the game it's inappropriate to come

7

forward and have the case dismissed for failure to plead with

8

particularity and we've already been through all of those

9

issues.

It would be my motion to the Court to allow

10

amendment to the pleading to 15-B to conform with the

11

evidence.

12

THE COURT:

Counsel, if I were to allow your

13

amendment to the pleading the only way I can possibly

14

reasonably do it is to include these issues in the pretrial

15

order with just kind of a summary, the pleadings are amended

16

to conform with this order in that fashion.

17

back and using up all the trees to redo your counterclaim and

18

affirmative defenses would be kind of brainless at this stage

19

but that would be a sensible way of doing it, wouldn't it,

20

counsel?

21

MR. OLSON:

Sure.

I mean, going

I think the case law that

22

follows 15-B is pretty clear that an actual amended document

23

is not required.

24
25

TTIE COURT:

Well, that's true.

vlhat do you say to

the Rule 16 and 27 concerns though, that none of these things
18

1

carry the weight that you get them beyond Mr. Ronnow's

2

motion?

3

going to be clear and convincing evidence which is short of a

4

criminal case, the highest burden that we have and if we have

5

one document that gives a range and accounting that gives a

6

lesser range I'm presuming, and a doctor saying, "Well, my

7

contract was non-existent at the time this sold because I'd

8

terminated it."

9

the discovery process.

His real concern is that your burden of proof is

10

This has all been on the table throughout

MR. OLSON:

Yeah, absolutely, and I think there's

11

more.

12

is going to say, it's not just that.

13

evidence from a number of witnesses, most of the parties that

14

were at this meeting, that are going to be contrary to those

15

representations.

16

know, we probably ought to have a finder of fact decide

17

whether it's clear and convincing.

18

enough on the table for the judge today to say, yeah, we

19

probably ought to let a jury decide whether we've met that

20

burden.

21

If we want to sit down and discuss what each witness
There is plenty of

So I think it really comes down to, you

THE COURT:

All right.

I think there's certainly

Mr. Ronnow, let me give you

22

a chance to respond to this basically timeliness argument

23

but-

24

MR. RONNOW:

25

THE COURT:

If I may, Your Honor.
— it goes to the heart of it.
19

1

MR. RONNOW:

First of all, Rule 15 as to amending

2

pleadings to include evidence or claims that are tried by

3

consent is a rule that is applied after the trial.

4

not tried issues in discovery.

5

discovery.

6

operation by the Court under Rule 16 or the very application

7

of motions in limine is to preclude and prevent just such an

8

occurrence.

9

would —

10

We have

We don't discover issues in

There has been no trial and indeed, the very

We are not trying this issue by consent, so I

THE COURT:

In fact, your heels are being drug into

11

the ground over that threshold.

12

MR. RONNOW:

Screaming and yelling, and so I would

13

say that Rule 15 does not apply to the circumstance.

14

going through Rule 16, Paragraph 5 and 6, the Court's

15

authority to facilitate settlement of the case which I think

16

includes resolution without settlement, but resolution; and

17

6, considering all matters that may add in the disposition of

18

the case, we come not to a motion to dismiss but I think the

19

Court has the discretion and authority through Rule 16 at

20

this point particularly in the face of a jury trial and tying

21

up jurors for a week of looking at this again under Rule 56.

22

THE COURT:

Now

Counsel, let me put the burden on you

23

that the Appellate Court would often do so and apparently

24

according to my colleagues on the appellate bench, they get

25

criticized for this a great deal, if you were to marshal all
20

1

the evidence supporting Mr. Olson's client's claim for fraud,

2

you would have the reconciliation sheet, you would have the

3

testimony of the doctor that he didn't think his contract was

4

in good standing and what else?

5

marshaling what else have you seen on the other side?

6

MR. RONNOW:

If you had to do the

Let me marshal it but as I do, also

7

marshal a little bit of what would stand along side of that,

8

all right, Your Honor?

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. RONNOW:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
Using that standard of review, it

11

would also, or it should and I would argue to the Court of

12

Appeals, be marshaled and reviewed through the lens of clear

13

and convincing, all right?

14

did the finder of fact have sufficient evidence to reach a

15

conclusion of fraud, for example —

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. RONNOW:

And so the issue is going to be

By the requisite burden of proof.
— by the requisite burden of proof?

18

Now, let's go to Dr. Cutler that has been mentioned here.

19

His name is Dr. Cutler.

20

can't recall for sure if I told Mr. Fisher before February

21

18th that I was dissatisfied with the contract, I may have.

22

That was after a series of badgering questions by the defense

23

counsel over objections and so the flip side of that is also

24

implicit in that testimony is, I may not have.

25

Notice of Termination not before as required under this

His testimony actually is that I

He filed a

21

contract, not before February 18, but a week after, after he
had been visited by the defendant here, Dr. Davidhizer, and
part of his testimony is he didn't want another doctor
managing his practice, all right?
Now, in addition, there will be facts marshaled
that indeed he continued in the contract.

Then he

renegotiated the contract and continued working with OMC on
that table in an arrangement for months after this.

There

will also be evidence marshaled that the contracts that the
Defendant Davidhizer had in his hands as part of what we'll
characterize as a due diligence kind of review, provide right
in them a unilateral right to terminate the contract with 3 0
days written notice.

So no matter what, under reliance in

the fraud standard, he had - Dr. Davidhizer has facts that he
has to rely on or that he has to deal with in relying on and
he's got a contract that gives him a unilateral right to
terminate in 3 0 days.

So regardless of the status of

February 18, the fact that Dr. Cutler actually terminates
this contract after that, is part and parcel of his burden of
inquiry before he signs that contract and cannot be pointed
to as reliance, evidence of reliance on any material
misrepresentation of a currently existing fact that he
reasonably relied on.
In addition Your Honor, we have - back to the
particularity, we have statements that go all over the board
22

1

as to what was and. wasn't said even among these witnesses

2

that Mr. Olson was —

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. RONNOW:

Were at the February meeting.
— referring to regarding the February

5

meeting.

6

his deposition under oath says, after going through the terms

7

of the contract Mr. Fisher asks him, says a leading question

8

or asks him, "Did you fulfill the terms of the agreement?"

9

For example, Dr. Davidhizer himself at one point in

"No."

10

"Why not?"

11

"Because the information I used that was given to

12

me to induce me to make this agreement was false."

13

"What specific information was that?"

14

"That the machines were generating $60,000 to

15

$80,000 a year."

16

"Any other information?"

17

"No."

18

Now then, that's exactly what the statement says —

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. RONNOW:

21

Reconciliation

says.

— in part or at least that n u m b e r is

there.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RONNOW:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
The reconciliation says OMC contracts,

24

plural.

Now in trying to clarify this, Dr. Davidhizer says

25

that the reasons - the question is leading, "That's the
23

1
2
3

reason why you say $60,000 to $80,000 was not correct?"
u

Yeah.

It says on the sheet of paper" referring to the

reconciliation, "that we had at the meeting" that Dr. Cutler -

4

You okay?

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. RONNOW:

7

— that the paper, he's referring to this

No, but we'll get through it counsel.
I've never had such an affect.

8

reconciliation, the paper we have at the meeting,

9

Cutler was doing $80,000 a year."
u

10

anywhere

11

$60,000 a year."

u

That Dr.

It doesn't say that

And I assumed the other one, Dr. Jepson was doing

12

So on a clear and convincing standard, let's - let

13

me just set that much out there under the review standard of

14

the Court of Appeals.

15

Now, let me suggest to the Court another way to

16

view this and that is in relationship to a summary judgment

17

but under some cases from the Federal Supreme Court that have

18

said that if Rule 56 is going to mean anything to us at the

19

end of discovery on the eve of trial, we have to have more

20

than just an issue of fact.

21

In this case, we have to have some evidence that clears the

22

bar of clear and convincing.

23

right?

24

we're looking at e x h i b i t s , and the question, for e x a m p l e ,

25

yesterday, counsel, do you m e a n to say that we have,

We have to have some evidence.

We've got a jury on tap, all

And we've got this situation here where again, as

that
24

1

this is the value of OMC contracts?

2

two contracts out of three for the table without regard to

3

multiple contracts that run to collecting and billing that

4

have nothing to do with the tables but are OMC contracts?

5

And again, in terms of marshaling, depending on where the

6

Court lands on what this statement is, we would say that we

7

will present ample accounting evidence that has those numbers

8

within range.

9

Or is it the value of

Now —

THE COURT:

That was my next question, counsel.

10

Mr. Olson says that he's got accountings that will show that

11

the $5 to $7,000 range is grossly overstated I would presume

12

in order to make that clear and convincing.

13

accounting evidence show?

14

MR. RONNOW:

What does the

Well, Your Honor, let me explain that.

15

First of all, we're all using the same accounting

16

information.

17

billing of these three therapy tables, they had only been

18

online for a very short time.

19

aspect of this review that grows out of Rule 9 and the

20

elements of fraud in our case law in terms of reasonable

21

reliance.

22

these tables in his own practice.

23

evidence - a history of involvement with the tables at issue

24

in our case as well as the receipc and access to ongoing

25

documentation and accounting long before he gets to the

Secondly, in relationship to the operation and

Now here is another critical

Dr. Davidhizer is a DO, osteopath.

He has one of

He has - we will show in

25

So

1

February meeting.

2

is going to be ratcheted way up on clear and

3

because of all the information that he h a s .

4

the whole issue of reasonable

reliance

convincing

N o w then, what led to this is another exhibit

which

5

w e will be presenting to the jury which I have come to call

6

the February 7-11 letter b e c a u s e the first page is dated the

7

7 t h , the next two page are dated the 11 t h .

8

Fisher, representing as counsel for OMC, puts together a

9

letter saying, we've got this disputed issue of a

In it Mr. D a r w i n

10

partnership.

11

defendant's camp - and what you want.

12

saying and he knocks out a b u n c h of numbers.

13

takes is all that is available in the accounting.

14

these tables less than two m o n t h s history and on one of them

15

two months history.

16

six weeks of history of b i l l i n g but very little in the way of

17

collecting because of such a short time the p i p e l i n e hadn't

18

b e e n filled.

19

here are the numbers.

20

m y formula.

21

but surely we agree that there should be some v a l u e .

22

have some other formula, some other number, bring it to the

23

table and let's discuss it on February 18.

24
25

Here's what you are saying - meaning

the

This is what we are
N o w what he
On one of

O n all three tables, about two m o n t h s to

In that letter M r . Fisher suggests, listen,
We'll give you the numbers.

This is

W e may not agree as to the value of these things

On that b a s i s , chat accountsag information
even rise to the level of data or as summarized

If you

doesn't

in this
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1

reconciliation as data that can be relied on in fraud.

2

really is firsu, an approximation; second, an opinion; and

3

third, am open invitation for a settlement discussion.

4

Now in addition to the marshaling —

5

THE COURT:

It

And it's your position that Dr.

6

Davidhizer in coming to that settlement discussion would have

7

brought his own experience with his own table.

8
9

MR. RONNOW:

That's right, and in that vein, Your

Honor, again, back to our appellate marshaling...

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RONNOW:

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

...Dr. Davidhizer is there with his

12

own insider, a man by the name of Eugene Coder who had been

13

the manager for OMC up until December prior to this February

14

meeting and who had on his own computer all kinds of

15

documents, accounting records that reflected all the same

16

information.

17

That's one advisor.

He had a second advisor by the name of Robert Nash

18

who had served as his own accountant and tax accountant and

19

financial advisor in other entrepreneurial business ventures

20

who was at that table.

21

meeting, both the - the plaintiffs deliver a comprehensive

22

packet in large part which will become one of our exhibits,

23

of current accounting data to Mr. Nash, the accountant, to

24

Mr. Coder at Mr. Coder's residence, the insider, former

25

manager.

The night before the February 18

While there's a dispute as to whether they looked
27

1

at it, they start off by saying, Oh no,

2

Nash comes to an admission in his deposition that yes, we

3

did.

4

They come in the next morning, February 18 and ask for

5

additional documentation and information clearly showing that

6

they had reviewed the documents if they wanted to see more.

7

And the request was focused by Mr. Coder based on his

8

experience with the accounting reports that could be

9

generated.

we didn't look at it.

They make their own projections which will be exhibits.

Therefore, all of this information in summary,

10

however, it gets defined as a statement or a

11

misrepresentation —

12
13
14

THE COURT:

Has to be overlaying with all that

other context.
MR. RONNOW:

— and weighed under the clear and

15

convincing standard as to reliance, reasonable reliance

16

between this group at arms length with their own, if not

17

expertise, at least facility for these numbers; availability

18

of the numbers; duty under the case law if they have

19

information they simply cannot rely on other statements; and

20

therefore again under clear and convincing marshaling, I

21

don't think they're going to get there.

22

Back to Rule 56 and Rule 16, on the eve of hauling

23

jurors into the courtroom to spend a week away from their

24

businesses, I chink we are clearly within che realm of Rule

25

16 if the Court chooses based on this evidence and a clear
28

1

and convincing standard to say it isn't there.

2

let me say one

3

Now, before -

more thing and then I'll sit down and shut up.

If in the alternative we're moving forward with

4

trial, we simply have to have some sort of focus on what:

5

these statements are back to Rule 9.

6

particularity because of the jury instructions that will go

7

with that and the clear and convincing standard.

8

aren't allowed to throw a shovel full of gravel at the jury

9

saying one of those rocks is fraud.

Rule 9 requires

They simply

We aren't required to

10

assume the burden of defending against that flock shot.

11

That's why Rule 9 is there.

12

THE COURT:

Mr. Olson, I'm going to give you a

13

chance to respond because Mr. Ronnow and I got into some

14

areas that I think you need to give me your take on,

15

MR. OLSON:

counsel.

Thank you, Your Honor and I guess the

16

first issue that I wanted to point out to the Court, Mr.

17

Ronnow said we've never consented to try these issues, we

18

haven't gone through trials so under the Rule 15-B analysis

19

t h e r e ' s no implied consent to try these issues

20

21
22

—

THE COURT:

I read Rule 15 m u c h broader than that,

MR. OLSON:

That's my question, why did they seek

counsel.

23

summary judgment if we didn't consent to trying these issues?

24

He sought summary judgment on those very facts.

25

seek a morion to dismiss at that time because we didn't plead

They didn't
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1

with particularity; rather they said, we've got all these

2

issues of fraud, we warn: summary judgment: on uhem.

3

they've consented to try these issues.

4

any question of that.

5

So

I don't think there's

Now given the amount of, 1 guess marshaling that

6

we've gone through, it almost puts me in a position where I

7

need to sit down with you, Judge, and go witness by witness,

8

this is what they're going to say and I'm happy E O do that.

9

But essentially we've got Dr. Davidhizer at the meeting.

10

He's going to testify with regard to the representation of

11

value that was made.

12

going to testify as to the representations that were made.

13

Eugene Coder was at the meeting.

14

the representations that were made.

15

going to testify and I've already alluded to that the next

16

day he goes to one of the doctors that has one of the

17

contracts, I already told Fisher I'm not moving forward with

18

this thing, I'm done with it.

19

m e e t i n g as w e l l .

20

C o d e talked to D r . Cutler after the fact and he's going to

21

say the same thing.

22

the meeting who admitted there was a problem with the Cutler

23

contract.

24
25

Robert Nash was at the meeting.

He's

He's going to testify as to
Dr. Davidhizer is also

Dennis McOmber was at that

He's going to say the same thing.

Gene

Gene Coder talked to David Fisher after

That's what he's going to say.
So we come out of the meeting, the representation

as to, Hey, these machines are making this kind of money and
30

1

some of those witnesses also say, a representation that the

2

contracts are in good standing, when they in fact are not.

3

THE COURT:

Counsel, how long had Mr. Coder been

4

away from OMC?

5

months and maybe a minimum of about six weeks by the 18 th of

6

February meeting?

7

I see it as a maximum of two and a half

MR. OLSON:

It's a very good question.

In fact, at

8

the time of the February 18 meeting,' he was still a member of

9

OMC.

This is an LLC, he still held a membership interest.

10

There's some question as to, you know, at what point in time

11

he quit acting officially and calling him president capacity

12

but the evidence is also going to show from testimony from

13

Eugene Coder and testimony from Robert Nash who was the

14

accountant assisting Davidhizer, that Gene Coder was not

15

sophisticated in financial affairs.

16

Fisher who was the chief financial officer.

17

didn't know a balance sheet from an income statement.

18

it's unfair to say that they had an insider with all this

19

financial information that was going to bring it to

20

D a v i d h i z e r and make sure he u n d e r s t o o d everything that was

21

going on.

22

he'll testify to that.

23

In fact, it was David
Gene Coder
So

I don't think Coder knew what was going on and

Robert Nash will testify that yeah, they brought

24

some accounting documents over the night before they had this

25

meeting, but quoting Robert Nash, he says they were in
31

1

horrible form.

2

accounting principles, I couldn't make heads nor tails from

3

them.

So as we come into a meeting the next day —

4
5

They weren't according to generally accepted

THE COURT:

Mr. Nash does have the sophistication

to make that judgement?

6

MR. OLSON:

He does.

He's got the education,

7

background.

He's worked as a tax accountant, certainly

8

understands the field and they're going to come in the next

9

day and say, they gave us representations we had to rely on.

10

We didn't have sufficient data to look at it and make a

11

conclusion for ourselves to prove or disprove that

12

representation.

13

I'm trying to think who else we need to deal with

14

here.

And yeah, Dr. Cutler is going to say, I don't

15

remember.

16

But we're going to have two witnesses that meetings with them

17

in which Dr. Cutler said, I told David Fisher already I'm

18

terminating this contract.

19

going to say I talked to —

I may have told them beforehand, I may not have.

We've got a third witness who is

20

THE COURT:

Now,

-

21

MR. OLSON:

— him a couple of days later —

22

THE COURT:

— let's talk about those two witnesses

23

that said I cold David Fisher I'm going to terminate this

24

contract.

25

What will those witnesses tell the jury?
MR. OLSON:

They met with Dr. Cutler the day after
32

1

the contract was signed.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. OLSON:

They met with him for the purpose of

4

okay, we've made a shift in OMC 7 we're now in charge, we're

5

going to be moving forward on this thing. And Dr. Cutler's

6

response was, I already told David Fisher I'm terminating

7

this contract, I'm not moving forward with it.

8

THE COURT:

Now, who are those witnesses?

9

MR. OLSON:

Lavern Davidhizer and Dennis McOmber.

10

THE COURT:

Okay, those two.

11

MR. OLSON:

It's Gene Coder who talked to Dr.

Thank you.

12

Cutler on the telephone a couple of days later and confirmed

13

that veiy same story.

14

THE COURT:

And then shortly thereafter - if I get

15

the facts right - shortly after Gene's call to Dr. Cutler,

16

the actual letter came to OMC,

17

contract."

18
19

MR. OLSON:

u

I'm terminating the

That's correct.

It was within about

four da;ys, somewhere in that b a l l p a r k .

20

THE COURT:

All right.

21

MR. OLSON:

And then the other evidence of that,

22

although it's not language of termination, but Darwin Fisher

23

is going to be on the stand and on cross examination he's

24

going to agree with what Dr. Cutler said,

25

with it," or at last informed David Fisher, "I wasn't happy

U

I wasn't: happy
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1

with the contract." Although that's not quite termination,

2

there's certainly some suggestion there that there was a

3

problem with the contract.

4

sitting down and saying these contracts are making $5 to

5

$7,0 00 a month but they're not saying, but we've got a

6

problem with Cutler's contract, he's not going to be doing

7

that any more.

8
9

Now at this meeting they're

There's also going to be evidence from Dennis
McOmber regarding the Jepson contract, that that contract

10

hadn't generated anything in months because of the

11

combination of they had no tech to run the table and they

12

were having billing problems through some other billing

13

company up in Park City.

14

jeopardy which we didn't know about until well after the

15

fact.

16

So the Jepson contract was in

The other issue - and again see where they're

17

coming from in saying we've got accounting that says

18

contracts were making what we represented, I'm saying we've

19

accounting saying they weren't and here's the discrepancy.

20

Their figures are what the doctors billed.

21

what was actually being collected, what was actually being

22

done.

23

My figures are

Now the reality of the fact is that the collection

24

of what was billed was in jeopardy at the time of this

25

meeting and it was, in fact, never actually collected.

So
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1

it's easy to say, yeah, the doctors billed all kinds of money

2

on this thing when after the fact the reality is, well, it

3

wasn't going to come in.

4

oranges.

5

So we're basing it on apples and

And again, Your Honor, we've got a lot of money

6

issues here.

There's obviously a lot of evidence going both

7

directions.

8

are going to be on the stand.

9

credibility, as to who knows what.

There's a lot of dispute between witnesses that
There's issues as to
They're all issues that a

10

jury needs to take care of.

11

that if the issue is that they don't have enough information

12

to understand what the particular pleadings of fraud are, if

13

they don't have enough information to go forward to trial,

14

then it's curious this was not brought up two years ago when

15

asked for

16

plenty of information, they knew what the issues were, they

17

moved forward on it.

18

THE COURT:

19

M r . Ronnow, your m o t i o n is granted.

20

MR. RONNOW:

21

THE COURT:

22
23
24
25

Again, I would just reiterate

summary judgment on the issue.

I think they had

Thank you.
Thank you, counsel.

Thank y o u , Y o u r Honor.

Counsel, with that, still going to

bring in a jury on Monday?
MR. RONNOW:

The only thing left, Your Honor, was

reserved in the Court's order on —
THE COURT:

Summary judgment.
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1

MR, RONNOW:

— the summary judgment was a

2

discussion thar would allow or a statement that would allow

3

rhe defendants to put on evidence with regard to che numbers

4

that are already part of the summary judgment on breach of

5

contract damages in the way of offset.

6

question is, we did not request the jury.

7

here without a jury to try to squeeze into a 3-day setting

8

here a long time ago.

9

talking - about the only thing that could possibly be left is

So,

So perhaps that
We would have been

we don't need a jury.

We're

10

some offset or some sort of proof that the payments were not

11

received.

12

THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Olson, I'm going to give you

13

a chance to mull that over.

14

now whether you need a jury or not because I think your

15

client is entitled to that much in terms of offset arising

16

out of the Court's prior order.

17

trial, I just don't think we've got anything here of clear

18

and convincing evidence to give to a jury; and yes, I realize

19

that this is mostly a rehash of the motion for summary

20

judgment but I feel a lot more comfortable in where we stand

21

today.

22

I'm not going to ask you right

But as this case comes up to

So counsel, I'll recess this case at this point.

23

We are ready to start up Monday morning.

24

tomorrow if you need a jury.

25

Let us know by noon

MR. RONNOW: We will, Your Honor.
36

THE COURT: Thank you counsel.
And you'll prepare the order, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW:

I will, Your Honor, thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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ST. GEORGE, UTAH - AUGUST 24, 2007

2

JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE

3

PRO

4

C E E D I N G S

THE) COURT: Fishe r v.

Davidhizer. Mr. ]Ronnow is here

5

on behalf of plaint!ff and Mr. Christiansen here for the

6

de fendants.

7

(Video goes off and on.)

8

THE COURT: -continue the trial setting and find out

9
10

where you are now.
MR. OLSON: Let me tell you, Your Honor, I filed two

11

motions for you. I'm sure you had nothing else to do today but

12

read through those.

13
14

(Audio goes off and on.)
MR. OLSON: - Your Honor, these motions go back and

15

forth and if we could move as quickly in the first (inaudible)

16

of the trial as we do in the last four or five days we could

17

crank up the revolutions of the wheels of justice.

18

THE COURT: Probably so.

19

MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I just need to address a

20

couple of things.

21

morning is to make sure I have a clear record of the objections

22

and the procedures that happened yesterday and part of the

23

problem yesterday is, of course, I had a motion before the

24

Court that I had one hour to review, to try to absorb and

25

respond to and argue.

The main reasoning for my motions this

So my first position is I simply, you

1

know, had inappropriate time to prepare and properly argue the

2

motion for the Court.

3

Court yesterday.

4

simple pretrial order problems.

5

again I don't think I'm going to persuade the Court today to

6

see the error of its ways as I see it but nonetheless —

7

Technically it wasn't even before the

The purpose for the hearing yesterday was

THE COURT:

So the point of my motion and

You would like to have at least some time

8

to respond to that and deal with whether or not we should go to

9

trial at all on Monday.

10

MR. OLSON:

And here's where I'm going with it.

11

Essentially the point of motion to continue is, let me respond

12

to this Motion in Limine.

13

granted it but let me have some proper response to the Motion

14

in Limine.

15

the Court is in error as far as the motion yesterday and

16

frankly, you know, as I walked away from the hearing yesterday,

17

I've got to be honest with the Court and I'm still not

18

completely sure what happened.

As I see it, essentially what

19

happened was summary judgment.

We had a Motion in Limine but

20

what essentially happened was summary judgement.

I understand the Court has already

As a part of that motion I do point out why I think

21

THE COURT:

In effect it was the same.

22

MR. OLSON:

Yeah, and I guess we need to in any event

23

just to have a proper record, we need to have an understanding,

24

was it a grant of a Motion in Limine saying I can't put on

25

evidence of fraud?

Was it a summary judgment?

Was it an order

1

dismissing my claims?

You know, what was it?

2

little foggy on that.

But again, the purpose, the main purpose

3

of my motions which I'm not sure the Court is going to give

4

much deference to, I also filed a Motion to Amend my Pleading,

5

is just to properly respond to what happened yesterday.

6

only purpose for continuing would be to give me the opportunity

7

to respond.

8
9

THE COURT:

So I'm still a

The

And your motion is granted, counsel.

I'm

not going to take this case to trial next Monday after having

10

pulled the legs out from underneath the table without giving

11

you a chance to respond to it, counsel.

12

decision granting the Motion in Limine is correct.

13

think you have a cause of action left.

14

Motion for Summary Judgment.

15

now is whether or not there were any set offs or counterclaims

16

- well, any set offs, not even counterclaims left, any set offs

17

at all against the motion earlier granted under the contract

18

action and I want to give you a chance to review that and

19

respond to it but I saw no instance where the state of the

20

record as I see it in this lawsuit should go in front of a jury

21

on issues of fraud and inducement or fraud of any kind.

22

standard of proof simply is beyond what is in the record in

23

this case.

24

trial setting is stricken,

25

I still think my basic
I don't

So the result is a

But the only thing that remains

So I will grant your Motion to Continue.

And counsel, where we stand now is I want to

The

Jury

1

immediately and I do mean immediately get this back to the

2

Court for final argument and then give you whatever time you do

3

need to have a resolution of whatever facts remain in the case.

4

MR. OLSON:

Your Honor, just so I can clarify, is the

5

Court's continuance solely to prep on this damage issue or is

6

the Court saying, yeah, go ahead and respond to the Motion in

7

Limine and I'll consider it, but I don't think I'm going that

8

direction?

9

THE COURT:

That's what I'm saying, counsel.

I'll

10

let you respond to the motion.

11

direction unless you can show me something that is absolutely

12

clear as a bell that I was wrong.

13

that's the case, then all we need to do is bring the damage

14

issue back before the Court and that's not going to take any

15

five days.

16

MR. OLSON:

I don't think I'm going that

I don't think I am but if

No, I don't think it will either but I

17

think we could use some clarification on that issue.

That's

18

one of the other reasons we asked to meet with you today.

19

we were looking at what are we trying next week?

20

entered its summary judgment on the issue of breach of

21

contract, again, when that motion was filed we kind of came in

22

and stood in this courtroom that, you know, we don't disagree

23

we didn't perform the contract.

24

justification.

25

figures including the debt my client was suppose to take on in

As

As this Court

What we're arguing is we have

Now the Court also had before it a number of

1

the contract.

2

There were also some figures of what David Fisher had paid in

3

interest (inaudible) and things and the Court basically said,

4

you can put on evidence that he didn't pay it.

5
6

So we don't dispute that those are the figures.

The other issues as I see it that are before the
Court are off sets and mitigation of damages.

7

THE COURT:

Counsel, mitigation of damages, if there

8

are things that Mr. Fisher did not do that increased his

9

damages in some fashion, I can see some argument about that but

10

mitigation of damages does not go back and reopen the box of

11

fraud or inducement or those kinds of things.

12

MR. RONNOW:

I understand that.

Your Honor,

13

mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense required to be

14

pled, it was not pled, that's why it's not included in the

15

order.

16

pleading in defendant's answer regarding mitigation of damages.

17

The Court's order from April 10, 2006 says on that, damage

18

issues are very narrow.

19

evidence at trial or other hearing that Fisher did not pay.

20

All right?

21

than non-payment and it's an affirmative defense and it has not

22

been pled, was not pled at the time the Court entered summary

23

judgment.

24

before the Court.

25

There is no pleading, not even in a generic catch-all

The defendant, Davidizer, may present

Mitigation of damages is a little bit different

So I think it's (inaudible) and it is not any longer

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, I want you to have a chance

1

to brief things, see where we stand now and if there's anything

2

(inaudible) that would take me away from ruling yesterday

3

morning, I don't mind being corrected on it, but we're going to

4

bring this one to a head within the next 60 days.

5

MR. OLSON:

Your Honor, the only other issue that I

6

guess I would like to address, I'm not sure it needs a whole

7

lot of help here but as we were preparing for Monday we were

8

discussing the possibility of, if we're only going to try

9

damages, letting the Court try those issues and not bringing

10

them before a jury.

11

that's okay, I don't want to waive my jury right should this

12

matter be appealed and come back on remand.

13

THE COURT:

My primary concern is if I say, yeah,

So I -

I don't think you could, counsel.

I

14

think you can reserve that, try this issue that way and if it

15

comes back on a remand (inaudible) get a jury on your fraud

16

claims, you'd be entitled to do that.

17

MR. OLSON:

My only concern is in looking at the case

18

law with regard to waiver and jury demands it doesn't take

19

much.

20

pretrial, the Court says okay we're going to try it before the

21

bench and nobody says anything about it and it was being waived

22

and then the guy stands up and says, Wait a minute, wait a

23

minute, I didn't catch that.

I mean, there's a handful of cases where you come to

24

THE COURT:

Well, counsel -

25

MR. OLSON:

It doesn't take much is my concern.

1

THE COURT:

Counsel, I want to make sure that the

2

record is clear that you would not be waiving that because I

3

don't see that the Court's order puts you in any position

4

except that you have to reserve that right and even if we

5

decide to go to trial without a jury on what remains in the

6

lawsuit now, and you appeal the judgment arising out that,

7

based upon the Court's ruling of the Motion in Limine, if we

8

were remanded you have not waived your right to a jury trial

9

and I'll put that in the form of a written order if that will

10
11

help.
MR. RONNOW:

And Your Honor, the April 10 order gives

12

defendant the option of either hearing which would be before

13

the bench or trial.

14

by opting for the hearing.

15
16

THE COURT:
with everything.

So our position is he would not waive it

I think that's a reasonable way to deal

All right, thank you counsel.

17

MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor,

18 J

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

19
20
21
22
23
24
25 I

-c-
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2
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3

(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

4
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5
6

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: Thank you, we're back on the record for

7

the 18th of December, 2007.

8

Fisher v. Davidhizer.

9

we have the plaintiff here.

The matter before the court is

The parties are not - well, actually
We don't have the defendant

10

here, but Mr. Olson, you are here on behalf of Mr. Davidhizer

11

and you're the moving party, Mr. Olson.

12

amend and there's opposition to that.

13

deal with the motions in limine.

14

listen to you, counsel.

15

MR. RONNOW:

You have a motion to
And then you want to

So I shall be still and

Your Honor, if I might just clarify

16

and just understand the procedure because we kind of - it was

17

real fluid and fast there for a minute just before trial.

18

filed a motion in limine to which Mr. Olson filed the quick

19

hearing essentially to set it aside, and then the Court said

20

let's go ahead and brief that, plus his motion to amend.

21

so while these - it would seem to me that these two are part

22

and parcel, so if I understand what you're saying, we're just

23

going to put the contiguous arguments, so to speak, on the

24

table from -

25

THE COURT:

We

And

We are, counsel, because it's really -

1

it's become an entire fabric throughout the litigation.

2

mean, the competing theories that we have going here are in

3

the entire - every single question in the lawsuit bears on

4

those competing theories.

5

to talk about is the motion to amend first, because if that

6

amendment is given, then the motion in limine may take some

7

more attention to see where we go with it.

8
9

MR. OLSON:

I

And I really think what we ought

If I may, Your Honor, address that

understanding that, you know, let's talk about procedures,

10

but nonetheless I think it's key. As I went back and reviewed

11

the fraud cases specifically in the context of the motion in

12

limine.

13

judgment that there's a Utah case that - in which the Court

14

of Appeals addressed that specific issue and affirmed a

15

dismissal of a fraud case for failure to plead with

16

specificity under Rule 9, and then denied the motion to

17

amend.

18

we argue the fraud issues that are the basis for the motion

19

to amend.

20

contention that even in the proposed - the proposed amended

21

complaint or counterclaim rather is not sufficient -

Rule 9 is distinguished from a Rule 56 summary

So I would urge the Court to reconsider and ask that

And I'll just give you a quick heads up, it is our

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RONNOW:

24

THE COURT:

25

Still fails Yes, Your Honor.
I see your point, counsel, but Mr.

Olson does get to talk about his case and Mr. Olson, let me

1

make sure I understand it.

2

in the inducement.

Your fraud theory goes to fraud

3

MR. OLSON:

Correct.

4

THE COURT:

That is the broad label to put with

5

this.

Specifically your client claims that

6

misrepresentations were made with respect to the status of

7

the various accounts that were being purchased, the income

8

derived from those accounts and that because of those

9

misrepresentations upon which your client relied, your client

10

suffered damage at least $10,000 and perhaps more according

11

to the proof.

12

that, counsel.

13

But let me give you a chance to expand upon

MR. OLSON:

I think you've done that in a nutshell,

14

Your Honor, that is - that is these fraud claims.

15

guess if I understand the direction we're going here, you

16

want to hear the motion to amend first.

17

intertwined issues, no question, that the whole purpose of

18

the motion to amend is based upon the motion in limine was

19

made seeking to keep those issues of fraud out.

20

whole point of my motion to amend.

21

- is an amendment to conform with the evidence under Rule

22

15(b).

23

impliedly consented to try the unplead matters.

24

And I

They are very

That's the

What we're asking for is

That's appropriate when the parties have expressly or

Now, the reason I would suggest that that's

25 I happened in this case is that two years ago this Court heard
3

1

summary judgment.

2

judgment asking this court to grant them summary judgment on

3

our issues of fraud, on those very issues of the income

4

representations, the status and the contract representations.

5

This Court ruled that there were genuine issues of material

6

fact, we're going to trial.

7

really nothing's changed since then.

8

discovery.

9

deposed any witnesses.

10

It was the plaintiffs' motion for summary

That was two years ago.

And

We haven't done any

We haven't found any new facts.

We haven't

Nothing's changed.

Now it was the plaintiffs that put those issues

11

before the court in summary judgment.

They submitted

12

affidavits attacking the very representations arguing that

13

they were opinions, not representations, that no, I didn't

14

say this about the status of the contract.

15

the Court depositions, you know, certainly this is what whs

16

said when, this is what was said then.

17

before the Court of, hey, their fraud claim is no good.

18

didn't ever say they didn't plead with particularity.

19

Rather, they said we want summary judgment on the fraud claim

20

because it's no good.

They put before

They put the issue
They

They put that issue before the Court.

21

Now, looking at the case law in the State of Utah,

22

there's a couple of cases that deal with implied consent for

23

purposes of Rule 15(b).

24

memorandum.

The Archuleta vs. Hughes case deals with this

25

very issue.

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court - well,

I've cited these cases in my

1

actually let me back track a little bit.

2

defendants are going to make is that Rule 15(b) only applies

3

to issues that actually go to trial, that are in a trial -

4

and at the end of the trial you say, hey, wait a minute, you

5

never plead it.

6

consent - you implied the consent to us, we're having a trial

7

on that.

8
9

The argument the

And you say, well, no, you implied the

My argument is it doesn't require trial.

It

requires interjection of those issues before the court by

10

consent in going on about the process of litigation.

11

Archuleta vs. Hughes case deals with that very issue.

12

Utah Supreme Court never says in that case it has to go to

13

trial.

14

in a motion.

15

wasn't implied to consented to just because it wasn't as

16

sufficient interjection, but they never said that it had to

17

be something that went to trial and that was a summary

18

judgment case.

19

found where one party raises an issue material to the other

20

party's case, and where evidence is introduced without

21

objection, where it appears that the parties understood the

22

evidence must be aimed at the unpleaded issue."

23 J

The
The

The issue before the court was something brought up
Now, the court in that case did rule that it

"Whether they say implied consent may be

That's exactly what's happened in this case.

24

Plaintiffs interjected those issues, sought summary judgment

25

on fraud, they understood that those issues were before the

1

court, they understood that those issues were the very basis

2

upon which we were going to trial.

3

detail as to what those misrepresentations were and argued

4

why they're not misrepresentations.

And they went into great

5

So, you know, it's our position that, you know,

6

actually I do have one other case, the - the Holstrom vs.

7

Viewer case that I've cited.

8

Utah Supreme Court actually looking at is something raised in

9

summary judgment sufficient implied consent under Rule 15(b)

Now in that case, we have the

10

where it doesn't have to go to trial.

11

you know, we're really not going to rule upon can be brought

12

on summary judgment or does it have to go trial.

13

they didn't rule either way on the issue.

14

uphold summary judgment on damages that were never plead in

15

the original complaint.

16

summary judgment, they granted damages -

17
18
19

THE COURT:

And they kind of say,

In fact,

But they did

In that case, the trial court issued

And the Supreme Court impliedly

approved implied argument?
MR. OLSON:

Exactly.

They said we're not going to

20

say the trial court was wrong in including those damages.

It

21

looks like it was before the court, it was put before the

22

court by the parties, we're not going to overturn it.

23

never really got to the issue of does it actually have to be

24

tried in court, could it be summary judgment.

25

reality in that case was summary judgment, they didn't go to

They

But the

1

trial.

2
3

THE COURT:

The outcome came out the way that the

party advocated those damages wanted.

4

MR. OLSON:

Exactly.

So it's really the exact

5

situation we have before us here.

6

court in summary judgment, and now we're on the eve of trial,

7

are we going to say that the issue can't go to trial.

8

that issue was tried by the implied consent of the parties

9

and two years passed without anybody saying a thing about us

10

Issue brought before the

Again,

not going to trial on these issues.

11

THE COURT:

Counsel, again it's the fabric of this

12

case that becomes so difficult for us to get our heads around

13

logically.

14

implying into the pleadings of fraud in the inducement plan.

15

It's been spoken of for years in this litigation.

16

been eluded to either directly or indirectly for years.

17

even if I grant your motion to amend, I'm still stuck with

18

the problem of looking at the arguments that Mr. Ronnow's

19

client is making that even if this were plead with

20

specificity, even if it were there within the pleadings and

21

all four corners, and I know they're not conceding that it is

22

and they're going to fight that nitch too.

23

was, there simply isn't the proof to carry by clear and

24

convincing evidence.

25

issue of fact as it goes to a preponderance test, but fraud

Because I really don't have any difficulty in

It has
And

But even if it

And yeah, there might be a justiciable

7

1

is clear and convincing and that's the next step that I

2

conceptually leapt to, and maybe I shouldn't have.

3

that's why I see the flavor of the case changing between the

4

time that we had summary judgment and the time we heard the

5

motion in limine.

6

But

Can you help me around that concern?

MR. OLSON:

Well, I can certainly try and that kind

7

of moves into the area of their motion in limine.

But again,

8

Your Honor, we came before you two years ago, almost to the

9

month, on summary judgment.

I guess maybe I'm not

10

understanding completely where the court is going in saying

11

that the flavor has changed in the last two years.

12

thing that's happened in two years is we're waiting for a

13

trial date.

14

THE COURT:

The only

Well, in all candor, counsel, one of

15

the things that happened is I think the court's focused more

16

specifically on what is needed in this case for it to go to

17

trial.

18

disputed facts, but those disputed facts will not meet the

19

necessary level of proof to make it to clear and convincing

20

in ocder to prevail and I can rule on that as a matter of law

21

based upon the record that we have.

22

us back to summary judgment that I wasn't specifically

23

focused enough two years ago, and I think you can rightly

24

tell your clients it's the fault of the Court.

25

should have done this bwo years ago looking at that evidence

And when I focused on the fact that, yes, we have

And so it kind of throws

Maybe I

and then suddenly it was focused for me at the last time when
Mr. Ronnow filed his motion in limine.
MR. OLSON:

Okay.

And I guess I see where the

court's going with this - obviously, that position is two
years ago we had an issue of fact, we still have an issue of
fact.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. OLSON:

And I understand that the Court's

essentially saying, well, maybe I changed my mind and I
understand that.

But I guess I would also assert that, you

know, assuming that I can amend, that we can get this issue
properly before the court, I would strenuously disagree that
there is not sufficient facts to put before a jury in this
case that they could find for the defendant.
In my memorandum in opposition, I essentially
treated their opposition to limine, I've essentially treated
it as an opposition to summary judgment and I've gone through
and I've laid out all the facts with citation deposition that
I would put before the jury in this case.

Now those facts

need to be construed in favor of my client.

The Court needs

to look at it saying let's assume that all of these facts are
correct, that all of them are going to come out before the
jury in this case, then make my decision.

Do I have or do I

not have rather enough to get us anywhere close to THE COURT:

And that's the kind of focus that I

1

need, counselor, it really truly is.

2

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

That being the case, I think

3

it's important that we look at - we look at the standard that

4

we're dealing with here.

5

that says summary judgment is drastic, especially when

6

granted in the pretrial stage.

7

should not weigh evidence or assess credibility, but only

8

grant if facts construed in favor of defendant or in summary

9

judgment.

10

I cited to Reliable Furniture case

It states, the trial court

Now as we go through the memorandum, I can

11

certainly go through all the facts I'm going to put - put

12

before the Court.

13

to February 18, 2002 where the parties sit down and they sign

14

the contract.

15

facts that we have deposition references to are as follows:

16

that at the meeting, Mr. Fisher stated that each of the

17

tables were subject to contracts with certain medical

18

professionals; that he stated that all the contracts were in

19

good condition at standing; that nothing changed with the

20

contracts; the contracts were still functioning.

There's kind of this period of leading up

It's the subject matter of this case.

21

THE COURT:

22

you're reading from pleading.

23

so I can -

The

I'm sorry to interrupt, counsel, but
Can you give me a page number

24

MR, OLSON:

Sure.

25

THE COURT:

- kind of get into it?
10

1

MR. OLSON:

I'm looking at my memorandum of points

2

and authorities in opposition to motion in limine, starting

3

on page two with my numbered paragraphs, wherein it says -

4

essentially I'm just reciting a statement of facts.

5
6

THE COURT:

And this is from the

depositions?

7
8

All right.

MR. OLSON:

It is from the depositions.

Each of

these facts have a deposition reference.

9

THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

10

MR. OLSON:

Official representative Davidhizer at

11

the meeting and prior to the meeting by letter from his

12

attorney, the tables were generating between $5,000 and

13

$7,000 in income each month.

14

agreement to purchase the entity and take on substantial

15

debts.

16

informed Mr. Fisher that he wanted to change the contract,

17

that specifically he wanted to cancel or that he would not be

18

continuing the contract.

19

wanted to change or cancel his contract prior to that

20

February 18 meeting, but didn't tell Davidhizer, rather, he

21

represented that the contracts were in good standing.

22

kn ew that Dr. Cutler was not happy with his contract, he knew

23

that Dr. Cutler had no tech hired to operate the table at his

24

place.

25

The meeting culminated in an

Prior to the February 18th meeting, Dr. Cutler had

Mr. Fisher knew that Dr. Cutler

Fisher

Immediately after the February 18th meeting as my
11

client's driving away from the meeting, Mr. Fisher tells Gene
Coder that Dr. Cutler's contract was in trouble, that he
wants to be changed to a lease agreement, or that he's
negotiating to become a lease agreement.

Fisher never told

Dr. Davidhizer any of these issues with Dr. Cutler's
contract.

Davidhizer didn't learn about the issues of Dr„

Cutler's contract until he met with Cutler in the next day or
so after signing the contract, wherein Cutler informs him of
this.

In that meeting, Dr. Cutler states that he'd already

talked to Fisher regarding the contract. He's already been
engaged in preliminary negotiations in maybe setting up a new
contract that would be necessary if he's going to continue
operating this table.
There is a dispute between plaintiffs and the tech
that was assigned to operate Dr. Jepson's table, went onto a
different contract.

That table became unmanned for a

significant period of time right before the signing of this
contract.

There was no tech to operate it, it was sitting

essentially latent doing nothing.

Rather than representing

to Davidhizer that there was a problem with Dr. Jepson's
table that it wasn't generating any income because there was
no tech to operate it [inaudible] for generating this amount
of income.
Because of billing problems or because of problems
with the billing company, the plaintiff was not receiving
12

1

payments actually due and owing on the Dr. Jepson table.

2

There was a third-party billing company that was operating

3

the billing of that table.

4

between the two of them, and OMC never got paid on many of

5

the billing on Dr. Jepson's table.

6

dealing with billing problems on that table prior to this

7

contract being signed.

8

those problems.

9

knew that OMC was paying out more money than they were

10

They were having a dispute

And they were actively

They said nothing to Davidhizer about

In Fisher's deposition, he states that he

generating.

11

The statement of facts go on to talk about the

12

actual monies generated by each of the tables leading up to

13

this February 18th time.

14

Cutler in mid-August of 2001 and the five months between that

15

and the time the contract was signed, they'd only deposited

16

$6,450 into its bank accounts from that contract with Dr.

17

Cutler, or approximately $1,300 a month.

18

The table was placed with Dr.

Placed a table with Dr. Ott in October of 2001.

In

19

the four months time between that and the time of the

20

contract, they had deposited $5,000 in the bank account from

21

Dr. Ott.

22

with Jepson in November of *01, and in the three months of

23

time that that was there before the contract was signed,

24

they'd only deposited almost $1,300 for an average of about

25

$425 a month.

Approximately $1,200 monthly.

They placed a table

13

1

So in looking at these averages from the time those

2

three tables were placed with each of those three doctors and

3

coming up to the point of signing the contract,- they averaged

4

$2,548 per month.

5

the $5,000 to $7,000 monthly that they claimed they were

6

averaging.

7

They weren't averaging anywhere close to

The accounting documents, although the plaintiffs

8

claim they provided accounting documents to Davidhizer prior

9

to this meeting, they had every opportunity to investigate

10

it, to look at it and determine what the income was.

The

11

testimony from the accountants who reviewed those documents

12

is they were in horrible form.

13

tails of it.

L4

accounting records that were sufficient to make any real

15

analysis until after that February 18 meeting.

We couldn't make heads or

They were useless.

He didn't receive any

16

So at the time of the meeting, Davidhizer had no

17

information to either prove or reject the claims that were

18

being made by plaintiffs with regard to the income or the

19

status of the contracts.

20

representations.

21

He had to rely on the

The testimony would be that had Fisher informed

22

Davidhizer about Dr. Cutler's intent to change or cancel the

23

contract or that the profits were not actually $5,000 to

24

$7,000 monthly, Davidhizer wouldn't have entered into this

25

agreement.

So as a direct result of those representations
14

regarding the profitability and the status of the contracts,
he entered in to a contract tl lat was i lot what it "was
represented to be.

Those are the facts all supported by

depositioi 1 testj mony of Davidhizer, Fisher, Gene Coder,
Robert Nash, Dr. Cutler, many witnesses that will come before
the Com;l

\o support: those very facts.

Now" while the Court

can sit here and review those facts and try and mull over and
do we have enougl i to get us to clear and convincing, the fact
of the matter is there are sufficient facts there that :i f we
construe those in favor of ray client, we assume that they
actually happened, there''' s no question iciat a reasonable jury
coi il d find in favor of defendant on this case.
go before a jury.

It's got to

My c] lent deser ves his d.iy in cmirL

We r ve been 1 itigating 1:his case f or six years .

And he

d e s e r v e s 11 i e o p p o r 11 11 i j f y t o p i i1 :i t before a ) i i r y o f

• aiid

determine whether he can succeed on his claims.
THE COI JRT:

Tl lai lk yoi it

coi m s e l .

MR. OLSON:

Thank

THE COI JRT:

I appreciate that insight with

you.

specificity.
Mr. Ronnow.
MR. RONNOW:

Your Honor, I'I n going to ask ror some

indulgence as we go back through [inaudible].
first of all focus the Court.

Rut 1 want to

Counsel has made this a

summary judgment argument because he gets to a different
15

1

standard, and if he gets to an issue of fact, he argues or -

2

I'm sorry, I don't want to personalize this, defendant has

3

made that argument, gets to the jury, okay?

4

Now then we did not, despite the fact that our

5

motion has the same result as a summary judgment, we did not

6

plead or argue or ask for summary judgment.

7

submit to the Court from the get go that reviewing this from

8

the standard and under the cases of summary judgment is a

9

mistake.

All right.

It's not where we are in this case.

So I

Indeed, where

10

we are is in construing the interaction of four rules of

11

civil procedure, all of which are - vest the Court with broad

12

discretion.

13

pretrial rule, and the - and particularly under the

14

amendments, the recent amendments, is 16 expanding the

15

flexibility of Rule 16, and expanding the remedies that the

16

Court has under the Court's broad discretion to apply the

17

requirements and sanctions from Rule 26 through Rule 37 - 37

18

being the sanctions, Rule 26, of course, being the discovery.

19

And those rules are first of all Rule 16, the

Now for starters as we put those - and then 9(b),

20

of course, with regard to specificity.

We're going to set

21

9(b) aside for just a minute.

22

statements that goes without saying and then here I'm going

23

to say it.

24

trial at the pretrial setting under Rule 16 to marshal and

25

inquire and discuss evidentiary issues, witnesses, exhibits,

This is one of those

The Court has broad discretion in managing a

16

etc.

And the cases that we cited in our memorandum clearly

give the Court authority to strike answers and defenses that
have the net effect of a summary judgment, but are indeed
procedural remedj es i mcler Rule 16, 2 6 and 37=
Now, that's where our motion is.

All right.

Nov/ that's important

because it's a different standard.

First of all, the Court

has broad discretion in managing, exercising the Court1' s
authority to manage under those three rules so that the
standard :i n review is abuse of , diseretion .

Dif f erent t:1 Ian

summary judgment,
THE COURT:

W< ul ]

t

1:1 le s tai idarc I c )f r e view my

decision would be abuse of discretion-

But your analysis, as

I I 11 i d e r s t a i i d :i t, c o i 11 I s e ] , t a k e s m e a w a y f r o in 11 I e R I i ] e 5 6
analysis drawing all inferences :i n favor of the party against
whom I in- ifit;f i n

i,') niadn,,

That takes me :i n a different

direction, doesiV t: i I , Mr. Ronnow?
MR- RONNOW:
Your Honor.

Yes, and that's where we go to next,

Ai id that brings us to Rule 9»

First of a J 1, in

the cases that we cited, just a quick summary, Rule 9 applies
to aid circumstances of misrepresentation covered by fraud :i i i
its broadest context.

That's the Williams vs. State Farm

case at hbb f,/!d lJbb which we rih'il in out i aemo a. t page 3.
Counsel has added in the eleventh hour as part of our
d i s c u s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g 1: h e p r e t r i a 1 o r d e r n e g 1 i g e n t

misrepresentation that wasn't expressly plead. So I want to
17

1

make sure - and much of the discussion here, if you go

2

through these facts that the defendant just went through,

3

most of those statements of fact are not statements of

4

representations or misrepresentations.

5

THE COURT:

Hang on a second, counsel.

6

MR. RONNOW:

That's quite all right.

7

THE COURT:

8

(Off the record briefly)

9

MR. RONNOW:

Go ahead.

All right.

So first of all if we look

10

at those facts, I'm going to come back to those in a minute,

11

much of what was just recited to the Court is - is

12

information developed through other witnesses as to what they

13

believe Mr. Fisher knew for the basis of a negligent

14

misrepresentation should have disclosed.

15

Okay?

All right.

So Williams vs. State Farm says Rule 9 encompasses

16

that as well, that the - that the negligent misrepresentation

17

and negligent misrepresentation is fraud encompassed under

18

Rule 9.

19

we cited in our memorandum and that brings us in, pulls us

20

away from the kind of negligence quagmire back into Rule 9

21

that even - even if we plead - even if the defendant pleads

22

in the counterclaim negligent misrepresentation, they don't

23

avoid the application of Rule 9.

That case is Smith vs. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919, which

24

In Derby vs. Noble this is - and this is important.

25

Derby vs. Noble states that the general rule that allegations
18

:i ii c o m p l a i n t s should b e liberally c o n s t r u e d does not a p p l y t o
fraud.,.

N o w 11 iat' s :i i nportant even when we come back to these

statements of fact THE COURT:

Is that becai ise of the high standard of

proof in a fraud case, counsel?
MR. RONNOW:

Is that the justification?

That's absolutely why and it's, I

believe, Your Honor, although courts have kind of started
with the text of Rule 9 p] ead with particularity, and have
focused on what is required to meet that standard without
talking a whole ] ot about policy that gave rise to Rule 9 in
the first place, bi it the allegation of fraud :I i I the
inducement j n a commercial setting has - has some serious
o n i i s t o :i I:, Y o \ :i 3 : I I o i I o r

P. .i l d f o r 11 I a t r e a s o i I , i t' s e a s :i 1 y

m a d e b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y easily p r o v e d bi it it's a litt] e b i t
J :i k e c :i : y r a p e

' '! i< - • •

• • • d - •; t h e c 1 i a r g e , t h e r e i s 11 i a t

s 1 1 gma 1: h a t a 11 aches p a r t i c u l a r I y i n a c omme r c i a 1 c ommu n i t y,
ai id so 11: Ie pub.1 i c poJ i c y :i s t: 1 ia I: :i f y o i i' re going to t h r o w
those a l l e g a t i o n s around, you're going to have to p l e a d it
with p a r t i c u l a r i t y and have some - some serious e v i d e n c e ,
clear and c o n v i n c i n g , before w e p u t that in front of a jury.,
So t h a t , a n d i inder t h e - t h e Derby v s . N o b l e case, it also
talks about that t h e p l e a d i n g s mus L state wi th par Licu 1.arity
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s supporting each e l e m e n t of fraud.

In other

w o r d s, t h e c i r c ui n s t a n c e s o f t h e w 1: i o I e p u n c h ] i s t,
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , knowledge of f a l s i t y , m a d e with intent to
19

1

rely, the actual reliance, damages, the other part of this

2

recitation of facts that we just went through from

3

defendant's memo is that much of that information is not

4

developed or received from the plaintiffs in this case.

5

comes from other sources.,

6

these alleged misrepresentations needs to be plead with

7

particularity, and it simply has not been done.

8
9

It

And so the issue of reliance on

Now, Your Honor, I want to focus on a case that I
think is - is right on point that we have cited, and I've

10

provided a copy - this isn't the West copy, Your Honor, so

11

citations are a little bit tricky*

12

Sabey, it's 79 P.3d 974, Ct. App. (2003).

13

it's important to note that this was a motion to dismiss, but

14

it was a motion to dismiss that had come down the road.

15

There had been some - some work done on this case, and it was

16

after a lengthy hearing and the court dismissed at the

17

conclusion of the hearing the fraud charges on the basis that

18

they failed to comply with Rule 9.

19

memorandum opinion that was prepared by the court after the

20

hearing, dismissed all the other claims that were raised by

21

the moving party in that case, and denied the motion to

22

amende

23

All right.

This is Carrols vs.
And first of all,

And then in addition, in

Denied the motion to amend.

Now in our situation, we have had, as counsel

24

pointed out, we have had years in this litigation.

And we

25

have had years since - since defendants hired current
20

1

counsel..

W e h a v e h a d a long p e r i o d of t i m e f o l l o w i n g t h e

2

close of t h e d i s c o v e r y o r d e r , 11 ie c u t o f f s :i i I 11 Ie d:i s c o v e r y

3

o r d e r , w h i c h w a s • a n order of t h e court w h i c h h a s n e v e r b e e n

4

amended,

5

t h e Friday b e f o r e 'a M o n d a y trial to a m e n d t h e c o m p l a i n t a n d

6

effect! v e 1 y a IT L e i i d 11 I e o r d e r s o f 11 I e d 1 s c o v e r y o r d e r e n t e r e d

7

b y t h e C o u r t , y o u know, without a n y r e a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n as to

8

wt Iy 11 Iere w a s 11 lat 1 eng11 Iy de] ay :i i i d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t h a d to

A n d n o w w e seek :i i I tl le e l e v e n t h 1 101 ixy .1 it era.] ly oi i

be done under; Rule 9.
Cn r. r o i s f:ar>(! goes o n a n d states t h a t t h e
1i

m e r e r e c i t a t i o n of the elements of
i',u;i ,•::<..

]

'•! '] •

fraud are simply

'uu look at p a r a g r a p h 2 7 , Yoi ir H o n o r ,

- | y o u begin a d i s c u s s i o n that real h< o u t l i n e s t h e d e t a i l s tl la 1:
.. * ' 'luired b y t h e Court of A p p e a l s u n d e r R u l e 9.

It states

1!.)

that the r e l e v a n t s u r r o u n d i n g f a c t s , e x c u s e xnei j i I Ri iJ e -

16

paragraph 26 is the statement that mere recitation of Hie

]7

elements oL f hind is not

18

It goes on to say that the relevant - in paragraph 27 - the

J2

relevant surroi n idii ig fac ts need In 1;HJ plead

2D

that it is evident what facts are claimed to constitute the

21

fraud cl larges.

22

2oes nni ^rii isty the i *'< )u i t ement „

in sin h ,i m,inner

,

Now even if you go back to this recitation of facts

22

in the memorandum that was just discussed with the Court,

24

there are no specific statements in there, save one,

25

paragrapl I 9, tl lat as Davidhizer was driving away, Plaintiff
21

Fisher told Gene Coder that Dr. Cutler's contract was going
to be changed to a lease agreement or that he is negotiating
to make it a lease agreement.

That does not change the

material contact - contract terms under the agreement that
they had discussed.,
THE COURT:

Well, counsel, let me follow you up

with that because changing this from a prior contract, which
I believe was a sale contract, -to a lease agreement may not
have had any material impact upon the cash flow from this
asset.

Is that really what you're telling me about it?
MR„ RONNOW:

No, hidden in that statement and

question is the implication that somehow a lease term is a
material change over a contract term.

In fact, all of the

contracts were terminable at will by these doctors.

So

that's - that's an important factor that gets lost.

We

haven't gone into that detail.

But so his - Mr. Fisher's

statement that we're changing this to a lease agreement does
not constitute fraud by clear and convincing standard that that somehow that statement or that change in status
materially undermines all of the discussions leading up to
that agreemento
THE COURT:
MR. RONNOW:

Okay.

I follow you.

The discussions and details that are

never articulated by defendant.

Now Carrols goes on to say

in paragraph 27 on the following page, that and continuing
22

into p a r a g r a p h 2 8 , that the relevant s u r r o u n d i n g facts m u s t
be plead in such a mannei; thai is iwi.deni
that constitute fraud.

whaL the facts are

We've said that and it simply isn't

apparent w h a t the factual statements are that
fraud.

constitute

They - :i t requires that it d e s c r i b e the m a t e r i a l

misrepresentatioi 1 wi 11 1 par t:icu 1 ar:i ty.

This r e c i t a t i o n of

facts does not d e s c r i b e any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , save t h e one we
jus t spoke aboi i t:, w:i 11 I ai Iy particu 1 arity at a 1J

If goes on

j i i p a r a g r a p h 28 to say that whi 1 e this :i s not ii i 1:ei Ided to be
,J11 exl laustd ve J i s t, we point oi it two f u r t h e r d e f i c i e n c i e s
the c o m p l a i n t .

First a section :i i i tl le complai i i t tl lat

purports to d e s c r i b e a m a t e r i a l m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

that

defendants m a d e to p i a i n t i f t s tall, s h o M . o I. doing

'o wiMi

particularity.

in

For the most p a r t , p l a i n t i f f s used a passive

voice failing to i den t i f y ex a c f ] y wi I o m a d e 11 i e a ] ] e g e d
misrepresentations.
N o w i f w e s t o p t h e r e f o r j i i s t a rn :i i I u t e a i i d even
pick up the first amended complaint, Your .Honor, in paragraph
1 ^ r win rli i » Mii; oiil/ paragj dph MiaL a t t e m p t s to p l e a d fraud,
the statement :i s, representations by and t h r o u g h O M C , David
F:i si ler ai id Darwj i i E ' i sher, and their o f f i c e r s , d i r e c t o r s ,
agents and e m p l o y e e s that OMC had b e e n m a k i n g p r o f i t s on the
tab] es of at least the amount of $5, 000 to $ 7 f 0 0 0 p e r m o n t h ,
and that the c o n t r a c t s w i t h d o c t o r s 1: o w h o in t i: i o s e t a b 1 e s w e r e
being leased w e r e ii I good standing.

The s t a t e m e n t that we
23

1

are negotiating a modification from a contract to a lease by

2

itself is not evidence that the contract was not in good

3

standing.

4

in the amended pleading, Your Honor, there is no statement

5

with specificity as to the how, what, where and why.

6

turn over, Your Honor, if you would, to footnote 15 and in

And there is no other - there is no other - even

7 J the copied case it's on page 12 of 15.
don't paginate the footnotes.

Let's

For some reason they

So we've got five pages of

9 I footnotes with no page numbers.

But if you look at the upper

10

right-hand corner, page 12 of 15, we have the footnote in

11

that case in which the court goes on to add some further

12

detail.

13

Furthermore, the allegation fails to provide other

14

relevant surrounding facts regarding misrepresentations such

15

as time, location in which it was uttered.

16

for that requirement. Requiring that the alleged fraud

17

conclude the who, what, where, when, and how.

18

paragraph of a newspaper story in the allegations.

19

cites to a federal case in the District of Utah, Cook vs.

20

Zions 1st National Bank, for the proposition that plaintiffs

21

failed to set forth in specific terms the time, place,

22

content and manner of each defendant's alleged material

23

misrepresentations or otherwise fraudulent conduct.

24
25

THE COURT:

It cites a case

The first
And then

Now -

The allegation of fraudulent conduct

toward all the classes of the plaintiff we the people is not
24

adequate.
MR. R O N N O W :

That's correct, Your Honor.

back t o t h e m e t a p h o r I i ised in A u g u s t .

Ai id w e go

W e are 01 1 t h e e v e of

trial with a j ury, ' not a bench t r i a 1 , bi 11 a j ury.

So we're

scrambling t o do e v e r y t h i n g that h a s to b e done in w a y of
jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , s p e c i a l ii i t e r r o g a t o r i e s , 11 ie ji ] J :y verdi ct
form, al] o f w h i c h r e q u i r e s p e c i f i c , e x p r e s s k n o w l e d g e of
these kinds of i s s u e s :i i i order for i is to fairly p r e s e n t 01 lr
case, p r e p a r e o u r case for a jury, o t h e r w i s e i t ' s like
throw i n g a s 1 i c > v e ] f i i ] 1 < ::) f g r a v e ] i i I : 11 I < * j i I r y a n d s a y i n g,
somewhere in t h e r e is a nugget of g o l d a n d leave tl: le jury to
sort i t oi i t or ] e a v e i is :i i I tl le w e e k w e h a v e a l l o c a t e d for
trial to sort it a l l o u t as we go..
11 ia 1: I 11 I:i i I] : i Ii iderp:i i Is Ri I 1 e 9.

That again is a p o l i c y
T1 iat is w h y Ru 1 e ] 6 h a s been

b r o a d e n t o give t h e c o u r t ' s a u t h o r i t y t o sift t h r o u g h
.:.")-

this

- , m o t i o n in l i m i n e o n t h e eve b e f o r e a jury

t r i a l , Wa.i L a n J n u t e ,

W e ' v e b e e n y e a r s at this t h i n g a n d

p l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n t e r c l a i m d e f e n d a n t s , F i s h e r s a r e n o w standing
here, they sti 11 d o i iot have an e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t as to wI: iei i,
where, 'who, how, what on each of those elements of fraud in
order to prepar.e an ef.fecti.vc: defense, and

JIIOSI- CJ

iLlcal.Ly,

Your Honor, in order to prepare effective cross-examination'
o(" i he d(3 fondant t:i ninterclaimants' w.i tnesses,,

That's wl ry

this Court has such broad authority in that pretrial setting,
M<\

Yorn.

IIOIKU",.

you -

WIHMI

you look at tl lat, this
25

1

case in argument as I said in the beginning is not a summary

2

judgment case.

3

if it were, defendants' own summary judgment case that they

4

cite is interesting, it has some interesting language, this

5

is Republic Group, Inc. vs. One Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285 at

6

291.

7

- in order to grant summary judgment claim - judgment on this

8

claim, the trial court had to determine that Republic failed

9

to supply evidence which if accepted as true would clearly

This isn't a summary judgment case.

But even

The court there says - and this is the Court of Appeals

10

and convincingly support each element of fraud - each element

11

of fraud.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. RONNOW:

Who, what, where, when, how.
So even if we look at this thing in a

14

summary judgment in a fraud case, in connection to Rule 9

15

requiring particularity, the standard is clear and convincing

16

each element with particularity, or this Court has the

17

discretion to grant summary judgment, and under Rule 16 has

18

discretion to do it in a pretrial hearing without further

19

expanded notice.

20

the same place we were that Friday before trial in August and

21

we still do not have with any particularity any evidence or

22

any specified pleadings as to each element of fraud.

23

isn't just misrepresentations or omissions.

24

doing - if we're doing a straight up fraud, that's the

25

misrepresentations, that's the knowledge that they were

That's what happened, Your Honor.

We're in

That

That is if we're

26

1

inaccurate, that's the intent to induce reliance, that's the

2

actual reliance, that's the damages.

3

to each one of those elements..

4

misrepresentation, then we have to have clear and convincing

5

evidence with regard to duty and the failure to discharge

6

that duty as well as the other elements of fraud.

7

burden, even under the summary judgment standard applicable

8

to fraud, has simply not been met, and this Court has the

9

discretion to grant and now affirm the order striking the

Clear and convincing as

If we add negligent

That

10

answer and counterclaim under Rule 9, 16, 26 and 37, which

11

the Court did before trial.

12

appropriate and should be affirmed, Your Honor.

We submit that that is

13

THE COURT:

Mr. Olson?

14

MR. OLSON:

Yeah, real briefly, Your Honor.

I

15

guess if the analysis is that we're not talking about summary

16

judgment here today.

17

the motion in limine.

18

first issue is if the Court's going to grant the motion to

19

amend, then we no longer have an issue on the motion in

20

limine now.

21

to go through a two-part analysis is am I going to grant the

22

motion to amend?

23

of no further issue.

24

pleading.

25

We're purely talking about Rule 16 and
If that's the analysis - well, the

We move forward.

So I think the court still has

If yes, then the motion in limine is really
We move forward based upon the amended

With regard to the representations and the reasons
27

1

for the motion in limine on the eve of trial seeking to

2

prohibit evidence of the issues of fraud, it's curious to me

3

that the argument would be made that we had no way to move

4

forward with trial because we didn't have the details of the

5

representations all of the elements of fraud.

6

that-

7

yet two years prior in a motion for summary judgment, they

8

stated with some very good specificity that, Hey, that letter

9

from my lawyer was just his opinion.

We didn't have

It wasn't particularly plead, we didn't have it.

But

You know, my

10

representations in that meeting were just my opinion.

11

know, I thought the contracts were in good standing.

12

and that.

13

So it's certainly not an issue of we got to the eve of trial

14

and we didn't have sufficient information to move forward and

15

base it on.

16

knew for two years prior to trial exactly the representations

17

that we were talking about.

18

before the court and suggest that we can't prepare for trial

19

the Friday before the Monday.

20

You
This

They discussed all the issues with particularity.

That's just not the case in this case.

They

You know, it's not fair to come

Your Honor, the details, again, the recitation of

21

facts as we go through my opposition to the motion in limine,

22

I disagree that we don't have an argument of the

23

misrepresentations.

24

all they have is all of this stuff gleaned after the fact

25

through discovery to support the misrepresentation.

The plaintiffs have suggested that, Hay,

They
28

1

went out and they talked to Cutler and they talked to Coder

2

and all these other people, and that's where they're getting

3

their stuff.

4

upon before the fact.

5

Your Honor.

6

in the meeting that the contracts were in good standing.

7

lawyer stated in a letter attached to the proposed amended

8

complaint before the meeting that the contracts were making

9

$5,000 to $7,000 monthly-

They didn't have misrepresentations they relied
Well, that's really not the case here,

Rather, saying very specifically Fisher stated

Those representations were made.

10

They were made by Fisher, they were made by his attorney.

11

That's exactly what those statements of fact say.

12

His

Now we did go out and we did do discovery and that

13

was to prove the falsity.

That's one other thing I have to

14

do is prove the falsity of the representation.

15

didn't go out and get that from whoever we can get it from.

16

I don't have to rely on my own client for the falsity.

17

rely on Coder, I can rely on Cutler, I can rely on anybody to

18

show that the representation made that my client relied upon

19

was false.

20

misrepresentations are.

Obviously, we

I can

So we do have sufficient statement of what the

21

Again, Your Honor, I would urge this Court that

22

summary judgment - the effective summary judgment at this

23

stage is a drastic remedy.

24

opportunity to put the case before the jury and see how it

25

comes out.

My client should be granted bhe

29

1

THE COURT:

2

Counsel, I really appreciate the quality of

3

lawyering that has been brought to this matter today.

4

really just an excellent, excellent, intellectual effort that

5

both of you have put in on this.

6

where I was back in August.

7

order from there will stand.

8
9
10

Thank you, counsel.

It's

But I am still persuaded

Mr. Ronnow was right, and the

You can draft that in whatever form you wish, Mr.
Ronnow, but we still stand where we were back on that Friday
in August.

11

MR. RONNOW:

All right, Your Honor.

In the spirit

12

of the Christmas plates, could I have two weeks to submit the

13

order?

14

THE COURT:

At least, counsel.

Take 21 days.

15

MR. RONNOW:

16

THE COURT:

All right.

17

MR. OLSON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you.

With that, Your

18

Honor, I'm assuming that the order includes denying my motion

19

to amend?

20

THE COURT:

It does, counsel.

21

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

22

THE COURT:

All right.

Thanks everyone.

Mr.

23

Olson, you're going to get all that stuff back for a recycle

24

credite

25

Mr. Ronnow can take his too.
MR. RONNOW:

Thank you, Your Honor.
30

1
2
3 I

THE COURT:

Thanks everyone.

We'll be in recess

until 1:30.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

4
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6
7
8
9
10
11
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riFTH DISTRICT COURT

2QB9J0128 PH2--58
V^SHINGTOH COUNTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN A^DFOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID FISHER, individually and on behalf
of OFFICE MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANTS, L.C.,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
LAVERN DAVIDHIZER, an individual;
ROBERT NASH, an individual; DENNIS
j Civil No. 020500856
McOMBER, an individual,
\
Defendants. Judge James L. Shumate

The above entitled and numbered case came regularly for trial on October 9,2008 and May
7, 2009. The parties having waived the jury, the matter was tried to the Court, with D. William
Ronnow, of Jenkins Ronnow Jensen & Bayles, LLP. and Darwin C. Fisher appearing as the attorneys
for David Fisher and Office Management Consultants, L.C., and Brian L. Olsen of Gallian, Wilcox,
Welker & Olsen, LC. appearing as the attorney for LaVern Davidhizer.

The Court heard the

testimony of the parties and received the exhibits offered at trial. The Court then directed counsel
for each side to submit closing arguments and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in written form and in compact disc. The Court received Plaintiffs pleadings in that form on June
10, 2009, and the matter was then under advisement
After considering the evidence, the arguments of counsel and being fully advised herein, the
Court makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff David Fisher (hereinafter "Fisher") is a resident of Washington county, State

ofUtah.
2.

Plaintiff Office Management Consultants, L.C. (hereinafter "OMC"), is a Utah limited

liability company having its principal place of business in Washington County, State of Utah.
3.

Defendant LaVern Davidhizer (hereinafter "Davidhizer") is an individual residing

in Soldotna, State of Alaska.
4.

Defendant Robbie Nash was dismissed prior to trial.

5.

Defendant Dennis McOmber was- dismissed prior to trial

Jurisdiction
6.

The written contract which is the subject of this lawsuit was negotiated and signed

in St. George, Washington County, Utah.
7.

Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to UCA § 78A-5-102(l).

8.

Venue of this action properly rests in this Court pursuant to UCA § 78B~3-304(2) and

UCA§78B-3-205(l)&(3).
HISTORY
9.

On April 10,2000, OMC was organized.

10.

OMC was in business to provide billing services and DRS tables to medical providers

2

for disc decompression treatments.
11.

Fisher and H. Eugene Coder ("Coder") were the only members of OMC.

12.

Coder was the managing partner of OMC until he resigned and ceased to perform any

services for OMC in December 200L
13.

In approximately October 2001, Defendant Robert Nash, Davidhizer? s accountant and

business advisor, created a dispute by claiming that Davidhizer was a partner in two DRS tables
owned by OMC.
14.

On February 18, 2002, a meeting was held to resolve the dispute.

15.

In attendance at the meeting were Fisher, Coder, Nash, Davidhizer, and attorney

Darwin Fisher who represented OMC.
THE AGREEMENT
16.

On February 18, 2002, a written Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") was drafted

and signed by the parties.
17.

The Agreement provided:
a.

That Fisher would transfer all of his ownership in OMC to Davidhizer; (See
Exhibit L at %l)

b.

That Coder would transfer all but 10% of his ownership in OMC to
Davidhizer leaving Coder with a 10% ownership interest in OMC; (See
Exhibit!, at fQ

3

That Fisher would transfer his ownership of the DRS table he personally
purchased and on which he was personally paying the purchase price, to
Davidhizer; (See Exhibit 1, at «||2)
That OMC would transfer its ownership in the two DRS tables it purchased
to Davidhizer; (See Exhibit , at T[3)
That in exchange for the ownership of OMC and the DRS tables, Davidhizer
agreed to assume and pay the following loans which represented debt
incurred by OMC and Fisher in the purchase of the DRS tables and debt
incurred in the operation of OMC;
1)

Far West Bank Line of Credit in the in amount of $40,000.00;

2)

North American Medical Corp. loan in the amount of $45,000.00;

3)

GMAC loan in the amount of $60,000.00;

4)

Anderson loan in the amount of $35,000.00;

5)

The Eagle Crest Partnership building lease past due balance and
future payments; and

6)

Wells Fargo Bank, Anchorage, Alaska loan in the approximate
amount of $99,000.00. (See Exhibit 1, at ff)

That Davidhizer shall make arrangements to have Fisher and Coder removed
as parties to any contracts, lines of credit and loans that Davidhizer is

4

assuming, and substitute security for any securiiy pledged by Fisher or Coder,
and/or obtain new lines of credit, and/or obtain new loans, and/or enter into
contracts to remove both Fisher and Coder from all liability; (See Exhibit
I,at1f5)
That Fisher shall retain ownership of the following equipment:
1)

one computer;

2)

1 Acer monitor;

3)

1 Microsoft keyboard;

4)

1 HP 3200 printer; and

5)

a copy of all of the software. (See Exhibit 1, at ^ 6)

That Fisher shall retain ownership of and collect all outstanding accounts
receivable except the accounts receivable for the Boise office; (See Exhibit
1, at 1(7)
That Fisher would continue to operate OMC through February 28,2002, for
which he would be paid 7% of all monies generated by OMC through
February 28, 2002, that he would be paid for all technician work he
performed through February 28,2002, and that he would be paid all expenses
of the operation for OMC through February 28,2002; (See Exhibit 1, at ^ 8)
That Davidhizer would assume and pay all debts incurred by OMC after

5

February 18,2002; (See Exhibit 1, at % 9)
k.

That Davidhizer would receive the equipment listed on Exhibit A attached to
the Agreement, which includes:
1)

2 computers with disc burner, Tower, and screen;

2)

1 fax machine;

3)

1 file cabinet;

4) "

5 office chairs;

5)

HCFA forms and envelopes; and

5)

Lytec software, Flash Code software, Suite 2000 software. (See
Exhibit 1, at flO)

1.

That Fisher shall retain all other equipment, fixtures, supplies, etc. (See
Exhibit 1, at % 10)

m.

That the Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. (See
Exhibit 1, at ^11)

n.

That if suit were to be brought to enforce the terms of the Agreement, that the
prevailing party "shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs." (See
Exhibit 1, at fl2)

18.

Fisher agreed to pay OMC's remaining debt in the approximate sum of

$20,000.00 from the monies he collected from the accounts receivables, even though that

6

obligation was not contained in the written Agreement.
19

After signing the Agreement, Fisher did operate OMC through February 28, 2002

as required by the Agreement.
20.

On or about l/ebvnnry 1 o, 2002, Coder, on behalf of Davidhizer, took possession

of the equipment, software, and supplies in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Neither
Coder nor Davidhizer ever fuimvti m- rn\>c» »iv >o Fisher.
21.

On February 22, 2002, Fisher provided Davidhizer with all the information

Davidhizer needed to assume the debts he agreed to assume under the temis of the Agreement.
22.

On February 27, 2002, Davidhizer informed Fisher that he v\ (*• J i ( . : v. ' , M > r n, >

terms of the Agreement.
23.

On February 28, 2002, Fisher notified Davidhizer in.wriun^ IIUL ih-. *. - w-ii'^•«?

and able to complete his performance i: • •^ « <k; i-. >-u>s of the Agreement, by transferring the
operation of OMC to Davidhizer, by transferring his ownership in his DRfr UIDic iu • /,i vi< ihi -. • r,
and by transferring his ownership in » -AK " u> 1 Javidhizer.
]

4

I Javidhizer did not assume or pay the loans and building lease, the operating

expenses of OMC, and failed to assume control ;:P- » ops: r ition of OMC.
)n or about April 12,2002, Davidhizer took the DRS table at Dr. Jeppson'. • >i ilce
without the knowledge or permission of Fisher. (See Exhibit 25)
' i»

Davidhizer, Coder, and McOmber formed a new business to compete with OMC and

7.

placed the table with Dr. Boyer, a client of OMC.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
27.

On April 19, 2005, Fisher file a Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's

Counterclaim and Affirmative Defense of Fraud, and a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract with supporting memoranda.
28.

On April 25, 2005, Defendant's attorney filed aNotice of Withdrawal of Counsel.

29.

On August 16,2005, the Court ruled that counsel for Defendants may withdraw and

that the Court will rule on Fisher's motions for summary judgment. (Minute entry, dated 8/16/05)
30.

On September 7,2005, the Court entered an order allowing Defendants' attorney to

withdraw.
31.

On September 12, 2005, Fisher filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel.

32.

On October 31, 2005, a hearing is set for December 1, 2005 to rule on Fisher's

motions for summary judgment.
33.

On November 10,2005, Mr.Brian Olsen filed a Notice of Appearance as counsel for

Defendants.
34.

On November 25,2005, Mr. Olsen filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs

Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and a
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants'
Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud.
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3 5.

Fisher filed a Motion to Strike Defendant Davidhizer' s Mem oranda in Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants3 Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim
of Fraud, claiming that the memoranda is untimely.
36.

On February 1,2005, the Court entered an order denying Fisher's Motion to Strike

Defendant Davidhizer's Memoranda in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
on Defendants' Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud.
37.

On February 13, 2006, the Court entered an order denying Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment on Defendant's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud.
38.

On April 10, 2006, the Court entered its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment on Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Breach of Contract granting Fisher partial summary
judgment.
39.

In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court found that there

were no genuine issues as to any of the following facts:
a.

On April 10,2000, Office Management Consultants, L,C, was organized.

b.

David Fisher and H. Eugene Coder ("Coder") were the only members of
OMC.

c.

Coder was the managing partner of OMC until he resigned and ceased to

9

perform any services for OMC in December 2001.
OMC was in business to provide billing services and DRS tables to medical
providers for disc decompression treatments.
In approximately October 2001, Defendant Robert Nash ("Nash"), Lavera
Davidhizer's ("Davidhizer") accountant and business advisor, created a
dispute by claiming that Davidhizer was a partner in two of the three DRS
tables employed by OMC.
On February 18, 2002, during the meeting a Settlement Agreement was
drafted and signed by the parties.
In attendance at the meeting were, Fisher, Coder, Nash, Davidhizer, and
attorney Darwin Fisher who represented OMC.
The Agreement provided:
1)

That Fisher would transfer all of his ownership in OMC to
Davidhizer;

2)

That Coder would transfer all but 10% of his ownership in OMC to
Davidhizer leaving Coder with a 10% ownership interest in OMC;

3)

That Fisher would transfer his ownership of the DRS table he
personally purchased and on which he was personally paying the
purchase price, to Davidhizer;
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4)

That OMC would transfer its ownership in the remaining two DRS
tables to Davidhizer;

5)

That in exchange for the ownership of OMC and the DRS tables,
Davidhizer agreed to assume payment of $180,000.00 of debt owed
by OMC and Fisher for the purchase of the DRS tables and of debt
incurred in the operation of OMC. The debts are:
a)

Far West Bank Line of Credit in the in principal amount of
$40,000.00;

b)

North American Medical Corp. loan in the principal amount
of $45,000.00;

6)

c)

GMAC loan in the principal amount of $60,000.00; and

d)

Anderson loan in the principal amount of $35,000.00.

That Davidhizer would pay the remaining balance of the Boise office
lease;

7)

That on all loans or lease agreements Davidhizer assumed, he would
have Fisher and Coder removed as parties, substitute security for the
security pledged by Fisher or Coder, obtain new lines of credit, obtain
new loans, and remove Fisher and Coder from all liability;

8)

That Fisher would receive certain equipment and would collect and
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retain all the accounts receivables except the accounts receivable for
the Boise office;
9)

That Fisher would continue to operate OMC through February 28,
2002, for which he would be paid 7% of all monies generated by
OMC through February 28, 2002, that he would be paid for all
technician work he performed through February 28, 2002, and that
he would be paid all expenses of the operation for OMC through
February 28, 2002;

10)

That Davidhizer would assume and pay all debts incurred by OMC
after February 18,2002;

11)

That Davidhizer would receive the following equipment:
a)

two computers with disc burner, tower and screen;

b)

one fax machine;

c)

File cabinet;

d)

5 office chairs; and

e)

software including Lytec, Flash Code, Microsoft Suite 2000,
and PC Anywhere.

12)

That if suit were to be brought to enforce the terms of the Agreement,
that the prevailing party "shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees
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and costs."
Fisher agreed to pay OMC's remaining debt in the approximate sum of
$20,000.00 from the monies he collected from the accounts receivables.
On February 18,2002, Fisher received the equipment he was to receive under
the terms of the Agreement.
On February 18,2002 or shortly thereafter, Coder, on behalf of Davidhizer,
took possession of the equipment and software he was to receive under the
terms of the agreement which included a computer, monitor, fax machine,
Lytec software, Flash Code software, Microsoft Suite 2000 software, and PC
Anywhere software, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
Fisher did not breach the Agreement.
After signing the Agreement, Fisher did operate OMC through February
28, 2002 as required by the Agreement.
On February 22,2002, Fisher provided Davidhizer with all the
information Davidhizer needed to assume the debts he was compelled to
assume by the Agreement.
On February 28, 2002, Fisher notified Davidhizer in writing that he was
willing and able to complete his performance under the terms of the
Agreement, by transferring the operation of OMC to Davidhizer, by
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transferring his ownership in his DRS table to Davidhizer, and by
transferring his ownership in OMC to Davidhizer.
On February 27, 2002, Davidhizer terminated the Agreement.
Davidhizer did not fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract by
failing to assume and to pay the loans and building lease of OMC, by
failing to pay the operating expenses of OMC, and by failing to assume
control and operation of OMC.
As a direct result of Davidhizer's breach of the Agreement, David Fisher
has incurred the following damages:
1)

2)

Fisher has paid:
a)
b)
c)

$ 10,893.27
$ 31,450.00
$ 4,368.70

d)

$ 2,289.50

e)
f)

$ 14,676.36
$ 4,387.50

g)

$ 8,979.00

h)

$77,044.59

Operation expenses for OMC.
Interest payments on the Anderson Loan.
Interest payments on the GMAC and
Anderson loans.
Interest payments on the Far West Bank
Line of Credit.
Payments to Eagle Crest
Interest payments to North American
Medical Corp.
Monies paid by Fisher for operating
expenses of OMC.
TOTAL

The remaining balances on the loans are:
a)
$40,000.00
Far West Bank Line of Credit
b)
$45,000.00
North American Medical Corp. loan.
c)
$60,000.00
GMAC loan.
d)
$35,000.00
Anderson loan.
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e)
3)

$180,000.00 TOTAL

Therefore, Fisher has been damaged in the amount of $257,044.59,
plus prejudgment interest in the sum of $31,466.30 for a total of
$288,510.89. Fisher will incur additional interest and principal
payments from March 1,2005 to the date of judgment, which
amount plus pre-judgment interest will increase his damages. In
addition, Fisher has incurred attorney fees and costs and is entitled
to an award in the amount of the attorneys fees and costs he has
incurred in prosecuting this action, if Defendant Davidhizer is not
successful on his affirmative defense of fraud.

40.

The Court further ordered that Davidhizer may present evidence at trial or other

hearing that Fisher did not pay:

41.

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

$ 10,893.27 ' for OMC operation expenses
$ 31,450.00 for interest payments on the Anderson Loan
$ 4,368.70 for interest payments on the GMAC and Anderson loans.
$ 2,289.50 for interest payments on the Far West Bank Line of Credit.
$ 14,676.36 to Eagle Crest
$ 4,387.50 for interest payments to North American Medical Corp.

g)

$ 8,979.00

for the operating expenses of OMC.

The Court also ordered "that, as none of the facts have been controverted by any

opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for
15

Partial Summary Judgment are deemed admitted...55. The additional facts contained in the
Memorandum are:
a.

Davidhizer admits that he breached the Agreement.
MOTION IN LIMINE

42.

A trial to determine the amount of damages to be awarded Fisher was scheduled

for August 27, 2007.
43.

On August 23, 2007, Fisher filed a Motion in Limine Re: Fraud and Negligent

Misrepresentation.
44.

On August 24, 2007, the Court granted Davidhizer the right to file a memorandum

in opposition to Fisher's Motion in Limine and continued the trial date.
45.

On September 5,2007, Davidhizer filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in Opposition to Fisher's Motion in Limine Re: Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation.
46.

On April 11, 2008, the Court entered an Order Striking Defendant's

Counterclaim.
47.

The Court found the following facts to be uncontested:
a.

On May 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint commencing this action.

b.

On May 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed an amended verified complaint.

c.

On July 2, 2002, Defendant filed an answer, counterclaim, and demand for

jury trial, Defendant pled as an affirmative defense and counterclaim fraud in the
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inducement in regard to the Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties on or
about February 18,2002, providing for the sale of Office Management Consultants, LC
and a number of therapy tables used for medical treatment.
d.

On April 15,2004, a fourth amended stipulated scheduling order was filed

with the Court.
e.

The Fourth Amended Scheduling Order required that all pleadings shall be

completed on or before September 15,2004.
f

On or about April 19, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment

on plaintiffs cause of action for breach of contract.
g.

On or about April 10, 2006, the Court signed an order granting Plaintiffs

Motion for Summary Judgment for Breach of Contract, finding that Defendant Davidhizer
had breached the Parties' Settlement Agreement.
h.

On or about April 19,2005, Plaintiff filed a separate Motion for Summary

Judgment on Defendant's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud.
i.

On or about April 10, 2006, the Court entered its order granting Plaintiffs

Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Defendant's Affirmative Defense and
Counterclaim of Fraud as to Defendants Dennis McOmber and Robert Nash; and denying
the Plaintiffs Summary Judgment as to Defendant LaVern Davidhizer's Affirmative
Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud, reserving such for trial.
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j.

On June 13,2006, the Court gave notice scheduling a jury trial to begin on

November 27, 2006, with the final pretrial conference to be held on November 7,2006.
k.

On November 21, 2006, the jury trial was cancelled due to a conflict with

the criminal calendar.
1.

On February 19,2007, the Court gave notice of a rescheduled jury trial to

begin August 27, 2007.
m.

On August 23, 2007, the final pre-trial conference was convened at which

Plaintiff filed the Motion in Limine requesting that the Court preclude Defendant from
presenting any claims or defenses asserting fraud in the inducement or from offering any
evidence in support of those claims and defenses on the basis that they had not been
properly plead under URCP 9. In the alternative, Plaintiff requested the Court to strike
Defendant's defenses and counterclaim for fraud in the inducement under URCP
37(b)(2)(B) for failure to comply with the Court's Fourth Amended Scheduling Order.
n.

Defendant made no attempt to amend Defendants' Answer and

Counterclaim or file a motion for leave to amend until August 24, 2007, the last business
day before trial, after Plaintiff filed the Motion in Limine, only then did Defendant file a
Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim.
o.

The only allegations Defendant set forth in his original Answer and

Counterclaim in support of Fraud are as follows:
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1)

(10.).. . based on certainfinancialrepresentations to Davidhizer,

Davidhizer was induced by Fisher to purchase OMC and to enter into the alleged
Settlement Agreement. The representations by Fisher as to the bills and income
of OMC were material to Davidhizer's decision to sign the alleged Settlement
Agreement. Plaintiff Fisher knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
representations being made were false when made. In reasonable reliance thereon,
Davidhizer executed the agreement, which has caused him damages as shall be
proven at trial herein...

(Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, FACTS,

TflO at 5).
2)

(2.) Plaintiffs owe to the Defendants such damages as shall be

proven at trial for the fraudulent inducement to Davidhizer for the DRS tables and
for fraudulent inducement in entering into the alleged Settlement Agreement
based upon misrepresentations of facts, including but not limited to, the assets and
liabilities of OMC (Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, COUNT I-FRAUD.
1J2at7).
3)

(2.) Plaintiff Fisher made representations to the Defendants which

a person of reasonable and prudent care would not have made thereby breaching
his duty of reasonable care to the Defendants. (Defendant's Answer and
Counterclaim, COUNT SD(-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. \2 at 9).
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4)

(3) Based upon said misrepresentations the Defendant Davidhizer

entered into an alleged Settlement Agreement. (Defendant's Answer and
Counterclaim, COUNT SIX-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. %3 at 9).
p.

Defendant cited to various statements in support of fraud in the

inducement taken from the depositions of David Fisher, LaVern Davidhizer, Eugene
Coder, Michael Cutler, M.D., Dennis McOmber, and Robert Nash, together with
statements from the Affidavit of LaVern Davidhizer, which were attached as exhibits to
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine regarding fraud and
negligent misrepresentation.
q.

Defendant's Motion to Amend the Answer and Counterclaim was filed

three years and ten months after the discovery cutoff established in the Fourth Amended
Scheduling Order, and five years, one month after filing Defendant's original Answer and
CouBterclaim.
TRIAL
48.

The remaining issues in the lawsuit were set for trial

49.

On January 13,2009, the parties filed a Stipulated Pretrial Order.

50.

The parties stipulated to the facts regarding the background of the case, the

formation of the business entities and the Agreement as set forth above.
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51.

The Stipulated Pretrial Order provided that at trial the contested issues of fact

would be:
a.

The amount paid by Fisher on the loans.

b.

The amount of interest accrued since February 27,2002.

c.

The value of the tables in Fisher's possession.

d.

Fisher's actions or lack thereof in mitigation of his damages.

e.

Whether Coder, on behalf of Davidhizer, took possession of a computer,
monitor, fax machine, and software including Lytec, Flash Code,
Microsoft Suite 2000, and PC Anywhere.

52.

The Stipulated Pretrial Order further provided that at trial the contested issues of

law would be:
a.

Whether Davidhizer is entitled to offset the value of the equipment in

Fisher's possession.
b.

Whether Davidhizer is entitled to an affirmative defense of failure to

mitigate damages.
c.

Whether Fisher failed to mitigate his damages.

d.

Whether the refinanced interest is a consequential damage.

e.

What is Plaintiffs measure of damages that can earn pre-judgment interest
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as a matter of law.
f.

Whether Plaintiffs attorneys fees, as claimed, are reasonable as a matter

of law.
53.

Trial was held on October 9,2008 and on May 7, 2009.

54.

Davidhizer agreed and the Court finds that he failed to assume the debt to

Anderson.
55.

The principle amount of the Anderson loan on February 18, 2009 is the sum of

$35,000.00.
56.

Since February 18, 2002, Fisher has made interest only payments to Anderson in

the amount of $39,950.00 as follows:
j 2003

Year

Anderson Payment History

2002

3/6/02

$850.00

Year

4/3/02

$850.00

(2003

5/3/02

$850.00

6/6/02

! 1/14/03

$850.00

Anderson Payment History
2/13/03

$850.00

|

3/13/03

$850.00

$850.00

|

4/3/03

$850.00

1

7/10/02

$850.00

J

5/6/03

$850.00

1

8/8/02

$850.00

1

6/5/03

$850.00

1

9/12/02

$850.00

j

7/10/03

$850.00

j

10/14/02

$850.00

j

8/3/03

$850.00

j

11/14/02

$850.00

1

12/13/02

$850.00

j
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1 2004

2005

1 9/10/03

J $850.00

J 10/10/03

J $850.00

11/4/03

1 $850.00

12/5/03

$850.00

1

1/6/04

$850.00

1

2/10/04

$850.00

1

3/3/04

$850.00

1

4/5/04

$850.00

J

5/5/04

$850.00

J

6/9/04

$850.00

1

7/8/04

$850.00

J

8/5/04

$850.00

J

9/10/04

$850.00

1

10/5/04

$850.00

1

11/2/04

$850.00

J

12/6/04

1 $850.00

J

1 $850.00

J

1 1/8/05

J 2005

2006

2/7/05

$850.00

3/8/05

$850.00

4/8/05

$850.00

5/10/05

$850.00

1

6/4/05

$850.00

J

7/8/05

$850.00

|

8/8/05

$850.00

9/2/05

$850.00

10/5/05

$850.00

11/4/05

$850.00

12/7/05

$850.00

1

J 1/11/06

$850.00

|

Total to Anderson

$39,950.00

57.

Each payment to Anderson was made on a specific date.

58.

The Anderson loan became due and Fisher was required to pay the principal

balance of $35,000.00 to Anderson.
59.

Fisher did not have the money to pay Anderson and had to borrow $35,000.00 to
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J

J

pay Anderson.
60.

To pay Anderson, Fisher borrowed $35,000 from Sandale at an interest rate of

20% per annum.
61.

The loan to Fisher from Sandale was a hard money loan.

62.

Fisher could not obtain a conventional loan and his only resource for borrowing

money was a hard money loan.
63.

Fisher had made several loans from Sandale for the purchase of real properties.

64.

Fisher had paid nearly all of the loans back but has not paid the monies borrowed

to pay Anderson.
65.

Fisher had to pay interest to Sandale in the amount of twenty percent (20%>) per

66.

Fisher paid interest to Sandale beginning in 2006, through April 14, 2009, as

annum.

follows:
Year

1 2006

SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY

09/11/06

SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY

$4,832.89 2008

12/10/08

$690.41

2009

01/09/09

$690.96

2007
J 2008

Year

01/17/08

$8,000.00

02/12/09

$782.47

01/31/08

$3,736.42

03/16/09

$598.36

09/08/08

$5,039.99

04/14/09

$805.48

10/07/08

$667.40

Total to Sandale

$26,626.85
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Year

SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY

11/10/08

67.

Year

SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY

$782.47

In addition, because it was a hard money loan, Fisher had to pay to Sandale a loan

origination fee of $1,750.00.
68.

Fisher's loss of the principal amount of $35,000.00 was complete on February 27,

2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not
fulfill the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
69.

The principal amount of $35,000.00 owed to Fisher by Davidhizer was fixed and

definite on February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18, 2002.
70.

Pre-judgment interest on the principal amount of the Anderson loan begins on

February 27, 2002.
71.

Fisher's loss of the payments to Anderson and Sandale was complete, fixed, and

definite on the date that Fisher made the payment.
72.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Anderson and to Sandale, and the

loan fee is due from the date on which each payment was made.
73.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Anderson and to Sandale, and the

loan fee has been calculated from the date of each payment through May 30, 2009.
74.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the principal amount
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of $35,000.00 is the sum of $25,257.53 through May 30, 2009.
75.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the payments to

Anderson is the sum of $21,266.53 through May 30,2009.
76.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the payments to

Sandale is the sum of $3,298.16 through May 30, 2009.
77.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the loan fees to

Sandale is the sum of $1,262.88 through May 30,2009.
78.

The total amount of pre-judgment interest due is the sum of $51,085.10 through

May 30,2009.
79.

The total amount due on the Anderson loan through May 30,2009, including the

principal amount, the payments made to Anderson and Sandale, and the pre-judgment interest, is
the sum of $154,411.95 through May 30,2009.
80.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) from

May 30,2002 to the date judgment is entered on the principal amount, payments made to
Anderson, payments made to Sandale, and payment of the loan fees.
81.

Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments

to Anderson or Sandale..
82.

Davidhizer admits and the Court finds that he did not assume and pay the GMAC

loan.
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83.

The principal amount of the GMAC loan on February 18,2002 is the sum of

$60,00084.

Fisher made payments to GMAC in the sum of $4,368.70 as follows:
Year
(2002

1

85.

GMAC PAYMENT HISTORY

03/13/02

$624.10 J

04/12/02

$624.10 1

05/14/02

$624.10 1

06/09/02

$624.10 J

07/12/02

$624.10 1

08/13/02 |

$624.10 J

19/19/02

$624.10 (

Total to GMAC

$4,368.70

The GMAC loan became due and Fisher did not have the *nonies to pay the

$60,000-00.
86.

In order to pay the GMAC principal amount of $60,000.00, Fisher borrowed

money from Barton.
07.

Fisher made interest payments to Barton in the sum of $20,291.50 as follows:

(See Exhibit 41, at 002)
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Year
1 2002

[2003

2004

2005

88.

Barton Payment History

1 11/4/05

$332.65

9/16/02

$332.65

1 12/2/05

$332.65

10/1/02

$332.65

1/11/06

$332.65

11/20/02

$665.30

2/6/06

$332.65

1/15/03

$665.30

1

3/7/06

$332.65

4/7/03

$665.30

1

4/5/06

$332.65

6/12/03

$665.30

J

5/5/06

$332.65

|

9/23/03

$1,330.60

1

6/9/06

$332.65

1

11/20/03

$665.30

1

7/5/06

$332.65

|

J 1/9/04

$332.65

|

8/3/06

$332.65

1

14/5/04

$997.95

1

9/12/06

$332.65

|

10/8/06

$332.65

1

11/17/06

$665.30

1/16/07

$665.30

3/8/07

$665.30

|

6/5/07

$665.30

1

7/9/07

$665.30

1

9/19/07

$332.65

1

$20,291.50

J

1 2006

6/18/04

$665.30

8/5/04

$665.30

9/21/04

$665.30

11/2/04

$332.65

12/1/04

$332.65

1

2/4/05

$665.30

1

4/8/05

$665.30

1

10/3/05

$1,995.90

J

[2007

Total to Barton

Fisher could not make the principal payment to Barton and had to borrow monies
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from Sandale to pay Barton
89.

The loan from Sandale is a hard money loan.

90.

Fisher's loan from Sandale being a hard money loan, Fisher had to pay loan

origination fees of $2,500.00
91.

Fisher had to pay interest to Sandale on the principal amount and on the

origination fee in the amount of twenty percent (20%) per annum.
92.

Fisher made interest payments to Sandale in the total sum of $17,293,15 as

follows: (See Exhibit 41, at 020)
Yeax 1 SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY
j 2008

03/10/08 1
04/03/08

2009

$4,043.84
$821.92 1

07/05/08

$3,419.19 |

10/07/08

$2,761.64 1

11/10/08

$1,117.81 1

12/10/08

$986.30

01/09/09

$986.30 J

02/12/09

$1,117.81

03/16/09

$887.67 1

04/14/09

$1,150.68 1

Total to Sandale
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$17,293.16

93.

Fisher's loss of the principal amount of $60,000.00 was complete on February 27,

2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not
fulfill the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
93 .a. The principal amount of $60,000.00 owed to Fisher by Davidhizer wasfixedand
definite on February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18, 2002.
93.b. Pre-judgment interest on the principal amount of the GMAC loan begins on
February 27,2002.
94.

Fisher's loss of the payments to GMAC, Barton, Sandale, and the loan fee paid to

Sandale were complete, fixed, and definite on the date that Fisher made the payment.
95.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to GMAC, Barton, Sandale, and the

loan fee paid to Sandale is due from the date on which each payment was made.
96.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to GMAC, Barton, and to Sandale, and

the loan fee is calculated from the date of each payment through May 30,2009.
97.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the principal amount

of $60,000.00 is the sum of $43,298.63 through May 30,2009.
98.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the payments to

GMAC is the sum of $2,897.70 through May 30, 2009.
99.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the payments to

Barton is the sum of $8,770.83 through May 30, 2009.
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100.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the payments to

Sandale is the sum of $1,174.06 through May 30,2009.
101.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the loan fees is the

sum of $373.97 through May 30,2009.
102.

The total amount of pre-judgment interest due is the sum of $56,515.19 through

May 30,2009.
103.

The total amount due on the GMAC loan through May 30, 2009, including the

principal amount, the interest payments to GMAC, Barton and Sandale, and pre-judgment
interest, is the sum of $160,968.54 through May 30,2009.
104.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) from

May 30,2009 to the date judgment is entered on the principal amount, on the payments to
GMAC, on the payments to Barton, on the payments to Sandale and on the payment of the loan
fees to Sandale.
105.

Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments

to GMAC, to Barton, or to Sandale.
106.

Davidhizer admits and the Court finds that he has not assumed or paid the Far

West Loan.
107.

The principal amount of the Far West loan as of February 18, 2002, is the sum of

$40,000.00.
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108.

Fisher made payments to Far West in the sum of $34,511.84 as follows: (See

Exhibit 41, at 046)
Far West Payment History j

Year

|

10/3/05

$1,000.00

2/2/02

$795.61

10/24/05

$1,000.00 j

1

6/19/02

$722.55 j

12/5/05

$500.00

1

7/26/02

$721.60 1 1 2006

1/10/06

$1,000.00 |

|

2/5/03

$762,342 1

3/6/06

$500.00 j

4/22/03

$764.38 j

4/6/06

$500.00 j

7/29/03

$772.88 1

5/8/06

$500.00 1

10/15/03

$820.01 1

6/9/06

$500.00 j

(2002
j

J 2003

J 2004

1 2005

5/11/04

$1,693.96 j

7/12/06

$500.00 j

6/15/04

$450.01 j

8/8/06

$500.00 j

7/28/04

$704.93 j

9/6/06

$500.00 1

10/25/04

$480.07 j

9/26/06

$500.00 1

11/10/04

$480.07 j

11/7/06

$500.00 j

12/7/04

$480.07 j

12/12/06

$500.00 1

1/19/05

$480.07 j 1 2007

1/16/07

$500.00 |

2/7/05

$480.07 1

2/13/07

$500.00 1

3/31/05 1

$984.14 J

2/27/07 i

$500.00 1

5/26/05 j

$480.07 j

5/14/07

$500.00 1

6/15/05 1

$550.00 1

7/9/07

$1,000.00 1

7/11/05 j

$434.13 j

8/15/07

$500.00 j

8/10/05 j

$480.07 1

10/4/07

$500.00 1
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[2008

11/14/07

$500.00

05/01/08

$500.00

11/2907

$500.00

05/19/08

$500.00 1

01/10/08

$500.00

07/21/08

$500.00 J

02/12/08

$500.00

08/20/08

$200.00 J

03/11/08

$500.00 J

09/12/08

$500.00 J

03/31/08

$500.00

10/10/08

$500.00

11/05/08

$500.00

12/19/08

$500.00

01/13/09

$500.00

02/23/09

$274.82

03/13/09

$500.00 1

04/17/09

$500.00 J

!

| 2009

Total to Far West

109.

$34,511.84 1

The amount of payments made by Fisher can be determined with a reasonable

certainty.
110.

Fisher's loss of the principal amount of $40,000.00 was complete on February 27,

2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not
fulfill the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
111.

The principal amount of $40,000.00 owed to Fisher by Davidhizer wasfixedand
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definite on February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18, 2002.
112.

Pre-judgment interest on the principal amount of the Far West Bank Loan begins

on February 27, 2002.
113.

Fisher's loss of the payments to Far West Bank were complete, fixed, and definite

on the date that Fisher made the payment.
114.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Far West Bank is due from the date

on which each payment was made.
115.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Far West Bank is calculated from

the date of each payment through May 30, 2009.
116.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the principal amount

of $40,000.00 is the sum of $28,865.75 through May 30,2009.
117.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the payments to Far

West Bank is the sum of $11,904.34 through May 30, 2009.
118.

The total amount due on the Far West Bank loan through May 30, 2009, including

the principal amount and pre-judgment interest, is the sum of $115,281.93 through May 30,
2009.
119.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the principal amount and the

payments made to Fax West Bank from May 30, 2009 to the date that judgment is entered.
120.

Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments
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to Far West Bank.
121.

Davidhizer admits and the Court finds that he did not assume and pay the

payments to Eaglecrest for the lease of the office space.
122.

The payments made by Fisher to Eaglecrest is the sum of $18,676.36, as follows:

(See Exhibit 41, at 081)
Year EAGLECREST PAYMENT HISTORY

Year ! EAGLECREST PAYMENT HISTORY
1 2002

2003

1
123.

03/21/02

$1,000.00

04/15/02

01/16/04

$1,200.00

$800.00

04/22/04

$1,000.00

06/24/02

$800.00

08/19/04

$526.36

08/02/02

$900.00

08/19/04

$1,350.00 1

08/30/02

$800.00

01/13/05

$2,100.00 J

11/27/02

$1,800.00

10/25/05

$2,267.73 1

01/28/03

$1,000.00

10/25/05

$1,732.27 1

Total to Eagle Crest

$18,676.36 1

05/20/03

$600.00 |

10/06/03

800.00

2004

2005

The amount of payments made by Fisher can be determined with a reasonable

certainty.
124.

Fisher's loss of the payments to Eagle Crest in the amount of $18,676.36 was

complete on the date that each payment was made.
125.

Fisher's loss of the payments to Eagle Crest were complete, fixed, and definite on
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the date that Fisher made the payment.
126.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Eagle Crest is duefromthe date on

which each payment was made.
127.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Eagle Crest is calculated from the

date of each payment through May 30, 2009.
128.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the payments to

Eagle Crest is the sum of $9,913.03 through May 30, 2009.
129.

The total amount due on the Eagle Crest Building lease through May 30, 2009, is

the sum of $28,590.03 through May 30, 2009.
130.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) from

May 30,2009 to the date judgment is entered.
131.

Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments

to Eagle Crest.
132.

Davidhizer admits and the Court finds that he did not assume or pay the North

American Medical loan.
133.

The principal amount of the North American Medical loan as of February 18,

2002 is the sum of $45,000.00
134.

Fisher made payments to North American Medical in the sum of $4,387.50 as

follows: (See Exhibit 41, at 109)
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Year

1 2002

1 2003

135.

NORTH AMERICAN MEDICAL
PAYMENT HISTORY

04/15/02

$1,012.50

06/27/02

$675.00 ]

01/28/03

$2,025.00 1

06/13/03

$675.00

Total

$4,387.50

The amount of payments made by Fisher on the loans to North American Medical

can be determined with a reasonable certainty.
136.

Fisher's loss of the principal amount of $45,000.00 was complete on February 27,

2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not
fulfill the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
137.

The principal amount of $45,000.00 owed to Fisher by Davidhizer was fixed and

definite on February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18,2002.
138.

Pre-j udgment interest on the principal amount of the North American Medical

Loan begins on February 27,2002.
139.

Fisher's loss of the payments to North American Medical were complete, fixed,

and definite on the date that Fisher made the payment.
140.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to North American Medical is due

from the date on which each payment was made.
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141.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments to North American Medical is

calculated from the date of each payment through May 30,2009.
142.

Pre-judgment interest on the principal amount at ton percent (10 %) is the sum of

$32,473,967 through May 30,2009.
143.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the payments to

North American Medical is the sum of $2,849.60.03 through May 30,2009.
144.

The total amount due on the North American Medical through May 30,2009, is

the sum of $84,711.07 through May 30, 2009.
145.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the principal balance and the

payments made to North American Medical in the amount often percent (10%) per annum from
May 30, 2009 to the date judgment is entered.
146.

Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments

to North American Medical.
147.

But for the breach of the contract by Davidhizer, Fisher would not have had to pay

the interest payments on the Anderson, GMAC, Far West, and North American Medical loans.
148.

But for the breach of the contract by Davidhizer, Fisher would not have had to pay

the payments to Eagle Crest.
149.

But for the breach of the contract by Davidhizer, Fisher would not have had to

borrow monies from Barton and Sandale to make payments on the Anderson and GMAC loans.
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150.

Davidhizer admitted and the Court finds thai it was foreseeable at ihe ikne that the

parties contracted that if Davidhizer did not fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract that
Fisher would have to pay the principal amounts owed on the loans and to make payments on the
loans and payments to Eagle Crest.
151.

Fisher is entitled to recover from Davidhizer the amount of payments that he made

on the loans and to Eagle Crest and is entitled to pre-judgment interest on those payments.
152.

Fisher paid the following expenses to continue the operation of OMC after

Davidhizer breached the Agreement. (See Exhibit 41, at 148)
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Year

1

OPERATING EXPENSES AFTER

|
02/18/02

2002

J Year

2/18/02
Qwest

OPERATING EXPENSES AFTER 2/18/02

$38.60 [2002 1 05/03/02 St. George City

$143.53

1 05/17/02 Office Supplies

J 02/26/02 Nextel

J $144.12

1 03/01/02 [Rent

1 $900.00

06/01/02

Rent

$900.00 j

1 03/04/02 Coder Wages 1 $113.49

06707/02

St. George City

$131.30 J

1 03/25/02 Counterchecks

$1.00

07/01/02

Rent

$900.00 j

$67.88

07/03/02

St. George City

$136.86 J

| 03/26/02 Qwest

$131.56

08/01/02

Rent

$900.00 j

:

03/26/02 Nextel

$380.86

08/17/02

St. George City

$213.25 1

04/01/02

Rent

$900.00

09/01/02

Rent •

$900.00 1

04/16/02

Postage

$34.00

09/06/02

St. George City

$189.49

04/18/02

Counter Checks

$1.00

10/01/02

Rent

$900.00 1

04/18/02

St. George City

$126.26 |

10/03/02

St. George City

$195.40 1

05/01/02

Rent

$900.00 1

11/01/02 , Rent

11/15/02

St. George City

$173.34 1 2003

03/05/03

St. George City

$136.13 j

12/01/02

Rent

$900.00 j 2004

03/04/04

Accounting Fees

$185.00 1

12/09/02

St. George City

$145.65 1

08/18/04

Counter Checks

j

$900.00 j 2005 1 01/20/05

Accounting Fees

]

$155.48 j

01/13/06

Accounting Fees

$100.00 1

J $900.00 1

12/15/06

Accounting Fees

$100.00 1

$144.07 j

Total

03/26/02

MCI

1 2003 J01/01/03 1Rent
01/10/03 1St. George City
02/01/03 J Rent

02/14/03 1St. George City
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$252.24

$900.00 |

$1.00 j

$100.00 1

$14,346.51 1

153.

But for the breach of the Agreement by Davidhizer, Fisher would not have had to

pay the operating expenses of OMC.
154.

Davidhizer admitted and the Court finds that it was foreseeable at the time that the

parties contracted that if Davidhizer did not fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract that
Fisher would have to pay the operational expenses of OMC after February 18,2002.
155.

The amount of money earned by OMC was deducted from the expenses and the

amount of $14,346.51 represents the expenses that were not paid because there was insufficient
income to pay them.
156.

The amount of payments made by Fisher can be determined with a reasonable

certainty.
157.

Fisher's loss of the payments for expenses were complete, fixed, and definite on

the date that Fisher made the payment.
158.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments for operating expenses is due from the

date on which each payment was made.
159.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) from

the date the expense was made to the date judgment is entered.
160.

The Agreement provides that "if any party brings any legal action to enforce the

terms of this agreement, the prevailing party shall be paid reasonable attorneys fees and costs."
161.

Fisher is the prevailing party.
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162.

Fisher has presented affidavits of attorneys fees (see Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 21

(Supplemental Affidavait -Ronnow 12/15/08) and affidavits presented at the 5/7/09 hearing
(Supplemental Affidavit-Darwin Fisher, Corrected Affidavit - William D. Ronnow))
163.

The affidavits set forth the legal work that was actually performed.

164.

The legal work set forth by the affidavits was reasonably necessary to adequately

prosecute Fisher's causes of action against Davidhizer and performed in defending against
Davidhizers' defenses and counterclaims.
165.

The attorneys' billing rate set forth in the affidavits are consistent with the rates

customarily charged in Washington County, State of Utah.
166.

Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence that the legal work performed was

not actually performed in prosecuting Fisher's causes of action against Davidhizer and performed
in defending against Davidhizers' defenses and counterclaims, and was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute this lawsuit.
167.

Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence that the attorneys' billing rates are

inconsistent with the rates customarily charged in Washington County, State of Utah.
168.

Fisher has expended or has incurred the sum of $200,253.61 for attorneys fees

and the sum of $12,087.60 for costs. (See Exhibit 41, at 098, and affidavits [Exh 3, 4, 5, 21 and
affidavits presented in trial and filed May 7, 2009.])
169.

Fisher has paid attorneys fees and costs in the sum of $ 133,762,06. (See Exhibit
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41, at 098)
170.

The amount Fisher paid for attorney fees and costs can be determined with a

reasonable certainty.
171.

Fisher's loss for the payments for attorney fees and costs were complete, fixed,

and definite on the date that Fisher made the payment.
172.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments for attorney fees and costs is due from

the date on which each payment was made.
173.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) from

the date on which payment for attorney fees and/or costs was made to the date judgment is
entered.
174.

Pre-judgment interest calculated at the rate often percent (10%) per annum from

the date on which each payment was made through May 30,2009, is the sum of $49,160.23. (See
Exhibit 41, at 098)
175.

The total amount of attorney fees and costs including pre-judgment interest

through May 30, 2009, is the sum of $261,501.44. (See Exhibit 41, at 098 and affidavits)
176.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the payments made for attorney fees

and costs at the rate often percent (10%) per annum from May 30, 2009 to the date judgment is
entered..
177.

Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence to meet the requisite burden of
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proof that he is entitled to an offset or mitigation of damages.
178.

Fisher continued to operate OMC on a full time basis for approximately one year

after the breach of the contract by Davidhizer.
179.

Fisher placed into OMC more than $246,000.00 to pay the loans, to pay Eagle-

Crest, and to pay the operating expenses of OMC that Davidhizer was to assume and pay.
180.

After February 18, 2002, Fisher continued efforts to place the DRS tables.

181.

Davidhizer, on approximately April 11, 2002, took one of the DRS tables,

depriving" Fisher of the income from that table to use in paying the loans, Eagle Crest, and the
operating expenses.
182.

Davidhizer took the table, and with Gene Coder and Dennis McOmber started a

new business which deprived Fisher of income to pay the loans as found above.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Breach of Contract
1.

The parties entered into a written Agreement on February 18, 2002.

2.

Fisher performed each and every term and condition required of him under the

agreement.
3.

Davidhizer breached the contract by failing to assume and pay the loans, by failing

to pay Eagle Crest, by failing to assume the operation of OMC, and by failing to pay the debts of
OMC after February 18, 2002.
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4.

As a direct iesult of Davidhizer's breach of ihe contract, Fisher has been damaged.

5.

But for Davidhizer's breach of the Agreement, Fisher would not have to pay the

principal amount of the loans.
6.

But for Davidhizer's breach of the Agreement, Fisher would not have had to make

payments on the loans, or make payments to Eagle Crest, or pay the operational expenses.
7.

But for Davidhizer's breach of the Agreement, Fisher would not have had to borrow

money to pay the principal balances on some of the loans.
8.

The payments made on the loans, to Eagle Crest, and on the operational expenses are

consequential damages
9.

Fisher is entitled to judgment against Davidhizer for the payments he made on the

loans, to Eagle Crest and on the operational expenses.
10.

The amount of payments made by Fisher can be determined with a reasonable

certainty.
11.

Fisher's loss of the principal amounts of the loans was complete on February 27,

2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not fulfill
the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
12.

The principal amounts owed to Fisher by Davidhizer was fixed and definite on

February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18,2002.
13.

Pre-judgment interest on the principal amounts of the of the loans begins on February
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27,2002.
14.

Fisher's loss of the payments on the loans, Eagle Crest, attorney fees and costs, and

the operating expenses were complete,fixed,and definite on the date that Fisher made the payment.
15.

The pre-judgment interest on the payments is due from the date on which each

payment was made.
16.

Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the principal amount of the loans, on the

payments to Eagle Crest, on payments on the loans including payments of interest, on the payments
for attorney fees and costs, and on payments for operating expenses.
17.

The Agreement provides that "if any party brings any legal action to enforce the terms

of this agreement, the prevailing party shall be paid reasonable attorneys fees and costs."
18.

Fisher is the prevailing party.

19.

The legal work set forth in the attorney's affidavits was reasonably necessary to

adequately prosecute Fisher's causes of action against Davidhizer and reasonably necessary in
defending against Davidhizers' defenses and counterclaims.
20.

The attorneys' billing rates set forth in the affidavits are consistent with the rates

customarily charged in Washington County, State of Utah.
21.

Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence that the legal work performed was not

actually performed in prosecuting Fisher's causes of action against Davidhizer and performed in
defending against Davidhizers' defenses and counterclaims, and was reasonably necessary to
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adequately prosecute this lawsuit.
22.

Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence that the attorneys3 billing rates are

inconsistent with the rates customarily charged in Washington County, State of Utah.
Motion ia Limine
23.

URCP 9(b) requires, "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
24.

Defendant's cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is a form offraudunder

Utah law and must also meet the particularity requirement of URCP 9(b); therefore, Defendant's
allegations of fraud or negligent misrepresentation must be plead with particularity.
25.

The general rule that allegations in a complaint should be construed liberally does not

apply to allegations in actions for fraud.
26.

In order for Defendant5 s allegations offraudto satisfy URCP 9, Defendant must state

with particularity the circumstances supporting each of the elements of fraud for each and every
allegation.
27.

Under Utah law, there are nine such common law elements of fraud: (i) a

representation; (ii) concerning a presently existing fact; (iii) which was false; (iv) which the
representer either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (v) for the purpose of inducing the other party
to act upon it; (vi) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (vii) did in
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fact rely upon it; (viii) and was thereby induced to act; and (ix) to his injury and damage.
28.

Defendant failed to state with particularity in the Answer and Counterclaim the

specific circumstances supporting each of the elements offraudunder Utah law, and failed to either
plead or proffer any allegation of fraudulent misstatements or conduct with sufficient particularity
as required under URCP 9 (b) as to the time, place, content, and manner of Plaintiff s alleged material
misrepresentations or other fraudulent conduct.
29.

Additionally, Defendant failed to proffer any evidence which, if accepted as true,

would clearly and convincingly support each element of afraudclaim against Plaintiff. Specifically,
the statements offered in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine taken from
various depositions and Defendant's affidavit are not sufficiently specific to meet the URCP 9(b)
requirement. Even applying the standard urged by Defendant, that he need only provide the Court
"with evidence which, if accepted by the trier of fact as true, would meet the clear and convincing
standard required to establish a fraud claim", see, Republic Grp. Inc. v. Won~Door Corp., 883 P.2d
285,292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); and assuming the statements abstracted from various depositions and
Defendant's affidavit as true, they do not meet the clear and convincing standard required to prove
fraud. Taken in total, the statements urged by Defendant are ambiguous and contradictory and
therefore cannot sustain the clear and convincing burden of proof.
30.

Defendant also failed to state with particularity in his Answer and Counterclaim any

misrepresentations which Defendant alleges Plaintiff negligently made or failed to make when they
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had a duly to do so.
31.

Defendant's Motion to Amend filed just three days prior to trial, more thanfiveyears

after filing Defendant's original Answer and Counterclaim, and more than three years after the
discovery cutoff established by the Court in the Fourth Amended Scheduling Order, is untimely.
32.

Defendant failed to demonstrate any valid reason for the considerable delay in

requesting leave to amend the Answer and Counterclaim and the untimely filing.
3 3.

Requiring Plaintiff to address an amended counterclaim after more thanfiveyears of

litigation, including an extensive discovery and motion phase, would be unreasonably prejudicial to
the Plaintiff.
34.

Defendant's failure to amend the Answer and Counterclaim, orfilea motion for leave

to amend prior to the motion cutoff date in compliance with the Court's Fourth Amended Scheduling
Order; and Defendant's failure to properly frame the allegations of fraud, are subject to sanctions
under Rule 3 7 for failure to comply with the Scheduling Order; and under URCP 16 pursuant to the
Court's authority to form and simplify issues and eliminate frivolous claims and defenses.
35.

Whether the violation of a scheduling order warrants sanctions in thefirstplace, and

the appropriate sanctions to follow, are clearly within the Court's discretion to invoke in the pretrial
heaiing pursuant to URCP 16.
36.

The sanctions provided under UCRP 37 apply and are appropriate in these

circumstances, including an order refusing to allow the noncompliant party to support or oppose
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designated claims or defenses, or striking and dismissing the noncompliant party's counterclaim.
37.

Fisher did not fail to mitigate his damages.

38.

Davidhizer is not entitled to an offset for the tables.
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The court accepts the calculation of damages prepared by Fisher.
JUDGMENT

40.

Fisher is entitled to judgment against Davidhizer including interest through May 3 0,

2009, in the total sum of $819,811.47, as follows:
a.

For the Anderson loan in the sum of $ 154,411.95;

b.

For the GMAC loan in the sum of $160,968.54;

c.

For the Farwest Bank loan in the sum of $115,281.93;

d.

For the payments to Eagle Crest in the sum of $28,590.03;

e.

For the North American Medical loan in the sum of $84,711.07;

f.

For attorney fees and costs in the sum of $261,501.44;

g.

For operating expenses in the sum of $14,346.51. (See Exhibit 41, at 001)

Dated this 28th day of July, 2009.
By the Court:

JAMES L. SHUMATE
DISTRICT JUDGE
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
N.D. California.
Eniko PRAKASH, Plaintiff,
v.
PULSENT CORPORATION EMPLOYEE LONG
TERM DISABILITY PLAN, Defendant.
Sun Life Financial and Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Real Parties in Interest.
No. C-06-7592 SC.
Aug. 20, 2008.
Laurence Fred Padway, Law Offices of Laurence F.
Padway, Alameda, CA, for Plaintiff.
Kathleen Elizabeth Hackett, John Russell Stedman,
Travis Richard Wall, Barger & Wolen LLP, San
Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES; DENYING MOTION TO
STRIKE JURY DEMAND
SAMUEL CONT1, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION
*1 Real Party in Interest and Counterclaimant Sun
Life Assurance of Canada (aSun Life") moves to
strike the affirmative defenses and jury demand
filed by Plaintiffs Eniko and Adityo Prakash. Docket Nos. 203 ("Jury Mot."), 206 ("Defenses Mot.").
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim-Defendants Eniko
Prakash and Adityo Prakash ("Plaintiffs" or
"Prakashes") opposed both motions, and Sun Life
replied. Docket Nos. 227 ("Defenses Opp'n"), 229
("Jury Opp 'n"), 231 ("Jury Reply"), 232
("Defenses Reply"). Having considered all of the
parties' submissions, the Court GRANTS Sun Life's
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Affirmative Defenses

and DENIES Sun Life's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
Jury Demand.
II. BACKGROUND
The basic facts underlying this case are known to
all involved. Therefore, the Court only addresses
here the procedural background relevant to the
pending motions.
Sun Life filed its Answer and Counterclaim (the
"Counterclaim") on February 26, 2007. Docket No.
8. Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the Counterclaim on April 10, 2007. Docket No. 16. The Court
denied that motion on June 28, 2007. Docket No.
28. Trial was scheduled for April 7, 2008. Nine
months after the Court ruled on Plaintiffs' motion to
dismiss the Counterclaims, and less than three
weeks before trial was set to start, the Court informed the parties that it had not received an Answer to Counterclaim from Plaintiffs. Sun Life said
it would object to any Answer filed at that point.
Docket No. 188. On March 24, 2008, Plaintiffs
filed their Answer to Counterclaim and their Demand for Trial by Jury. Docket Nos. 192
("Answer"), 193 ("Jury Demand").
The parties appeared before the Court on March 25.
At that hearing, the Court vacated the trial date, accepted the late filing of the Answer, and ordered
Sun Life to file any motions in response to the Answer and Jury Demand by June 6, 2008. Sun Life
filed the instant motions in a timely manner.

III. AFFIRMA TIVE DEFENSES
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f),
the Court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).
The Court may do this on its own or on a timely
motion filed by a party. Id Sun Life brought this
motion in a timely manner, objecting to each of
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Plaintiffs' five affirmative defenses. The Court considers each objection in turn.

A. First Affirmative Defense: Failure to State a
Claim

The Court therefore strikes Plaintiffs' First Affirmative Defense because it is both legally insufficient
and untimely. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f); Todaro, 755
F.Supp. at 1234; Sands, 902 F.Supp. at 1166-67
(striking Rule 9(b) affirmative defense).

In the First Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs argue
that the Counterclaim "does not state facts sufficient to state a claim for relief ...." Answer at 8. In
their Opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the basis for
this defense is that Sun Life's Counterclaim fails to
meet the particularity requirements and heightened
pleading standards of Rule 9(b). See Defense Opp'n
at 2-6. Plaintiffs spend a good deal of their brief arguing the merits and substance of the Counterclaim.
The merits are not before the Court; rather, the issue at present is whether Plaintiffs should even
have the opportunity to attack the merits. Rule 9(b)
is basis for attacking the pleading, not an affirmative defense on which Plaintiffs will offer evidence
at trial. See SEC v. Sands, 902 F.Supp. 1149,
1166-67, (C.D.Cal.1995). As an affirmative defense, it is therefore legally insufficient.

C. Third Affirmative
Pulsent

*2 To the extent failure to plead fraud with specificity could be an affirmative defense, Plaintiffs
did not assert this defense in a timely manner.
Plaintiffs previously filed a motion to dismiss the
Counterclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), but did not
raise the specificity issue at that time. By waiting
until after they filed both a Rule 12 motion and a
summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs waived their
objections under Rule 9(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(h)(1); Todaro v. Orbit Int'l Travel, Ltd, 755
F.Supp. 1229, 1234 (S.D.N.Y.1991); United Nat'l
Records, Inc. v. MCA, Inc. ., 609 F.Supp. 33, 39
(N.D.I11.1984) (Rule 12(h)(1) waiver provisions apply to Rule 9(b) motion). The purpose of Rule 9(b)
is to assure that defendants are apprised of the allegations against them in sufficient detail to frame
an adequate responsive pleading. See Todaro, 755
F.Supp. at 1234. Where, as here, Plaintiffs have extensively litigated the Counterclaim, any concern
that they did not adequately understand the allegations against them is unwarranted.

In the Third Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs argue
that Sun Life failed to join an essential party, Defendant Pulsent Corporation Employee Long Term
Disability Plan ("Pulsent"). Answer at 9. Plaintiffs
argue that because Sun Life is not an ERISA benefit plan, but rather the insurer of such a plan, Sun
Life cannot have been the victim of fraud, and
therefore cannot sue Plaintiffs for fraud. See Defenses Opp57Dn at 7-8. Plaintiffs rely on Ford v.
MCI Communications Corp. Health & Welfare
Plan, 399 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.2005). Under Ford, an
individual beneficiary may not bring an ERISA
claim against the insurer of a benefits plan, even
where the insurer has discretionary control over the
plan. Id. at 1081-82. Whether or not Plaintiffs could
have sued Sun Life for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA is entirely irrelevant to whether Sun
Life was defrauded by Plaintiffs. Sun Life did not
bring its fraud claim under ERISA and ERISA does
not govern the claim. See Docket No. 28. The Third
Affirmative Defense is therefore legally insuffi-
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B. Second Affirmative Defense: ERISA Preemption
In the Second Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs argue
that the Counterclaim is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Answer at 9.
The Court previously rejected this exact argument
in ruling on Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the Counterclaim. See Docket No. 28. The Court therefore
strikes the Second Affirmative Defense because it
is legally insufficient
and redundant. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f); Sands, 902 F.Supp. at 1166-67.

Defense: Failure to Join
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*3 Additionally, Plaintiffs previously stipulated that
Pulsent's involvement in this case is unnecessary. In
the early stages of this litigation, Plaintiffs agreed
that Pulsent "need not be served, file an appearance
in this action, or actively participate in this action
in any way ...." See Docket No. 19. Plaintiffs now
claim that the foregoing stipulation had "nothing to
do" with the Counterclaim. Defenses Opp'n at 8.
However, the parties reached this agreement after
Sun Life had filed the Counterclaim and after
Plaintiffs had filed their motion to dismiss, so
Plaintiffs' claim rings hollow.
The Court therefore strikes the Third Affirmative
Defense because it is both legally insufficient and
contrary to Plaintiffs' previous stipulation and admission. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).
D. Fourth Affirmative Defense: Failure to Allege
Lack of Knowledge and Reliance
In the Fourth Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs argue
that Sun Life failed to plead that Pulsent was unaware of the true facts and failed to plead that
Pulsent relied on the allegedly false representations.
See Answer at 8. This is essentially a repetition of
the Third Affirmative Defense, and is equally meritless. Even if, as Plaintiffs allege, the payments
Sun Life made to Plaintiffs were made on Pulsent's
behalf, see Answer at 9, that is not a reason why
Sun Life cannot recover. Sun Life is not suing on
the grounds that Pulsent was injured, or otherwise
trying to recover for Pulsent's injury. The Counterclaim clearly alleges that Plaintiffs knowingly made
false representations directly to Sun Life with the
intention of defrauding Sun Life, and that Sun Life
itself justifiably relied on those misrepresentations
to its detriment. See Counterclaim 1ffl 24-52. What's
more, Plaintiff has alleged from the outset that Sun
Life made all decisions for Pulsent regarding disability benefits, so Sun Life would have been the one
to rely on any statements from Plaintiffs. See Compl. Tf 3. Sun Life is suing on its own behalf. Wheth-
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er it can carry its burden of proving its claims will
be decided at trial, but its failure to allege that
Pulsent was defrauded is immaterial.
The Court therefore strikes the Fourth Affirmative
defense because it is both redundant and immaterial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).
E. Fifth Affirmative Defense: Breach of Fiduciary
Duty
In the Fifth Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs allege
that Sun Life violated certain provisions of ERISA
requiring a plan to explain its reasons for denying
benefits and to provide a claimant the opportunity
to respond. See Answer at 9. In denying Plaintiffs
the opportunity to respond, Plaintiffs allege, Sun
Life violated its fiduciary duty. See Defenses Opp'n
at 8-9. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that had Sun Life
followed the mandated procedures, it would have
learned all of the material facts necessary to resolve
this matter, so it should not be allowed to conduct
discovery to support the Counterclaim. See id.
*4 This purported defense lacks any legal foundation. Plaintiffs' sole legal authority, Saffon v. Wells
Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d
863 (9th Cir.2008), does not support their position.
Under Saffon, where a plan administrator fails to
explain its reason for denying benefits, a district
court reviewing that decision should be less deferential to the administrator, and the claimant should
be allowed to present new evidence before the district court. Id. at 873-84. This may be relevant to
the Court's review of the denial of benefits underlying the Complaint in this case, but it is immaterial
to the Counterclaim. Nothing in Saffon suggests
that a plan administrator's failure to provide the opportunity to respond should insulate a claimant
from a charge of fraud.
Plaintiffs' attempts to frame this defense as a discovery issue are also inappropriate. As the docket
makes abundantly clear, discovery in this matter
has been both extensive and contentious. Sun Life
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has propounded numerous discovery requests related to its fraud allegations, many of which have
already been the subject of motion practice before
the Magistrate Judge. If Plaintiffs believed that this
alleged breach of fiduciary duty precluded discovery related to the Counterclaim, they should have
raised it earlier than three weeks before the scheduled trial date.
The Court therefore strikes the Fifth Affirmative
Defense because it is both legally insufficient and
untimely. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f); Sands, 902
F.Supp. at 1166-67.

IV. JURY DEMAND
Sun Life also moves to strike Plaintiffs' Jury Demand. See Jury Mot. On any issue triable by a jury,
a party may demand a jury trial by "serving the other parties with a written demand-which may be included in a pleading-no later than 10 days after the
last pleading directed to the issue is served."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b) (1). "A party waives a jury trial
unless its demand is properly served and filed."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(d).
Sun Life concedes in its moving papers that the last
pleading addressing the issues to be tried by jury in
this matter was Plaintiffs' Answer, filed on March
24, 2008. See Jury Mot. at 3. Plaintiffs filed their
Jury Demand on the same date they filed the Answer. Plaintiffs therefore satisfied the requirement
of Rule 38(b)(1) that they make their demand for
jury trial no later than 10 days after the last pleading was served.
Sun Life argues that because Plaintiffs were delinquent in filing the Answer, they should not be allowed to rely on that filing date to excuse the tardiness of the Jury Demand. See Jury Mot. at 4. According to Sun Life, the Jury Demand should have
been filed no later than 10 days following the deadline for timely filing of the Answer. Id. at 3-4. The
Answer would have been due on or before July 13,
2007, 20 days following the Court's ruling on

Plaintiffs' Rule 12 motion. Therefore, Sun Life
claims that the Jury Demand should have been filed
on or before July 27, 2007.
*5 The authorities on which Sun Life relies are distinguishable. In all but one of those cases, the jury
demand was filed more than 10 days following the
last pleading, so the party had violated Rule
38(b)(1). See, e.g., Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH
Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th
cir.2001); Russ v. Standard Ins. Co., 120 F.3d 988,
989 (9th Cir.1997); Ray a v. Maryatt Indus., 829
F.Supp. 1169, 1170, 1175 (N.D.Cal. 1993). Sun Life
places a great deal of emphasis on Larson v. General Motors Corp., 134 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.1943). In
that case, however, when the plaintiffs did not respond to the defendant's counterclaim within 20
days, plaintiffs were in default under Rule 55(a)
and the clerk set the case for a non-jury trial. Id. at
452. Here, although Plaintiffs went months after the
Court's order on the Rule 12 motion without filing
the Answer, Sun Life never sought entry of default.
Both parties ignored Plaintiffs' failure to file their
Answer for months on end, even as the case approached trial. Only when the Court raised the issue
and gave Plaintiffs leave to file the Answer did Sun
Life complain. During that entire period, the parties
and the Court prepared for a trial that all involved
assumed would include a jury portion. See Docket
Nos. 13, 21, 151, 153. As the Court permitted the
Answer to be filed on March 24, 2008, the simultaneous filing of the Jury Demand was timely under
Rule 38(b) (1). Sun Life's motion to strike the Jury
Demand is therefore DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS
Sun Life's motion to strike Plaintiffs' affirmative
defenses and DENIES Sun Life's motion to strike
Plaintiffs' Jury Demand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
N.D.Cal.,2008.
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